成本效益原则与职业谨慎原则在审计中的应用

提高独立审计质量是审计职业界的一个急待解决的问题。本文从审计技术角度,从审计实践中的职业谨慎原则和成本效益原则的冲突入手,通过对其协调,提出了审计实践中提高审计质量的技术措施。     

比例责任制与连带责任制下审计风险的比较研究

在比例责任制体系下,每一个被告人应负担的责任范围在于他所造成的损害部分。在连带责任制下,每一个被告人要对原告的所有损失负责,比例责任制是根据每个被告人不同的过错程度分摊责任。这样,一个被告人只需要对法院判定下其应该承担的责任部分进行赔偿。本文对比例责任制降低与连带责任制有关的欺诈和审计风险的效力进行了研究。     

桥式抓斗卸船机钢丝绳的损伤分析与改进措施

钢丝绳使用的安全性是人们长期以来一直关心的问题，因铜丝绳的损伤或破断而产生的重大事故时有发生。为了确保使用中钢丝绳的安全运行，分析钢丝绳的损伤原因及改进措施很有必要。在实践的基础上，分析绕绳系统钢丝绳局部损坏的原因，认为除传统的疲劳、磨损及变形外，作用在钢丝绳单位面积上的压力也是钢丝绳损坏的主要因数，从而提出了避免绕绳系统某一段钢丝绳提前损伤的改进措施。     

Management Ownership and Audit Firm Size*

The finance literature identifies two agency problems between managers and outside shareholders. First, there is a divergence‐of‐interests problem as management ownership falls. Second, there is an offsetting entrenchment problem when management ownership increases within intermediate regions of ownership. Agency problems are mitigated through contracting, but contracts are often based on accounting numbers prepared by management. Because accounting numbers must be reliable for contracts to be enforced, agency theory predicts a demand for higher‐quality auditors when agency problems are more severe. However, extant studies find no significant or robust relation between management ownership and audit firm size. In contrast to extant research, this study samples unlisted companies rather than listed companies for two reasons. First, the monitoring value of auditing may be higher in unlisted companies because they are less vulnerable to takeover and they are required to disclose much less nonaccounting information to shareholders. Second, unlisted companies have greater variation in management ownership, which permits more powerful tests of the demand for auditing as ownership varies between 0 percent and 100 percent. Consistent with a divergence‐of‐interests effect, the association between management ownership and audit firm size is found to be significantly negative within low and high regions of management ownership. The association is flatter and slightly positive within intermediate regions of management ownership, suggesting the existence of an opposite entrenchment effect. The negative association and the nonlinearity is consistent with the finance literature and with the predictions of agency theory.     

Toward the Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management——Empirical Evidence from Manufacturing Enterprises Listed in Shanghai Stock Market

Nowadays, earnings management is a hot issue, but most of the researches focus on the incentives of earnings management and few of them refer to the effect of audit quality on earnings management. In this study, we directly examine the effect of external audit quality on earnings management by using discretionary accruals. We find that the discretionary accruals of non-dual audit companies are significantly greater than those of dual audit companies. We also find that clients of non-First Ten auditors intend to report greater discretionary accruals than those of First Ten auditors.     

Environmental regulations and the problem of sustainability: Moving beyond “market failure”

The standard metaphor of market failure is an impediment to the crafting of environmental policy that can escape policy lock in. Sustainability requires a policy process that can avoid this lock in. Sustainability concerns the creation of dynamic human processes that can respond to—indeed anticipate—unanticipated feedback from biological processes.     

论提高注册会计师独立审计质量

独立性是注册会计师审计的灵魂，独立审计质量直接关系到注册会计师行业的生存和发展。     

浅析电算化会计背景下的审计程序

会计电算化是会计发展的必然方向.传统的财务审计在新的条件下就显得很不适应,必须进行修改与完善,一般审计程序可分为准备阶段、实施阶段、审计结论和执行阶段、异议和复审阶段.文中从审计的内容与程序论述了会计电算化中的审计工作.     

《萨班斯-奥克斯利法》对完善我国上市公司审计委员会制度的影响

我国上市公司的审计委员会制度无论在法律规定还是在实践中,都处于初期阶段,有待于成熟和规范.本文通过对《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》中美国较为成熟的审计委员会制度的变革过程及变革成果的认识,在分析我国上市公司审计委员会制度实施环境和存在问题的基础上,对完善我国上市公司审计委员会制度提出合理建议.     

Earnings Behaviour of Financially Distressed Firms: The Role of Institutional Ownership

Using a sample of 859 U.S. bankruptcy-filing firms over the period 1986–2004, we examine the earnings behaviour of managers during the distressed period by looking at sources of abnormal accruals prior to the bankruptcy-filing year. Results show that managers of highly distressed firms shift earnings downwards prior to the bankruptcy filing. We test and provide evidence in support of two potential contributing factors. First, top-level management turnover among distressed firms leads new managers to earnings bath choices during the distressed period. Second, qualified audit opinions exert pressure on managers to follow more conservative earnings behaviour during the distressed period. Evidence is also provided that the management of distressed firms with lower (higher) institutional ownership has greater (lesser) tendency to manage earnings downwards. Results also show that higher institutional ownership mitigates the negative abnormal returns of firms with top management turnover. To the authors' knowledge, this is the first study that attempts to examine whether institutional ownership relates to market reaction in conjunction with a top management turnover or a qualified audit opinion during the distressed period. Prior studies focused on the investigation of earnings management or institutional ownership (separately) during the distressed period, but did not examine if the effect of institutional ownership on earnings behaviour also influences subsequent returns. Thus, the results of this study should be of interest to analysts, standard setters and regulatory bodies since our results show that management turnover, qualified audit opinions and firm governance mechanisms affect the quality of earnings and the level of abnormal returns.