Unobserved firm heterogeneity and the size-exports nexus: Evidence from German panel data

This paper starts from the stylized fact that firm size and exporting tends to be positively related. Using large sets of establishment panel data for three different industries from official statistics, evidence is presented that the familiar picture of an export/sales ratio that increases (at a decreasing rate) with firm size vanishes if unobserved firm heterogeneity is controlled for in a fixed-effects fractional logit regression model. This finding is well in line with the fact that many small firms are “hidden export champions.” JEL no. F10, D21, L60     

预算软约束、企业财务风险与审计定价

本文具体考察在上市公司存在预算软约束的情况下,我国的会计师事务所在审计定价时如何考虑上市公司的财务风险.研究结果表明:①事务所的审计收费与上市公司的负债比率之间呈显著的正相关关系;②在国有上市公司中,预算软约束程度的增加降低了公司的财务风险,因此审计收费与公司负债比率之间的正相关关系有所减弱;③在金融发展水平比较高的地区,预算软约束程度的减轻提高了公司的财务风险,因此审计收费与公司负债比率之间的正相关关系有所增强.这一研究结果说明,我国的会计师事务所在审计定价时不仅考虑了上市公司的财务风险,而且还会根据公司的预算软约束程度对其财务风险进行相应的调整.     

家族企业制度安排演化的博弈分析

家族企业制度安排是保证其持续成长的内在基础,而缺乏系统的制度安排是目前我国家族企业主要弊病之一。本文运用演化博弈论的基本原理分析了家族企业制度安排的演进过程,具体论证了确立家族企业制度安排的必要性。     

环境不确定性、高管任期与企业绿色创新

企业是绿色经济发展的主力军,理解环境不确定下高管异质性如何影响企业绿色创新对于我国加快生态文明建设具有现实意义.本文以2010-2019年中国上市公司为样本,实证检验高管任期对企业绿色创新的影响以及环境不确定性在其中的调节作用.实证结果表明:高管任期和企业绿色创新呈倒U型关系,即当高管任期较短时,高管任期会促进企业进行绿色创新,当高管任期较长时,高管任期会抑制企业进行绿色创新.企业环境不确定性对高管任期和企业绿色创新之间的关系具有正向调节作用,企业环境不确定性会加强高管任期和企业绿色创新的倒U型关系.进一步研究发现,环境不确定性的调节作用仅在国有企业中存在.政策不确定性对高管任期和企业绿色创新之间的关系具有正向调节作用,政策不确定性会加强高管任期和企业绿色创新的倒U型关系,这种调节作用在国有企业和非国有企业中均存在,且在国有企业更为明显.绿色补助对高管任期和企业绿色创新之间的关系具有正向调节作用,绿色补助会加强高管任期和企业绿色创新的倒U型关系,但这种调节作用仅在国有企业中存在.本文研究结论对于高管人事聘任和企业绿色创新具有指导意义.     

新新贸易理论及其进展

21世纪初诞生的新新贸易理论突破了新古典贸易理论和新贸易理论以产业为对象的研究范畴,将分析变量进一步细化到企业,以异质企业的贸易投资作为研究重点.企业异质性有两种形式,由于产业内部不同企业生产率的差异而产生的异质性以及企业组织形式差异而产生的异质性,这两种异质性紧密相连.新新贸易理论通过异质企业贸易模型的建立,阐明了现实中只有部分企业选择出口和对外直接投资的原因;通过企业内生边界模型的建立和拓展,将产业组织理论和契约理论的概念融入贸易模型,很好地解释了公司内贸易模式,并在企业全球化生产研究领域进行了理论创新.     

林权制度改革对林地经营模式影响分析——江西省林权改革调查报告

介绍了江西省林权改革第一阶段明晰产权工作的主要做法,并运用实地调研的数据分析了林权改革的实施对自留山、责任山、集体山的林地经营模式产生的影响。通过分析发现,自留山和责任山的经营模式在林改前后没有发生大的变化,几乎不受林权改革影响;而集体山林的经营模式受林改的影响较大,林改之后股份合作、承包、转让等模式逐渐取代了集体统一经营的模式成为集体山林经营的重要模式;提出了江西省林权改革工作存在的不足之处及改进的建议。     

Board size,corporate regulations and firm valuation in an emerging market: a simultaneous equation approach

We investigate the association between board size and firm valuation for a sample of 169 firms from 2002 to 2011 in South Africa (SA). The SA corporate context is interestingly and uniquely characterised by an urgency to meet affirmative action regulations, such as black empowerment in board appointments, limited qualified and experienced directors, especially black directors, concentrated ownership, weak enforcement of corporate regulations and greater government ownership. These features make SA corporate boards perform a weaker agency (advisory, monitoring and disciplining) role than Western European and US boards, but a stronger resource dependence role, by providing access to resources, such as business contacts and contracts. This suggests that any positive impact of board size on firm valuation is likely to depend on the effective execution of the resource dependence role more than the agency role. Our results suggest that board size has a positive association with firm valuation, consistent with larger boards providing better access to resources. Overall, our results support the resource dependence role of boards more than their agency role. The results are robust across a raft of econometric models that control for different types of endogeneity, as well as different types of accounting and market-based firm valuation measures.     

INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR,CORPORATE CONTROL,AND PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL: EVIDENCE FROM A SURVEY OF UKRAINIAN FIRMS

We analyse the impact of ownership and corporate control on firms’ investment using the 2001 survey of Yacoub et al. on Ukrainian firms. The model explains investment by output, financial and soft budget constraints, and corporate control (and ownership) categories potentially enjoying private benefits of control. We find that the corporate control model fits better than the ownership model, a negative relationship between state and employee control and firms’ investment, and evidence for the presence of soft budget constraints. A negative relationship between firms’ investment and the relative size of non‐monetary transactions strengthens the conclusion of private benefits of control impacting investment.     

Learning and Efficiency with Search Frictions

This paper studies the allocative efficiency in a Moscarini (2005)-type equilibrium search environment with learning. It is shown that the stationary equilibrium is efficient if and only if the Hosios condition holds no matter whether learning is about firm-specific human capital or about general human capital. However, the stationary equilibrium can never be efficient if externalities exist from unemployment. In contrast, even with externalities, the stationary equilibrium can be efficient under some modified Hosios condition if there is no uncertainty (standard Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)-type equilibrium search environment). The key intuition is that the equilibrium can only be efficient if firm-worker matching is formed and terminated efficiently.     

企业特征、高管薪酬结构与企业绩效

利用2005—2010年我国沪深两市A股非金融保险行业1654家上市公司的高管年度薪酬数据,结合企业特征,对不同类型企业的高管薪酬结构与企业绩效的关系进行了实证研究,细化锦标赛理论和行为理论在不同类型企业中可能形成的差异化实施效应。结果显示:我国不同类型的企业都比较适宜采用锦标赛理论制定高管薪酬激励政策,竞争性的高管薪酬结构对于提升企业绩效具有正面作用,均等化高管薪酬结构不利于企业的价值创造;相对于民营企业、小规模企业、低成长企业而言,我国国有企业、大规模企业、高成长企业更宜采用锦标赛理论设计企业高管薪酬结构。因此我国不宜对非金融保险行业国有企业的高管薪酬进行过度均等化的管制,否则会负面影响企业绩效提升和企业价值创造。