Impacts of the timing of the discovery of a subsequent event on the auditors’ approach to subsequent events

This study investigates the underlying causes affecting auditors’ approaches to subsequent events. As auditors are required to perform the majority of subsequent events procedures near the due date of the audit report, I examine whether auditors are less likely to make adjustments or disclosures regarding subsequent events that occur after the audit completion, but before issuing the audit report. Results indicate that auditors were less likely to adjust Type I events that occurred after audit completion when the risk was low, but not when the risk was high. This was not the case for Type II events, which only require disclosure.     

Audit Partner Disciplinary Actions and Financial Restatements

This study investigates the signalling role and rectification effectiveness of an audit partner disciplinary system. The signalling role refers to whether sanctions reflect the poor audit quality of disciplined audit partners, and rectification effectiveness addresses whether disciplinary actions enhance subsequent audit quality. The sample consists of Taiwanese listed companies, in the period 2000 to 2006, where the identities of audit partners who sign audit reports and who are sanctioned are accessible. Empirical results indicate that in the pre‐sanction period, the probability of financial restatements by clients of disciplined audit partners is significantly higher than that of non‐disciplined audit partners. The more severe or frequent the sanctions, the higher the likelihood of financial restatements in the pre‐sanction period. These findings imply that audit partner disciplinary actions can serve as a signal of lower audit quality provided by those partners. The rectification effectiveness of disciplinary actions is examined from two perspectives: (1) the effects on subsequent improvements of audit quality of disciplined audit partners; and (2) audit quality enhancement of successor non‐disciplined audit partners who accept clients from disciplined audit partners. Empirical results show a lower probability of restating financial statements audited by disciplined audit partners after sanctions. We also find a lower likelihood of restating financial statements audited by successor non‐disciplined audit partners in the post‐sanction period. Both findings support our conclusion that audit partner sanctions improve audit quality. Overall, audit partner disciplinary actions can signal lower quality audit partners and are effective in enhancing audit quality.     

Compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards and auditor choice: New evidence on the importance of the statutory audit

We examine the impact of auditor choice on IFRS compliance under the assumption of strict exogeneity of auditor choice. Our results reveal that compliance is positively related to auditor choice after controlling for firm size, profitability, leverage, degree of international diversification, and whether a firm has a U.S. listing or was audited according to International Standards of Auditing. We also find that auditor choice is positively related to firm compliance when controlling for unmeasured, firm-specific effects. The results of our study reinforce the importance of developing institutional mechanisms (e.g., enforcement, auditing, or corporate governance structures) to encourage compliance with IFRS.     

Are fully independent audit committees really necessary?

Accounting scandals and concerns about the quality of financial statements have led to many calls for improved audit committee effectiveness. Prior research indicates that audit committee independence is positively related to effective oversight of the financial reporting process. Unfortunately, prior research has not provided an answer as to how much independence on the audit committee is enough. This is an important unanswered question because while Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) currently requires all listed companies to maintain an audit committee that is 100% independent there has been much debate regarding easing the SOX requirements for smaller and foreign companies. In this paper we examine whether the regulatory requirements of a completely independent audit committee are necessary to obtain the monitoring benefits related to audit committee independence that have been documented in prior literature. Our results suggest that the benefits of audit committee independence are consistently achieved only when the audit committee is completely independent. These results provide support for the SOX requirement of 100% independent audit committees.     

审计意见购买:理论分析与治理路径

审计意见购买的治理是审计监管的重要议题。本文以代理理论、契约理论、信号理论以及管制理论对审计意见购买的产生机理及动机进行了深刻分析,指出委托代理关系变异、契约的不完全性、信号传递失灵及管制失败是影响审计意见购买行为发生的重要因素。审计意见购买行为的治理需要从需求、供给及监管等三方分别采取合适的措施与策略。其中,引导自愿性审计需求,发挥审计市场的信号机制和声誉机制作用,是治理的根本出路。     

审计师行业专长对审计收费的影响分析——来自2006～2007年我国审计市场的证据

本文在借鉴传统审计收费模型的基础上,采用我国A股上市公司2006～2007年的数据,对审计师行业专长与审计收费之间的相关关系进行实证分析.研究表明,我国的审计师行业专长程度较低,审计师行业专长与审计收费之间存在正相关关系.研究审计师行业专长与审计收费之间的关系对于规范审计定价行为、形成有效市场结构有重要意义.     

Has SOX Enhanced Non–Big 4 Auditors' Ability to Deal with Client Pressure?

We investigate whether non–Big 4 auditors have enhanced their ability to resist client pressure over accrual reporting following the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX). Regressing abnormal accruals on proxies for economic bonding, we find that changes in the association, defined as (Post–Pre), are significantly negative, implying an improvement in auditor independence after SOX. Among non–Big 4 auditors, only Tier 3 auditors compromised reporting objectivity before SOX, but neither Tier 2 nor Tier 3 auditors yielded to client pressure after SOX. Evidence that these two groups of non–Big 4 auditors differ in the way they cope with client pressure in a loose regulatory regime highlights the importance of assessing the efficacy of SOX separately for subsets of auditors and contributes to an understanding of the underresearched, but inherently important, segment of the audit market served by non–Big 4 auditors. Further analysis indicates that the low pre‐SOX audit quality observed in the full sample is driven by non–PCAOB registrants.     

Responses by Australian auditors to the global financial crisis

We examine the impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) on auditor behaviour in Australia. Using a sample of listed companies, we examine whether the GFC impacted the propensity of auditors to issue going concern modifications and increased audit effort as reflected in audit fees and audit reporting lag. Controlling for client characteristics, we find an increase in the propensity to issue going concern opinions during the period 2008–2009 compared with the period 2005–2007 and that Big N auditors responded to the GFC earlier than non‐Big N auditors. In relation to audit effort, we find evidence of increased audit fees during the period 2008–2009 compared with the period 2005–2007. There is, however, no evidence of increased audit reporting lags during the GFC.     

The Determinants and Effects of Clients Following Audit Partners Who Switch Audit Firms

Abstract

We examine the determinants of clients’ decision to follow departing partners to new audit firms and the effect of this decision on the likelihood of financial restatements. Using Taiwanese audit partner turnover data from 1984 to 2010, we find that clients are more likely to follow departing partners when the partners have more clients, longer tenure, and when both lead and concurring partners leave simultaneously. By contrast, clients are more likely to stay with their incumbent audit firms when the firms are one of the Big Four or when only the concurring partners leave. The extended partner tenure due to clients following departing partners, however, does not enhance audit quality. In fact, clients that stay at the incumbent firm experience a significant decrease in the probability of financial restatements in the first year after the audit partners leave, but clients that follow do not.     

Optimal law enforcement when victims are rational players

The economic analysis of crime usually views a victim as a passive party whose role is limited to suffering harm. In this paper, we extend the economic theory of law enforcement by modeling victims as an active party in criminal deterrence. First, they may take some precautions to avoid victimization. Second, they may or may not report their victimization. The lack of reporting weakens law enforcement and criminal deterrence by reducing detection rates. This suggests that victims could be encouraged to report by being paid a compensation. Nevertheless, compensating victims certainly reduces precaution. We argue that such effect never offsets the gains obtained in terms of criminal detection and apprehension. Received: December 1998 / Accepted: January 2000