监管宽容下的存款保险定价应用研究

本文介绍了Merton期权模型及其扩展对存款保险进行定价的方法,并采用考虑监管宽容的Ronn and Verma(1986)模型来估算上市银行的保费率,针对我国存在大量的非上市银行提出采用"市场对照"法,用上市银行的数据间接的估计出非上市银行的风险特征,再带入Ronn and Verma(1986)模型间接地估计出非上市银行的存款保险费率。本文为我国实行基于风险调整的差别存款保险费率提供了可行的操作方案,最后通过实证研究提出一些政策建议以促进我国存款保险制度的建立。     

Overpaid CEOs got FDIC debt guarantees

From 2008 to 2009, the FDIC guaranteed hundreds of billions of dollars of newly issued bank debt through the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP). We find that CEOs making more than their peer groups were significantly more likely to steer their companies to obtain federal guarantees for their banks’ debt. The average bank in our sample with a debt guarantee had a CEO who was paid $1.6 million per year more than the average CEO in his or her peer group. In addition, there is evidence that large, systemically important banks were more likely to obtain FDIC debt guarantees.     

The importance of rules-based monetary policy in practice

This paper draws on several actual policy experiences of the author to demonstrate why it is important to have a rules-based monetary policy. These experiences show that policy rules provide a needed “steady as you go” strategy and serve as an insurance against excessive intervention. They also show why in practice one must consider rules-based policy in the broader policy context in which the Federal Reserve operates.     

The Chrysler effect: The impact of government intervention on borrowing costs

This paper studies intercreditor conflict arising from political interference in the bankruptcy process. The U.S. government’s intervention in the 2009 reorganizations of Chrysler and GM purportedly elevated claims of the auto union over those of the automakers’ senior creditors in violation of bankruptcy priority rules. Critics predicted that businesses would experience an increase in their borrowing costs because of the risk that politically-powerful junior claimants might now leap-frog other creditors. We examine the financial market where this effect would be most detectible, the market for bonds of highly unionized companies. We find no evidence that bondholders of unionized firms reacted negatively to the government intervention and reject the claim that investors viewed the reorganizations as establishing a precedent for priority jumping by organized labor.     

Bank bailouts and political instability

This paper studies bank solvency crises due to macroeconomic shocks in a model where government is prone to bailout because of cronyism. Citizens can dismiss the government and overrule its decision if they believe that a bailout is not economically justified. The results are as follows. First, the probability of a political crisis in equilibrium increases with the scope of the political principal-agent problem. Second, political uncertainty enlarges the set of parameters for which a banking crisis takes place and thereby increases financial instability. Third, politico-financial crises may stem from foreign lenders' loss of confidence.     

次贷危机加剧和救市政策的有效性分析

本文从货币流通速度下降和资产负债表恶化来解释美国次贷危机不断加剧的原因。同时本文也指出次贷危机下存在"流动性陷阱"和"投资陷阱",在此基础上,分析了美国救市政策的有效性。笔者认为目前财政政策是有效的,尤其是政府直接增加财政支出更为有效。     

Is centralization a solution to the soft budget constraint problem?

This paper focuses on the centralization program implemented in Israel in 2004 to analyze whether the administrative subordination of municipalities is an effective policy to deal with problems related to soft-budget constraint of lower level governments. The results consistently show, for different specifications and samples of municipalities, that this program brought a substantial decrease of municipalities’ expenditures (mostly because of decreases in salary payments), and an increase of local property tax collection. Our analysis shows that all of the fiscal impact of the program is due to the appointment of an accountant that reports directly to the central government, a relatively mild form of administrative subordination. In contrast, more intrusive forms of subordination, like the central imposition of a recovery program, do not result in any substantial improvement of municipalities’ fiscal situation. This leads us to conclude that a mild form of administrative subordination is an effective tool to cope with problems related to soft-budget constraints, whereas political subordination is not an effective tool to reach that goal.     

A 50-year history of “zombie firms” in Japan: How banks and shareholders have been involved in corporate bailouts?

We review long-term changes in “zombie firms” in Japan over this half-century using listed firm data with a framework in which the concept of “zombie firms” includes possible efficient bailouts. The first wave of zombie firms occurred during the period of main banks (hereinafter MBs). MBs were able to actively choose which firms would receive bailouts at the time. However, commonly held beliefs about MBs’ monitoring power and the special role of corporate groups and long-term credit banks for bailouts are not supported. In the largest wave of the lost decade, we find the zombie firm problem in the manufacturing sector was just as serious as the non-manufacturing in terms of firm count. Moreover, the pathological phenomena such as unwilling concentration of loans to MBs were also rather typical in the manufacturing. Soft budget constraints have continued in the manufacturing even after the resolution of banks’ non-performing loans since the bubble burst came to an end, leading to the manufacturing-centered third wave of zombie firms following the Global Financial Crisis.     

Monetary and fiscal coordination in preventing bank failures and financial contagion

This paper uses a theoretical model to analyze the optimal combination of monetary response (lowering of interest rates) and fiscal bailouts in preventing bank failures and financial contagion. I show that the optimal way of rescuing failing banks is to combine the two. This is because lower interest rates reduce the size of the bailout required to rescue failing banks as they reduce the cost for banks to raise and retain deposits. The main result of the paper is that banks are willing to monitor their investments more closely when they anticipate a monetary response in addition to bailouts in case of a banking crisis. Additionally, capital requirements such as the Basel Accords do not always incentivize banks to monitor their investments if there is a potential contagion from unhealthy to healthy banks.