Institutional failure or market failure?

We investigate the effect of the power of creditors, property rights protection, and institutional quality, on bank profits using a panel of 498 banks from 46 countries. Results show that better institutions and stronger property rights protection reduce bank profits, while stronger power of creditors drives up bank profits significantly. Results imply that better institutions and enhanced property rights protection lead to greater flow of credit allowing firms and investors to undertake more profitable ventures. By extension, stronger creditor rights erect steeper barriers to external finance for firms and investors. National indicators of economic freedoms may be more important to lowering the spread than strict creditor rights. Seemingly, credit markets fail when economic institutions fail or when governments intervene into these markets in ways that impede the safety and soundness of financial transactions and private contracting.     

基于银行流动性管理视角的宏观审慎与货币政策协调研究

本文从商业银行流动性管理视角出发,探究银行微观主体行为如何影响宏观审慎与货币政策的协调。我们借鉴净稳定资金比例的设计理念,将商业银行的流动性管理行为纳入传统理论模型,刻画出两种流动性管理行为对货币政策信贷传导渠道效率的潜在影响及传导路径。在此基础上,采用我国50家商业银行2012年第1季度—2018年第2季度面板数据进行实证检验。我们发现,银行为提升长期流动性水平而进行的优化信贷资产结构的行为,能够显著提高货币政策传导效率。但是,部分净稳定资金比例较低的股份制银行和城市商业银行调整非信贷资产结构的行为则有可能降低货币政策传导效率。因此,在执行既有流动性监管措施的同时,关注与引导银行资产结构调整方式,对增强宏观审慎与货币政策的协调大有裨益。     

Regulatory Capital Arbitrage and the Potential Competitive Impact of Basel II in the Market for Residential Mortgages

U.S. banking regulators have proposed a bifurcated system of capital regulation where the largest, internationally active banking organizations would be subject to significantly more risk sensitive regulatory capital requirements than are currently in place, while most others would remain subject to the current rules. The proposed new capital regime has the potential to affect the competitive landscape among banking institutions, particularly in the area of residential mortgage lending. We analyze the potential competitive effects of the proposed, bifurcated regulatory capital system on competition in the residential mortgage market from the perspective of the theory of regulatory capital arbitrage. We then apply the theory and available evidence to perform some benchmark calculations that suggest a significant, potential shift of market share and income to the largest banking institutions in the mortgage market.

The effect of capital requirement regulation on the transmission of monetary policy: evidence from Austria

This paper analyzes the role of banks’ regulatory capitalization in the transmission of monetary policy. We use a confidential dataset for Austrian banks spanning from the first quarter of 1997 to the fourth quarter of 2003. We find evidence that Austrian banks react in an asymmetric way to monetary policy depending on their regulatory excess capitalization, i.e. low capitalized banks react more restrictively to a monetary tightening than their highly capitalized peers.

Connecting National Safety Nets: The Dialectics of the Basel II Contracting Process

Basel II consists of supervisory guidelines negotiated by representatives of central banks and national regulatory commissions that were members of the Basel committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The BCBS is itself a regulatory response to globalization, which is connecting national safety nets in market-driven ways. A country’s financial safety net is a social contract established by short-lived agents for principals in long-lived economic sectors. Restraints placed on the authority of the BCBS members to contract for their principals by domestic politics explains: why Basel II authorizes individual countries to implement the agreement in markedly different ways; why US implementation of Basel II ran into so much doubt, controversy, and delay; and how the implementation debate set small and large banks and the Federal Reserve and other federal regulators against one another.

我国房地产泡沫与银行信贷规模的相关性研究

本文首先从理论上深刻剖析了房地产泡沫与银行信贷规模相互之间的作用与传导机制,在此基础上选取2006年-2018年相关指标的年度数据,对房地产泡沫与银行信贷规模进行了图形拟合与周期性波动规律分析,分析发现二者存在极高的契合度。建立房地产泡沫的函数,构建协整方程实证发现银行信贷规模对房地产泡沫的长期弹性系数为0.51,从长期来看银行信贷规模每增加1%,房地产泡沫也相应增加0.51%,进一步建立VAR模型实证发现房地产泡沫与银行信贷规模互为格兰杰因果关系,二者相互影响、相互促进。通过方差分解实证发现银行信贷规模对房地产泡沫的变动具有重要的影响,另一方面,房地产泡沫是影响银行信贷规模变动最主要的因素。     

商业银行市场营销体制依赖及理论模型——基于不同体制条件下的我国商业银行市场营销研究

银行市场营销活动总是在一定的体制背景下并依赖于一定的体制运行的,体制（或制度）是解释商业银行市场营销行为的重要变量。本文首先阐述了体制与制度的内涵及二者间的逻辑联系,阐明体制是制度的一部分;论证了市场营销对体制的依赖,体制要素结构为市场营销提供了资源配置的机制或方式;分析了体制或制度对银行市场营销的重要作用,指出体制是确保银行市场营销活动规范有序并持续获得高效益的根本保障;其后建立了商业银行市场营销的一般理论模型;最后分别以不同体制条件下商业银行市场营销的市场营销目标、营销变量特征、营销体制约束与激励条件的分析为依托,构建并比对了相应的经济转轨时期、市场体制下以及开放经济下商业银行市场营销的理论模型。     

伪满洲中央银行发行的纸币考证

1931年九一八事变后,日本帝国主义扶植建立了以满清逊帝溥仪为头子的傀儡政权伪满洲国。为全面控制东北经济,又策划建立了伪满洲中央银行,并强行发行伪币,收缴旧币,以统一东北币制。伪满洲中央银行发行的纸币数额巨大,种类繁多,先后发行改造券及甲、乙、丙、丁等多套票券。这些伪币不断变换票面图案,其用意无非是麻痹中国人民的反满抗日情绪,以利于扩大发行,垄断和独霸东北金融市场。     

论经济增加值在商业银行考核评价中的应用

传统的考核体系以单纯的利润指标作为考核业绩的标准,但利润大并不代表业绩就一定好,引入经济增加值指标可以克服传统的业绩考核的缺陷。考核体系又称为银行经营管理的指挥棒,将价值管理思想融入银行,实现银行价值最大化是商业银行经营的最终目标,科学的绩效考核评价体系是实现这一目标的保障。因此,在商业银行建立以经济增加值为基础的绩效考核评价体系,是提升商业银行竞争力的重要举措。     

央行和商业银行视角下存款准备金率的实证分析

本文分别从央行货币政策调控目标和商业银行对存款准备金率容忍度的视角出发,利用参数法和神经网络模型对存款准备金率进行实证分析。研究发现,央行近年来多次上调存款准备金率主要是为了对抗通货膨胀以及回收货币流动性。在不考虑银行容忍度下,参数模型给出的目标存款准备金率为23%,而在考虑了存款准备金率对银行的负面影响后,根据神经网络模型得出2011年上半年合理的存款准备金率应为21.34%,与当前21.5%的实际存款准备金率相符。说明央行在货币调控时考虑到了银行的容忍度,是符合宏观审慎性原则的。而模型的敏感性分析表明,未来存款准备金率仍旧存在上调的区间与上调的可能性。