Reputation,risk-taking,and macroprudential policy

This paper examines the role of macroprudential capital requirements in preventing inefficient credit booms in a model with reputational externalities. In our model, unprofitable banks have strong incentives to invest in risky assets when macroeconomic fundamentals are good in order to avoid the stigma of being assessed as low ability by the market. We show that across-the-system countercyclical capital requirements that deter such gambling are constrained optimal when fundamentals are neither extremely weak nor extremely strong.     

Flight to liquidity and the Great Recession

This paper argues that counter-cyclical liquidity hoarding by financial intermediaries may strongly amplify business cycles. It develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which banks operate subject to agency problems and funding liquidity risk in their intermediation activity. Importantly, the amount of liquidity reserves held in the financial sector is determined endogenously: Balance sheet constraints force banks to trade off insurance against funding outflows with loan scale. A financial crisis, simulated as an abrupt decline in the collateral value of bank assets, triggers a flight to liquidity, which strongly amplifies the initial shock and induces credit crunch dynamics sharing key features with the Great Recession. The paper thus develops a new balance sheet channel of shock transmission that works through the composition of banks’ asset portfolios.     

Institutional failure or market failure?

We investigate the effect of the power of creditors, property rights protection, and institutional quality, on bank profits using a panel of 498 banks from 46 countries. Results show that better institutions and stronger property rights protection reduce bank profits, while stronger power of creditors drives up bank profits significantly. Results imply that better institutions and enhanced property rights protection lead to greater flow of credit allowing firms and investors to undertake more profitable ventures. By extension, stronger creditor rights erect steeper barriers to external finance for firms and investors. National indicators of economic freedoms may be more important to lowering the spread than strict creditor rights. Seemingly, credit markets fail when economic institutions fail or when governments intervene into these markets in ways that impede the safety and soundness of financial transactions and private contracting.     

Risk shifting in the US banking system: An empirical analysis

This paper contributes to the empirical literature on risk shifting. It proposes a method to find out whether risk shifting is present in the banking industry and, if so, what type. The type of risk shifting depends on the group of debt holders to whom risk is shifted. We apply this method to the US banking sector in 1998–2011. To study the relationship between risk shifting and the 2008 crisis, the sample is also split into pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods. Our results suggest that the same type of risk shifting is present in the entire sample and in the pre-crisis and crisis subsamples. We find no evidence of risk shifting after the crisis. Furthermore, holding capital buffers seems to disincentivize risk shifting. This finding appears to provide support for the conservative buffer included in Basel III.     

Predicting bank insolvencies using machine learning techniques

Proactively monitoring and assessing the economic health of financial institutions has always been the cornerstone of supervisory authorities. In this work, we employ a series of modeling techniques to predict bank insolvencies on a sample of US-based financial institutions. Our empirical results indicate that the method of Random Forests (RF) has a superior out-of-sample and out-of-time predictive performance, with Neural Networks also performing almost equally well as RF in out-of-time samples. These conclusions are drawn not only by comparison with broadly used bank failure models, such as Logistic, but also by comparison with other advanced machine learning techniques. Furthermore, our results illustrate that in the CAMELS evaluation framework, metrics related to earnings and capital constitute the factors with higher marginal contribution to the prediction of bank failures. Finally, we assess the generalization of our model by providing a case study to a sample of major European banks.     

Bank capital and lending: Evidence of nonlinearity from Indonesia

This paper studies the transmission of bank capital shocks to loan supply in Indonesia. Using bank data for the period 2001:Q1 to 2018:Q4, we estimate dynamic panel data models of bank lending. We find nonlinear effects of capital on loan growth. Specifically, the response of weakly capitalized banks to changes in their capital positions is larger than that of strongly capitalized banks. This non-linearity implies that not only the level of capital but also its distribution across banks in the system affects the transmission of shocks to aggregate lending. Likewise, the effects of bank recapitalization on loan growth depend on banks’ starting capital positions and the size and distribution of capital injections.     

On the role of Islamic and conventional banks in the monetary policy transmission in Malaysia: Do size and liquidity matter?

This paper empirically investigates the impact of monetary policy on the credit supply of Islamic versus conventional banks of Malaysia using an unbalanced panel dataset over the period 2005-2016. While estimating the effects of three alternative measures of monetary policy on banks' credit supply, we include several bank-specific and macroeconomic variables in the specification as control variables. We provide strong evidence on the existence of the credit channel of monetary policy transmission mechanism in Malaysia. Yet, we show that Islamic banks respond considerably less to changes in monetary policy instruments as compared to their conventional counterparts. We also find that the monetary policy measures affect small-sized banks and less-liquid banks more as compared to large-sized and more-liquid banks. Our findings suggest that for an effective monetary policy, there is a vital need to consider the nature of Islamic banking while devising any monetary policy instruments to manage credit supply in the economy.     

Internal conflict and Bank liquidity creation: Evidence from the belt and Road initiative

The Belt and Road Initiative is the most important international economic strategy in the 21st Century initiated by China. In this paper, we conduct the first international study on the effects of the host country’s internal conflict risk of the Belt and Road Initiative on bank liquidity creation, one of the key functions banks provide for the public. We find that the host country’s internal conflict risk negatively affects bank liquidity creation. The results are also economically significant and robust to subsample tests. It also indicates that Chinese firms that will conduct foreign investments in the countries of the Belt and Road Initiative should take the host country’s internal conflict risk into account.     

央行货币政策报告文本信息、宏观经济与股票市场

本文利用金融情感词典和文本分析技术,分析中国人民银行货币政策执行报告的文本情绪、文本相似度和文本可读性等多维文本信息,刻画央行货币政策执行报告的文本特征,探究货币政策报告的文本信息与宏观经济和股票市场的关系。实证研究发现,货币政策报告的文本情绪的改善会引起显著为正的股票市场价格反应,报告文本相似度的增加会引起股票市场波动性的显著降低,报告可读性对公布后股票市场的波动性影响不显著。货币政策报告文本情绪还与诸多宏观经济指标显著相关。进一步研究发现,引起股票市场显著反应的是报告文本情绪中反映货币政策指引的部分,而反映宏观经济历史状态的部分对股票市场的影响不显著。本文从文本大数据分析角度证明了我国央行沟通的有效性,对国内央行沟通相关研究形成了有益补充。     

Investor protection,regulation and bank risk-taking behavior

This paper examines whether the influence of investor protection on banks’ risk is channeled through banking regulation, and vice-versa, using panel data from a sample of 567 European and US banks for the 2004–2015 period. As banking regulatory factors, we consider capital stringency, activity restrictions and private monitoring, whereas as investor protection factors, we consider the level of shareholder and creditor protection. We find that banking regulation moderates the positive direct influence of investor protection on banks’ risk, while investor protection reinforces the negative direct influence of banking regulation on risk. Moreover, we show that the negative effect of national regulations on banks’ risk is more pronounced during systemic crisis years. Finally, taking into account market competition, we argue that private monitoring only has a direct effect on banks’ risk, whereas the effects of capital stringency and activity restriction are channeled through market competition.