水价对中国北方城市居民用水需求影响分析

介绍城市居民用水需求变化的背景,对北方城市居民用水需求进行了预测。得出结论：水价对于减少城市居民用水需求的作用非常显著;城市化的高速发展会对城市居民用水造成巨大压力,对城市居民用水价格、用水管理手段和农业节水制度的积极改革,为解决城市居民用水供需缺口提供可能。     

银行监督、企业社会性成本与贷款融资体系

本文从政府机构控股国有企业所造成的企业行为扭曲的角度来研究银行贷款策略组合的微观机制,即银行对国有企业和私营企业进行事前筛选的程度及贷款利率设定,并建立了关于银行贷款融资体系的微观模型和理论框架。首先,将企业社会性成本和银行监督功能(事前筛选)引入债务合同模型,说明国有企业在面临破产做清算决策时会考虑到社会破产成本,从而推导出国有企业的还款机制有别于私营企业,信息不对称条件下银行事前对贷款筛选的激励也会有所不同,并提供了一般性推导和数值解拟合分析;同时,事前筛选存在一定的反转效应,因此需要就监督效率的社会剩余价值进行权衡。     

金融全球化过程中银行危机的传染性及我国的应对策略

随着经济全球化的深化,随着我国整个金融体系开放程度的加深,任何来自国际金融市场的危机都可能对我国商业银行体系造成灾难性冲击,本文从分析银行危机跨国传染的路径着手,提出了我国防范国际金融危机传染的对策和建议,以期为我国银行体系的改革提供新的思路。     

基于失效风险的建筑物预防维修成本模型优化

建筑物预防性维修成本的最优控制问题,是企业现代化经营管理的一个重要组成部分,直接影响到企业的经济效益。针对承受重复荷载作用的建筑构件,失效概率随服役时间增加而增大的实际情况,提出了失效风险的概念。采用役龄回退因子描述了维修后失效概率降低的程度,在此基础上推算出满足可靠度约束条件,适用于特定时间段非等间隔检测期序列,计算出单位维修周期内的检测次数。通过对维修成本函数的分析,建立了基于等失效风险状态的维修成本优化模型。为房屋物业管理部门进行建筑物的维修和更换决策提供参考依据。     

电力供需实验室的开发与建设

国家电网公司电力供需实验室是"十一五"期间国家电网公司重点建设的八大实验室之一。电力实验室由数据信息平台、业务支撑平台和应用平台3层平台构成。三者既相互独立,又相互联系。数据信息平台是电力供需实验室的基础。应用平台是直接面向用户、实现电力供需分析预测以及实验等功能的窗口,业务支撑平台是连接数据信息平台和应用平台的桥梁。目前,电力供需实验室已经基本具备了电力市场分析预测功能以及实验功能,可以应用于年度电力市场分析预测工作中。     

Inconvenience cost of mobile communication failure: The case of South Korea

Mobile communication failure can occur when mobile traffic exceeds the manageable level. This depends on frequency bandwidth. Mobile communication failure causes inconveniences in a user's daily life that lead to social and economic damage. To address this issue, mobile telecommunications companies deploy additional bandwidths and develop new technologies, but these are costly strategies. This study applies a spike model based on a contingent valuation method (CVM) to measure the inconvenience cost resulting from mobile communication failure. The mean monthly willingness-to-pay (WTP) to avoid communication failure per user is estimated to be KRW 898.14 (USD 0.80) over a period of five years in our study. The inconvenience cost borne by the population is estimated to be KRW 2.97 trillion (USD 2.61 billion). Users experiencing greater frequency of communication failure are found to be willing to pay more to avoid the inconvenience. When excluding respondents citing zero-WTP, the mean WTP per user was calculated to be KRW 3426.41 (USD 3.01). Data traffic usage and frequency at which communication failure is experienced are variables that exhibit statistically significant effects on WTP to avoid mobile communication failure. Overall, estimation results show that a price discrimination based on data traffic usage or quality can be considered by mobile telecommunications companies and regulators to address the issue of data traffic inducing mobile communication failure.     

Technology‐push,market‐demand and the missing safety‐pull: a case study of American Airlines Flight 587

Through a critical case study of the crash of American Airlines Flight 587, this paper draws upon ‘the Social Shaping of Technology’ (SST) approach to offer a reconceptualisation of the technology‐push and market‐demand model for High‐Reliably Organisations (HROs), providing support for a third factor, called here a ‘safety‐pull’. A safety‐pull is defined as organisationally supported reflexivity in which technology innovators and frontline operators collaborate to consider the potential implications of adopting new technologies in HROs and the complex ways this change may impact human operators' work performance, often in risky and unanticipated ways. In contrast to accidents occurring solely as the result of individual operator error, analysing the safety‐pull provides a way to tease out the wide range of factors that can contribute to HRO failures and offers a new SST perspective through which to examine high‐risk operations.     

白音查干矿井涌水量预计

矿井涌水量计算是矿床水文地质勘查中一项重要而复杂的工作,也是矿床水文地质勘查中的根本任务之一。运用大井法和廊道法对首采区、首采工作面和开切眼涌水量进行了预计,认为大井法计算的涌水量成果较为可靠,矿井最大涌水量为296.80m3/h,为今后的矿井安全生产提供了理论依据。     

How to get banks to take less risk and disclose bad news

There is wide agreement that before the recent financial crisis, financial institutions took excessive risk in their investment strategies. At the same time, regulators complained that banks did not reveal the extent of their difficulties in a timely fashion thus reducing the effectiveness of government intervention to prevent or mitigate the deleterious effects of the financial crisis. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how regulators can best use certain tools at their disposal to motivate banks to take less risk and to provide adverse information to regulators early. We argue that two tools, namely (i) allowing bank payouts to equity holders even when banks report they are in trouble and (ii) constraining banks’ future investment strategy when they are in trouble can achieve both goals. We show that, in some cases, it is optimal to use both of these tools in combination. That is, in such cases it is optimal to allow equity payouts when banks report they are in trouble, even though such payouts increase the incentive for banks to take excessive risk and even though these payments are financed by taxpayers. We also show that the more socially costly is constraining the bank’s portfolio selection or the more complex are the bank’s assets, the more likely it is that allowing larger payouts and fewer constraints is optimal. Finally we discuss how changes in bank capital requirements interact with inducing disclosure and preventing excessive risk taking.     

Financial liberalization and bank risk-taking: International evidence

This paper analyzes the channels through which financial liberalization affects bank risk-taking in an international sample of 4333 banks in 83 countries. Our results indicate that financial liberalization increases bank risk-taking in both developed and developing countries but through different channels. Financial liberalization promotes stronger bank competition that increases risk-taking incentives in developed countries, whereas in developing countries it increases bank risk by expanding opportunities to take risk. Capital requirements help reduce the negative impact of financial liberalization on financial stability in both developed and developing countries. However, official supervision and financial transparency are only effective in developing countries.