Independent director death and CEO acquisitiveness: Build an empire or pursue a quiet life?

Research summary : This study examines the relationship between an independent director's death and CEO acquisitiveness. Using a sample of large U.S. public firms, we find that CEOs who have experienced an independent director's death undertake fewer acquisitions in the post‐director death period, in particular fewer large acquisitions. Our findings are consistent with the prediction of posttraumatic growth theory that mortality awareness can induce CEOs to reevaluate their life priorities and reduce the importance of extrinsic goals in their decision making. This study contributes to the strategic leadership literature by highlighting the influence of the death of CEOs ' social peers on CEOs ' strategic decisions . Managerial summary : Does the death of CEOs ' social peers influence CEOs ' strategic decisions? We find that CEOs who have experienced an independent director's death engage in fewer acquisitions in the post‐director death period, in particular fewer large acquisitions. One likely explanation for our findings is that the death of an independent director may heighten CEOs ' mortality awareness, lead the CEOs to pursue a quieter life, and weaken their propensities for undertaking decisions (i.e., acquisitions) that increase their compensation and social status . Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ripple Effects of CEO Awards: Investigating the Acquisition Activities of Superstar CEOs' Competitors

Research summary : This study proposes that CEOs may undertake intensive acquisition activities to increase their social recognition and status after witnessing their competitors' winning CEO awards. Using a sample of U.S. S&P 1,500 firm CEOs, we find that CEOs engage in more intensive acquisition activities in the period after their competitors won CEO awards (i.e., postaward period), compared to the preaward period. Moreover, this effect is stronger when focal CEOs themselves had a high likelihood of winning CEO awards. Our findings also show that acquisitions by focal CEO firms in the postaward period realize lower announcement returns compared to acquisitions by the same CEOs in the preaward period. Managerial summary : Each year a few CEOs receive CEO awards from business media and CEOs who receive such awards become instant celebrities, that is, superstar CEOs. This study explores how superstar CEOs' competitors react to not winning CEO awards. We find that superstar CEOs' competitors undertake more intensive acquisition activities in the postaward period compared to the preaward period. This is particularly true for competitors who were close, yet did not win CEO awards. In addition, acquisitions by superstar CEOs' competitors are associated with lower announcement returns in the postaward compared to the preaward period. These findings collectively indicate that acquisitions may be used as a channel for superstar CEOs' competitors to elevate their own social status, but at a cost to shareholders. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Examining CEO succession and the role of heuristics in early‐stage CEO evaluation

This study develops and tests predictions regarding factors that influence early‐stage CEO evaluation. We suggest that contextual elements of the CEO succession process will influence the heuristics that directors employ to aid in their early evaluation of a CEO because traditional performance metrics, such as firm performance, are less diagnostic of CEO quality in the first years of their tenure. Broad empirical support for our theoretical arguments is shown in a sample of Fortune 1000 firms. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of corporate governance on CEO luck: Evidence from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)

CEOs are “lucky” when they receive stock option grants on days when the stock price is the lowest in the month of the grant, implying opportunistic timing. Extending the work of Bebchuk et al. (2010), we explore the effect of overall corporate governance quality on CEO luck. Provided by the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), our comprehensive governance metrics are much broader than those used in prior studies, encompassing more diverse aspects of corporate governance, such as audit, state laws, boards, ownership, and director education. We show that an improvement in governance quality by one standard deviation diminishes CEO luck by 14.77–21.06%. The governance standards recommended by ISS appear to be effective in deterring the opportunistic timing of option grants.     

The effect of CEOs on firm performance

The extent to which CEOs influence firm performance is fundamental to scholarly understanding of how organizations work; yet, this linkage is poorly understood. Previous empirical efforts to examine the link between CEOs and firm performance using variance decomposition, while provocative, nevertheless suffer from methodological problems that systematically understate the relative impact of CEOs on firm performance compared to industry and firm effects. This study addresses these methodological problems and reexamines the percentage of the variance in firm performance explained by heterogeneity in CEOs. The results of this study suggest that in certain settings the ‘CEO effect’ on corporate‐parent performance is substantially more important than that of industry and firm effects, but only moderately more important than industry and firm effects on business‐segment performance. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

过度自信与企业多元化研究综述

相对于国内外文献集中公司层面的特征来研究企业的多元化动因,作者试图从行为金融学视角揭示作为CEOs的认知偏差,特别是过度自信对企业多元化决策的影响。本文通过对国内外文献在企业多元化及公司高管认知偏差两个维度研究历程的回顾,为进一步的理论和实证研究打下基础。     

Chief executive officers' dispositional optimism,host country's rule of law,and foreign market equity mode choice of Ghanaian small and medium‐sized enterprises

Despite a growing interest in the influence of managerial characteristics on firms' strategic decision‐making process, scholarly knowledge is limited with regard to how and when psychological attributes of executives affect firms' foreign entry mode decision. Building on behavioral decision‐making theory, we address this gap by investigating the effect of chief executive officers' (CEOs') optimism on firms' foreign market equity mode choice. In addition, we examine the moderating influence of the host country's rule of law on this relationship. Using primary data from 227 small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) in Ghana, we found that increases in the levels of CEOs' optimism are related to the increases in preference for equity entry mode. This relationship is amplified when CEOs perceive the host country to have stronger rule of law. The findings have theoretical, managerial, and policy implications for SMEs' foreign market entry mode strategy.     

Pilot CEOs and corporate innovation

We find evidence that chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) hobby of flying airplanes is associated with significantly better innovation outcomes, measured by patents and citations, greater innovation effectiveness, and more diverse and original patents. We rule out alternative explanations, leading us to conclude that CEO pilot credentials capture the personality trait of sensation seeking. Sensation seeking combines risk taking with a desire to pursue novel experiences and has been associated with creativity. Our evidence highlights sensation seeking as a valuable personality trait that can be used to identify CEOs who are likely to drive innovation success.     

Home Alone: The Effects of Lone‐Insider Boards on CEO Pay,Financial Misconduct,and Firm Performance

Research summary: Corporate scandals of the previous decade have heightened attention on board independence. Indeed, boards at many large firms are now so independent that the CEO is “home alone” as the lone inside member. We build upon “pro‐insider” research within agency theory to explain how the growing trend toward lone‐insider boards affects key outcomes and how external governance forces constrain their impact. We find evidence among S&P 1500 firms that having a lone‐insider board is associated with (a) excess CEO pay and a larger CEO‐top management team pay gap, (b) increased likelihood of financial misconduct, and (c) decreased firm performance, but that stock analysts and institutional investors reduce these negative effects. The findings raise important questions about the efficacy of leaving the CEO “home alone.” Managerial summary: Following concerns that insider‐dominated boards failed to protect shareholders, there has been a push for greater board independence. This push has been so successful that the CEO is now the only insider on the boards of more than half of S&P 1500 firms. We examine whether lone‐insider boards do in fact offer strong governance or whether they enable CEOs to benefit personally. We find that lone‐insider boards pay CEOs excessively, pay CEOs a disproportionately large amount relative to other top managers, have more instances of financial misconduct, and have lower performance than boards with more than one insider. Thus, it appears that lone‐insider boards do not function as intended and firms should reconsider whether the push towards lone‐insider boards is actually in shareholders' best interests. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Heavy lies the crown? How job anxiety affects top executive decision making in gain and loss contexts

Research summary: Despite abundant anecdotal evidence that many top executives experience anxiety in their jobs, the upper echelons literature has remained largely silent on the organizational implications of executive job anxiety. In this study, we theorize that job anxiety will cause executives to (1) create a social buffer against threats by surrounding themselves with supportive decision‐making teams, and (2) pursue lower‐risk firm strategies. We further argue that these effects will vary depending upon whether strategic decisions occur in gain versus loss contexts. We test our ideas using a novel multisource, multimethod approach that includes data from 84 top executives of large organizations, their decision‐making teams, their friends and families, and archival sources. Results from an analysis of 154 major strategic decisions provide general support for our theory. Managerial summary: Although many top executives experience anxiety in their jobs, some struggle more with anxiety than others. Our paper is the first to focus on how job anxiety affects executives' decisions. We analyze 154 major strategic decisions made by 84 top executives of large organizations in a range of industries, collecting data from personal interviews with executives and surveys of their decision‐making teams, spouses, and friends. We find that anxious executives take fewer strategic risks, especially when things are going well. We further argue that anxious executives focus more on “buffering” themselves from threats, and find that they surround themselves with close supporters when times are tough. Our results demonstrate a pattern through which anxiety causes top executives to focus more heavily on avoiding potential threats. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.