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This paper addresses the relation between CEO gender and bank risk. We exploit a unique dataset of 365 Polish cooperative banks, 42% of which are run by female CEOs. We find that banks headed by female CEOs are less risky: they report higher capital adequacy and equity to assets ratios. Credit risk in female-led banks is not different from male-led banks, and therefore higher capital adequacy does not stem from lower asset quality and is likely to be linked to higher risk aversion of female CEOs. Our evidence supports the view that women are more risk averse bank CEOs than men. Our findings suggest that gender quotas in bank boards can contribute to reduce risk-taking behavior. 相似文献
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At the pinnacles of organizations, comparative tests of unity of command and shared command are nearly impossible because only one individual sits atop most organizations. In organizations led by co‐CEOs, however, such a test is possible because co‐CEOs can truly share power. But do they? Our research pits the unity‐of‐command principle against the shared‐command principle and finds overall support for the former, even within the co‐CEO context. Our sample of 71 co‐CEO pairs at publicly traded U.S. firms shows that increasing power gaps between co‐CEOs are positively associated with firm performance. This positive association wanes and turns negative, however, as power gaps become very large. We conclude that whatever benefits the co‐CEO structure might offer likely lie outside the shared command paradigm. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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A recent study by Fitza argued that the prior estimates of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) effect are conflated with events outside the CEO's control, are largely the result of random chance, and that the true CEO effect is smaller than has been previously estimated. We suggest that the empirical methodology employed by Fitza to support these claims substantially overstates the “random chance” element of the CEO effect. We replicate Fitza's findings, highlight methodological issues, offer alternative conclusions, and using multilevel modeling (MLM), suggest that his analyses mischaracterize the CEO effect. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Markus A. Fitza 《战略管理杂志》2014,35(12):1839-1852
Variance decomposition analysis is often used to examine the degree to which CEOs influence their companies' performance (the so‐called CEO effect). Such studies play an important role in a body of literature that investigates the effect of leadership on organizations. In this paper, I argue that these previous studies have an important underlying flaw. Empirically, these studies wrongly attribute the performance effect of randomness—of chance—to the CEO. I demonstrate how randomness can affect the measured effects in a variance decomposition analysis, and I show that this is especially problematic for the measurement of CEO effects. I demonstrate how this results in a greatly inflated CEO effect and develop an approach to correct for it. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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核心高管特征与公司成长性关系研究——基于中国沪深两市上市公司数据的经验研究 总被引:9,自引:0,他引:9
本文以我国沪深两市2004—2006年的上市公司为样本,从核心高级管理人员的人力资本特征视角,对高管特征与上市公司成长性的关系进行了经验检验。本文发现,在其他条件不变的情况下,上市公司成长性与核心高管的平均年龄、平均任职时间显著相关,而与核心高管平均学历的相关性不显著。进一步的研究还表明,在国有控股公司和非国有控股公司中,核心高管特征与公司成长性的关系具有显著差异。本文的研究有助于深化认知人力资本特征在公司发展过程中的重要地位,对强化核心高管遴选、完善人力资源管理具有积极的借鉴意义。 相似文献
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XU JIANG;VOLKER LAUX; 《Journal of Accounting Research》2024,62(3):981-1005
Visionary CEOs have strong beliefs about the right course of action for their firms. How should a board of directors that does not necessarily share the visionary CEO's confidence advise and monitor the CEO? We consider a model in which the board can acquire costly information about the firm's optimal strategic direction. The board not only advises the CEO on strategy, but also must approve it, and the CEO exerts effort to implement the strategy. We find that the board gathers less information when the CEO believes more strongly in his vision. Further, depending on the strength of the CEO's belief bias, the board either plays an advisory role, a monitoring role, or a rubberstamping role. The model predicts that in firms that are led by highly visionary CEOs, boards are passive in that they acquire little information and rubberstamp the visionary's proposal. Nevertheless, shareholders prefer the visionary over an unbiased manager in industries in which obtaining information about the correct course of action is difficult and costly. 相似文献
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We investigate the relationship between chief executive officers’ (CEOs) early-life exposure to marketization transition and the research and development (R&D) intensity of Chinese small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). We find that there is a significant positive relationship between the early-life transition experiences of CEOs and the R&D intensity of SMEs. CEOs who have experienced higher stages of marketization transition are significantly more likely to engage in proactive innovation activities. The means of the potential R&D intensity distributions are increasing in the treatment level, although this increasing trend is not always significant. Overall, the results confirm the view that experiencing a transition in early-life significantly facilitates CEOs’ engagement in innovation activities. 相似文献
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We find evidence that chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) hobby of flying airplanes is associated with significantly better innovation outcomes, measured by patents and citations, greater innovation effectiveness, and more diverse and original patents. We rule out alternative explanations, leading us to conclude that CEO pilot credentials capture the personality trait of sensation seeking. Sensation seeking combines risk taking with a desire to pursue novel experiences and has been associated with creativity. Our evidence highlights sensation seeking as a valuable personality trait that can be used to identify CEOs who are likely to drive innovation success. 相似文献
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Timothy J. Quigley Donald C. Hambrick Vilmos F. Misangyi G. Alessandra Rizzi 《战略管理杂志》2019,40(9):1453-1470