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121.
Abstract. The aim of this paper is to estimate the effect of fertility on the decision of labour force participation of married females
in Spain, allowing for the existence of unobserved characteristics that affect both fertility and participation. We use a
pooling of five waves of the European Household Panel for Spain (1994–1998). Results indicate that not taking into account
the unobserved characteristics that affect both variables imposes on average a strong downward bias on the true effect of
fertility on participation. This bias is especially strong for highly educated females.
We are grateful to Raquel Carrasco and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Financial support from Gobierno Vasco (PI-1999-160)),
Ministry of Education and Science (BE2000-1394), Instituto de la Mujer and Universidad del País Vasco (UPV 00035.321-13511/2001)
is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
122.
Summary. We examine how irreversible capital reduces the possibility of a duopoly to sustain implicit collusion by grim strategies,
when the product is homogenous and firms compete in quantities. Compared with the case of reversible capital, there are two
countervailing effects: Deviation from an existing collusion is less attractive, because capital once installed causes costs
forever. But the punishment will also be less severe due to the high capacity the deviating firm can build before punishment
starts. The last effect dominates, meaning that the commitment value of capital is negative for all firms. If capital is irreversible,
collusion breaks down for realistic magnitudes of interest rates.
Received: April 30, 1999; revised version: November 30, 2001 相似文献
123.
Federico Echenique 《Economic Theory》2003,22(4):903-905
Summary. I prove that the equilibrium set in a two-player game with complementarities, and totally ordered strategy spaces, is a sublattice
of the joint strategy space.
Received: May 31, 2001; revised version: October 4, 2002 相似文献
124.
Double Moral Hazard,Monitoring, and the Nature of Contracts 总被引:8,自引:0,他引:8
Pradeep Agrawal 《Journal of Economics》2002,75(1):33-61
generalized double-sided moral-hazard model, with risk-averse parties who mutually monitor each other (to get a reasonable idea of outcome/effort).
The model considers trade-off between monitoring costs and moral hazard costs, which are endogenously determined by the extent
of monitoring.
Using this model, we formally prove a generalized version of Coase's conjecture – that the optimal contract minimizes the
agency and risk costs. We then show how varying assumptions about the feasibility or cost of monitoring of the outcome or
the worker's effort lead to different contracts being optimal. The analysis is then used to explain the nature of contracts
observed in practice under many different situations. We will give an explanation as to why industrial workers typically work
under wage contracts, while share contracts are common in agriculture and will explain why profit sharing is more common for
senior managers than for the production workers.
Received September 19, 2000; revised version received October 30, 1997 相似文献
125.
We analyze the impact of product diversification on performance. This topic has been discussed in the literature, and there
is no consensus so far as to the significance or the direction of the impact. Performance is measured using Tobin's q for
a sample of 103 large, non-financial Spanish firms (1992–1995). Diversification is measured by means of a categorical variable,
as suggested by Varadarajan. The principal results indicate that the firms with intermediate levels of product diversification
have the highest performance, while the firms with low and high levels of diversification show significantly lower performance,
which performance is not significantly different between them. 相似文献
126.
Summary. A model that includes the cost of producing money is presented and the nature of the inefficient equilibria in the model
are examined. It is suggested that if one acknowledges that transactions are a form of production, which requires the consumption
of resources, then the concept of Pareto optimality is inappropriate for assessing efficiency. Instead it becomes necessary
to provide an appropriate comparative analysis of alternative transactions mechanisms in the appropriate context.
Received: September 5, 2000; revised version: May 3, 2001 相似文献
127.
Summary. We analyze an oligopoly model of homogeneous product price competition that allows for discontinuities in demand and/or costs.
Conditions under which only zero profit equilibrium outcomes obtain in such settings are provided. We then illustrate through
a series of examples that the conditions provided are “tight” in the sense that their relaxation leads to positive profit
outcomes.
Received: April 7, 2000; revised version: September 14, 2000 相似文献
128.
The objective of this paper is to adjust a traditional total factor productivity (TFP) measure for the direct effect of environmental regulation on material and capital input. For this purpose we consider the fact that part of material input and pollution abatement capital have not been used to increase output but to cover the cost of using the environment as a factor of production. Therefore TFP growth rates are lower if part of the material input is allocated to abatement activities instead of producing output. We propose to treat compliance with environmental regulation as an unproductive input linked to the use of productive material input. Our aim is to answer and discuss two questions: How to measure the effect of environmental regulation on TFP, and does the effect matter. We examine data from 1975–1991 for ten pollution intensive German industries.We would like to thank Cornelia Oßwald for valuable research assistance. We are especially grateful to two anonymous referees for many helpful comments. 相似文献
129.
Alex Possajennikov 《Economic Theory》2003,21(4):921-928
Summary. I show that aggregate-taking behavior is often evolutionarily stable for finite population in symmetric games in which payoff
depends only on own strategy and an aggregate. I provide economic examples exhibiting this phenomenon.
Received: August 27, 2001; revised version: January 29, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The paper has profited from the comments of Maria Montero, Burkhard Hehenkamp, Wolfgang Leininger, and Dave Furth.
Financial support from the DFG via Postgraduate Programme at the University of Dortmund and via SFB 504 at the University
of Mannheim is acknowledged.
RID="*"
ID="*" Present address: University of Mannheim, SFB 504, L 13, 15, 68131 Mannheim, Germany (e-mail: possajen@sfb504.uni-mannheim.de) 相似文献
130.
Reiko Aoki 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):653-672
We show how credible revelation and ability to commit to quality choice effect equilibrium qualities and welfare when product
market is either Bertrand or Cournot competition. We show that results depend on the type of competition but not generally
on the cost of quality function. We show that with Bertrand competition, the equilibrium qualities are lower with credible
commitment. Competition is moderated and producer surplus is higher and consumer surplus lower. With Cournot competition,
higher quality will be better but lower quality will be worse with credible commitment. Consumer surplus is always greater
with credible commitment and if cost does not increase too quickly with quality, producer surplus will also increase. Thus
credible commitment is a collusive device with Bertrand competition but it can improve social welfare with Cournot competition.
Received: February 8, 2000; revised version: February 14, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The idea of this paper originated in the weekly workshops of Mordecai Kurz at Stanford. I am forever in debted to Mordecai
and fellow students – Luis Cabral, Peter DeMarzo, John Hillas, Michihiro Kandori, Steve Langois, Patrick McAllister, Steve
Sharpe, Peter Streufert, Steve Turnbull and Gyu-Ho Wang – for their criticism and encouragement. I also benefited from comments
from Yi-Heng Chen, Jin-Li Hu, Kala Krishna, Jinji Naoto, Thomas J. Prusa, and Shyh-Fang Ueng at various later stages of this
work. Last but not least, I am grateful for the detailed comments of the referee. 相似文献