论企业本质、公司治理与财务会计理论的契合:资本保全视角

基于企业本质从价值角度描述为财务资本、人力资本、组织资本与社会资本的一个不完全契约组合,公司治理就是保证这一契约组合有效执行的制度安排,而现代财务会计在理论与实践上更接近于公司治理.本文利用资本保全概念将企业本质、公司治理与财务会计理论整合为一个完整的理论框架.     

论公司法的修改与完善

《中华人民共和国公司法》在其实施的七年多时间里 ,对我国的经济发展起到了重要作用。但毋庸讳言 ,其部分条文设计的先天不足及指导思想的偏差 ,使得它与时代的要求还存在着一定的差距。本文从公司的设立条件、独资公司的取舍与规范、公司的治理结构以及如何在公司法中加强诉讼保护等方面 ,对公司法的修改与完善提出了相应的建议 ,以期对我国公司制度的成熟和发展有所裨益     

国有商业银行改革所面临的困难及改进措施

随着加入WTO后金融领域的逐步开放和外资银行的大批涌入 ,国有商业银行的改革和创新日益紧迫 ,而影响国有商业银行发展和竞争力的根本因素依然存在 ,如资本严重不足、治理结构及经营机制不完善、经营环境不健全等。要解决这些问题 ,不仅需要商业银行本身加大改革力度 ,大胆进行制度创新 ,建立法人治理结构 ,还需要国家有关部门在宏观调控和具体政策上为国有商业银行营造有力的政策和市场环境。     

Corporate Governance: Factors Influencing Voluntary Disclosure by Publicly Traded Canadian Firms*

We report on the comprehensiveness of voluntary corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports and management information circulars of Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) firms. We focus on disclosure of the corporate governance practices implemented by our sample of TSE 300 firms vis‐à‐vis the 14 guidelines set out in the TSE's report on corporate governance Where Were the Directors? Our analysis indicates that only a very few firms disclose that they have fully implemented the TSE guidelines, and that the extent of disclosure of corporate governance practices implemented varies widely among the firms. We then test factors associated with the comprehensiveness of such disclosures and the choice of disclosure medium using simultaneous equations multivariate analysis. We also assess the influence of publicized corporate governance failures on disclosure. Overall, our results suggest that the choices of disclosure medium and the extent of disclosure are made concurrently, and are influenced by the strategic considerations of management.     

The minimum variance hedge and the bankruptcy risk of the firm

In this paper, we analyze the influence of hedging with forward contracts on the firm's probability of bankruptcy (POB). The minimization of this probability can serve as a substitute for the maximization of shareholders' wealth. It is shown that the popular minimum variance hedge is generally neither necessary nor sufficient for the minimization of the firm's POB. Moreover, our model suggests a correction of the widespread view that a reduction in the variance of the future value of the firm is inevitably accompanied by a reduction in its default risk. We derive an analytical solution for the variance-minimizing hedge ratio of a firm exposed to both input and output price uncertainty that takes into account the issue of correlation. Based on this solution, we provide a graphical analysis to prove our claim that there is a fundamental difference between hedging policies focused on bankruptcy risk and those following conventional wisdom even if positive correlation constitutes a “natural” hedge.     

Default- and call-adjusted duration for corporate bonds

Call and default can potentially alter the timing and amounts of promised cashflows for callable, corporate bonds. While prior research has indicated the theoretical importance of adjusting Macaulay duration for the impacts of default and call, the question of their relative impact remains a matter of debate [The High Yield Debt Market, Dow Jones Irwin, New York, 1990, p. 18; J. Finan. 53 (1998) 2225]. We develop a theoretical analysis incorporating both default and call effects on duration and test its implications employing a previously unexplored data base of Canadian, investment grade, corporate bond indices containing an unusual provision making it possible to identify callable and noncallable indices.     

Capital, corporate income taxes, and catastrophe insurance

We provide estimates of the equity capital needed and the resulting tax costs incurred when supplying catastrophe insurance/reinsurance using a partial equilibrium model that incorporates a specific loss distribution for US catastrophe losses. After consideration of insurer investment in tax-exempt securities, tax loss carry-back/forward provisions, and personal taxes, our results imply that the tax costs of equity finance alone have a substantial effect on the cost of supplying catastrophe reinsurance. These results help explain a variety of industry developments that reduce tax costs. Also, when coupled with non-tax costs of capital, these results help explain the limited scope of catastrophe insurance/reinsurance.     

公司治理与IPO抑价——来自中国股票市场的经验证据

Jensen与Meckling(1976)认为,代理成本是投资者愿意支付的价格与公司内在价值之间的差异。投资者对公司代理成本的预期也会体现在IPO定价过程中,良好的公司治理结构有助于降低公司IPO抑价。本文以我国2002—2003年的133家IPO公司为研究样本,研究样本公司治理结构特征对IPO抑价的影响。结果发现,控制权结构特征以及关联交易性质对IPO抑价有显著的影响,而董事会独立性对IPO的抑价影响则不显著。本文的结果表明,良好的公司治理结构可以显著地降低IPO抑价,降低公司股权融资成本。     

Management accounting and corporate governance: An institutional interpretation of the agency problem

Challenging the dominant economic agency theory of corporate governance with a new discourse drawn from institutional theory, the paper analyses how management accounting is implicated in corporate governance. The proposed institutional theory of agency links the micro-institutions of the organization that are informed by the practices of management accounting with external institutional players and stakeholders. The paper identifies emerging narratives in which the management accounting profession has recognised a distinctive, post-Enron set of sensibilities. Although techniques drawn from strategic management accounting can be adapted to embed better corporate governance practices, the institutional theory of agency identifies tensions between the heroic CEO narrative and the routinization of strategy implicit in strategic management accounting.     

Board Members and Company Value

This essay surveys research about the value of individual members of boards of directors. When directors join or exit corporate boards, company stock prices respond, often in magnitudes of 1% of firm value or more. Related research shows that when a significant event impacts the stock price of one company, the effects are transmitted to other companies that share board members in common with the primary company. Share price reactions are sensitive to variables such as a director’s occupation, independence, and professional qualifications. Together, this evidence suggests that a well-functioning market for directors might already exist, making direct regulation unnecessary and possibly counter-productive.