Same as it ever was? Europe's national borders and the market for corporate control

National borders continue to be strong barriers for mergers and acquisitions in Europe. Using regional data, we construct a gravity model and find that the restraining impact of national borders decreased by more than 17 percent between 1991 and 2007. However, no significant change has occurred since the mid-1990s (i.e., four years before the introduction of the euro). In comparison, we run a corresponding analysis in the United States using the 10 federal regions as country equivalents. The resulting ‘quasi-border’ effect in the United States is weaker than that in the European Union. Yet its decline by 43 percent is much stronger in the same period. We conclude that European integration policy has had little effect on fostering M&A cross-border transactions.     

Corporate social responsibility reporting in financial institutions: Evidence from Euronext

The legitimacy, the identity and the social impact of financial institutions go beyond the generation of revenues for providers of capital, through financial intermediation. Financial institutions bear significant corporate social responsibility (CSR). We produce measures of CSR disclosure and explore the determinants of CSR disclosure practices in a cross section of financial institutions. Working with financial companies whose stocks are listed in the Euronext stock exchange, we find that the extent of disclosure of CSR practices is greater in large companies and also in companies of greater financial leverage. Therefore, increased corporate visibility and financial risk increase stakeholder demand for transparency on the social impact of financial institutions and their CSR practices.     

Mutual monitoring and corporate governance

Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number two executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the No. 2 executive are positively related to future firm value (Tobin’s Q); (2) the beneficial effect is more pronounced for firms with stronger incentives for the No. 2 to monitor and with higher information asymmetry between the boards and the CEOs; and (3) mutual monitoring is a substitute for other governance mechanisms. The results suggest that mutual monitoring provides important checks and balances on CEO power.     

Corporate risk-taking,firm value and high levels of managerial earnings forecasts

We examine the impact of high levels of managerial earnings forecasts, an important form of voluntary disclosure, on corporate risk-taking and firm value. Theory and anecdotal evidence suggest that a policy of high disclosure may reduce managers' willingness to invest in higher-risk, higher-return projects. We first verify, as in prior research, that corporate risk-taking is associated with higher future firm value. We then document a negative relation between firms with high levels of forecasting and corporate risk-taking. Finally, we provide evidence suggesting that high levels of managerial earnings forecasts reduce the positive association between corporate risk-taking and future firm value. Our results are robust to alternative measures of corporate risk-taking and future firm value, and alternative definitions of high levels of managerial earnings forecasts. Our results may be of importance to varying interests as they highlight the potential for high levels of earnings forecasts to inhibit corporate risk-taking and lower firm value.     

Extent of corporate governance disclosure by banks and finance companies listed on Nepal Stock Exchange

Corporate governance disclosure has seen renewed interest by researchers, policy makers, and regulating bodies internationally, but has remained only an emerging construct in Nepal. The primary purpose of this study was to assess the extent of mandatory corporate governance disclosure in Nepal. The secondary purpose was to examine the associations between the extent of disclosures and five firm-specific characteristics. The third purpose was to assess the significant determinants to explain variations of disclosures. The study's sampling frame consisted of 125 banking and finance companies listed on Nepal Stock Exchange. A sample size of 59 companies was randomly selected. On average, companies disclosed 91% of items in the mandatory category, 48% in the voluntary category, and 74% in total. A significant positive correlation existed between governance disclosures and firm characteristics of size, leverage, and foreign ownership. There was no significant relation between governance disclosure and listing age or profitability. With regards to determinants, bank size was a significant predictor of governance disclosure. Three regression models for total disclosures (DScore), mandatory disclosures [DScore (M)], and voluntary disclosures [DScore (V)] with three predictors of size, leverage, and foreign ownership were significant and explained 47%, 24%, and 54% variations respectively in total, mandatory, and voluntary corporate governance disclosures in Nepal. This research provides guidelines to policy makers and standard setters for developing future regulations and accounting policies.     

Engagement partner specialization and corporate disclosure transparency

This paper explores the association of audit partners' industry specialization with corporate disclosure transparency and the latter's informativeness. The distinctive institutional designs of partner signature requirement and Information Disclosure and Transparency Ranking System (IDTRS) adopted in Taiwan allow us to empirically address the issue. We posit and find that the rankings from the IDTRS are higher for firms audited by industry specialist engagement partners than for firms audited by non-specialist engagement partners. Additionally, the results show that the probability of informed trade (PIN) proxy for information asymmetry is negatively associated with the rankings for clients of industry specialist engagement partners, but not for clients of industry non-specialist engagement partners. The results are robust with respect to alternative estimation method and alternative measures of industry specialization. Overall, the evidence suggests that industry specialist engagement partners enhance the credibility of corporate disclosure transparency, through which information asymmetry is further declined. The evidence provides policy implications to the partner signature requirement adopted in Taiwan and China.     

The role of banks in the governance of nonfinancial firms: Evidence from Europe

The aim of our research is to investigate the important role of banks in the governance of companies listed in the Euronext 100 index. Primarily, this research seeks to examine the impact of a bank’s presence within a firm, as a creditor or shareholder, on firm performance, as well as the motivations of banks to acquire holdings, and whether the presence of a bank as a shareholder of a firm facilitates its access to bank loans. Empirical analyses are conducted with a sample of 86 nonfinancial institutions listed in the Euronext 100 index over the period 2008–2013 using the three-stage least squares method. The study shows, first, that the presence of a bank within a firm, as a creditor or shareholder, is positively related to firm performance. Moreover, the firm’s performance is an important determinant of the presence of bank shareholding. Finally, the presence of a bank as a shareholder of a firm does not facilitate its access to bank loans.     

Differences and similaritites between corporate governance principles in Islamic banks and Conventional banks

The purpose of this paper is to present the some differences and similarities between corporate governance principles in Islamic banks and conventional banks by paradigmatic diversification. Since Corporate governance in Islamic banks is a social phenomenon in Islamic societies, the paper uses social theory paradigms (functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist and radical structuralist) to compare between corporate governance in Islamic banks and conventional banks. This paper demonstrates that mainstream corporate corporate governance theories are not a law of nature but a social construct.     

Diversification and cash dynamics

Why do diversified firms hold significantly less cash than focused firms? We study this question using a dynamic model of corporate investment, saving, and diversification decisions. We find that investment dynamics are more important in explaining the cash differences than financing frictions. More efficient internal capital markets increase cash differences and are especially valuable when a firm diversifies or refocuses. Contrary to static models, more diverse conglomerates have lower cash differences. Endogenous selection (diversifying firms are larger and have better growth opportunities) accounts for 68% of the cash difference, and the diversification event itself reduces cash holdings by 32%.     

The relationship between corporate governance and foreign ownership of the banks in developing countries

The aim of this paper is to determine the effect of corporate governance on foreign ownership of the banks. Within this context, annual data of 65 developing countries for the periods between 2004 and 2013 was analyzed. In addition to this situation, 7 explanatory variables were used in this study in order to achieve this objective. As a result of the analysis, it was identified that there is a strong relationship between operations of foreign banks and governance levels of the countries. In this regard, it was determined that the factors of corruption, political stability, rule of law and flexibility in legal regulations affect foreign bank operations. Moreover, it was also analyzed that foreign bank operations are stronger in the countries that have low poverty, high political stability and efficient legal infrastructure. On the other hand, it was defined that strict legal regulation affects foreign bank operations negatively which shows that foreign banks prefer to enter into the countries that have flexible legal regulations. This study gives essential information to developing countries about the factors that affect the decisions of foreign banks in order to enter into a developing country. Therefore, by considering the results of this study, the authorities of these countries can have a chance to take necessary actions so as to attract foreign banks.