The impact of equity ownership groups on investment: Evidence from Ukraine

We empirically investigate the impact of different ownership groups on companies’ investment in Ukraine with a novel dynamic investment model where investment is based on present and historical levels of profitability (market-to-book value of equity) and lagged investment. Groups include state, insider, non-domestic, financial and financial and industrial group (FIG) ownership. Contrary to the literature, we find that the past level of profitability significantly affects investment; the majority presence of and increases in state ownership have a negative impact on firms’ investment, as is the case for non-domestic and financial companies’ ownership. Insider and FIG ownership have no impact on investment. We explain the results by the extent of liquidity concerns (hard and soft budget constraints), measured by cash flow interacted with a dummy variable of majority ownership of the respective group, and the extent of asset stripping for the corresponding ownership group and relate them to over- and under-investment, and to the free cash flow or cash constraint hypothesis.     

Engagement partner specialization and corporate disclosure transparency

This paper explores the association of audit partners' industry specialization with corporate disclosure transparency and the latter's informativeness. The distinctive institutional designs of partner signature requirement and Information Disclosure and Transparency Ranking System (IDTRS) adopted in Taiwan allow us to empirically address the issue. We posit and find that the rankings from the IDTRS are higher for firms audited by industry specialist engagement partners than for firms audited by non-specialist engagement partners. Additionally, the results show that the probability of informed trade (PIN) proxy for information asymmetry is negatively associated with the rankings for clients of industry specialist engagement partners, but not for clients of industry non-specialist engagement partners. The results are robust with respect to alternative estimation method and alternative measures of industry specialization. Overall, the evidence suggests that industry specialist engagement partners enhance the credibility of corporate disclosure transparency, through which information asymmetry is further declined. The evidence provides policy implications to the partner signature requirement adopted in Taiwan and China.     

Differences and similaritites between corporate governance principles in Islamic banks and Conventional banks

The purpose of this paper is to present the some differences and similarities between corporate governance principles in Islamic banks and conventional banks by paradigmatic diversification. Since Corporate governance in Islamic banks is a social phenomenon in Islamic societies, the paper uses social theory paradigms (functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist and radical structuralist) to compare between corporate governance in Islamic banks and conventional banks. This paper demonstrates that mainstream corporate corporate governance theories are not a law of nature but a social construct.     

International investors’ reactions to cross-border acquisitions by emerging market multinationals

How do international investors react to announcements of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CM&As) by emerging market multinational enterprises (EMNEs)? Using a unique and manually-constructed firm-level dataset, this paper examines the stock price reactions to CM&A announcements made over the period 1991–2010 by Chinese MNEs listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the wealth impacts of their corporate governance. Our empirical findings confirm a positive stock price reaction on average, and suggest that international investors react positively to the presence of large shareholders, but negatively to the presence of institutional shareholders. There is a negative impact if the largest shareholder is either the State or the corporate founder. We suggest that this is because the international investors perceive potential principal–principal conflicts in such ownership/control constellations and discount equity prices accordingly. We also find that Board size and independence have positive effects on the price reaction, but that large supervisory boards engender negative reactions.     

Does CEO duality constrain board independence? Some evidence from audit pricing

This study examines whether CEO duality affects the association between board independence and demand for higher quality audits, proxied by audit fee. The findings show that there is a positive association between board independence and audit fees. This result is consistent with findings of Carcello et al. (2002) that more independent boards demand higher audit quality and effort. However, this positive association is only present in firms without CEO duality, thus suggesting that CEO duality constrains board independence. The results support recommendations against CEO duality by showing that dominant CEOs may compromise the independence of their board of directors. Additionally, evidence is provided that board size (the number of directors on the board) is positively associated with audit fee pricing. This is consistent with prior studies that indicate that larger board sizes are associated with inefficiency and negative firm performance.     

Political interventions in state-owned enterprises: The corporate governance failures of a European airline

This paper is based on the theory of hybrid organizations and we investigate the context, factors, mediators, and outcome of a public scandal involving a Romanian state-owned company in the civil aviation sector. This retrospective case study is part of a research design that alternates between inductive and deductive procedures devised to test relevant hypotheses, integrate several theories, and construct the causal mechanism of the corporate scandal. Four theories have been selected to address multiple aspects of the case: the hybrid organization theory, the agency theory, the fraud triangle theory, and the legitimacy theory. Several hypotheses have been proposed at the confluence of these frameworks, and the data collection process was conducted to ensure the credibility, dependability, and transferability of results. In addition to the themes and categories that have emerged from the thematic analysis, the paper also uses the process-tracing method to propose a causal graph and an event-history map in support of the hypotheses. The paper puts forward a series of recommendations on how to improve the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises, and to prevent potential scandals. The authors suggest that the separation of ownership and control is beneficial for strategy implementation in state-owned enterprises and can alleviate an entity’s financial difficulties.     

公司社会声望与高管薪酬:公共服务抑或职业声誉

本文基于“隐性—显性”契约激励研究范式,探讨公司社会声望对高管薪酬的影响以及作用机制。本文选取2009—2017年间的非金融A股上市公司为样本,研究发现,拥有较高社会声望的公司,其高管显性薪酬较低。具体而言,公共地位较高的国有企业、具有较高市场声誉的民营上市公司,其高管薪酬平均而言分别比其他上市公司低4.97%和6.30%。进一步地,我们发现公司声望对我国高管显性薪酬契约存在两种作用机制:一方面,公共地位较高的国有企业,可以为高管带来较高的社会声誉和社会认可,满足了“公共服务”类高管的社会声望偏好,从而降低了显性薪酬的支付水平;另一方面,市场声誉较高的民营企业,可以为高管带来较高的职业声誉和未来职业利益,符合“以商为荣”类高管的社会声望偏好,使高管愿意接受较低的显性薪酬。本文的结论为公司声望作为一种有价值的资源,可以对高管显性薪酬形成议价能力提供了重要证据,揭示了公司声望对高管显性契约激励的影响路径;同时,为国有企业高管薪酬契约设计以及激励机制提供了一定启示。     

REASONS FOR DELISTING AND CONSEQUENCES: A LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH AGENDA

This paper discusses the literature on delisting, drawing on USA and international evidence. Given the great heterogeneity in delisting operations, we first consider the standard existing typology based on the initiator of the delisting (the stock market authorities, or the firm itself). Second, while managers often cite high compliance costs (especially due to Sarbanes–Oxley Act implementation) as the official reason for the voluntary delisting of their firm, we highlight that firms face different trade-offs in their delisting decision. We also examine the reasons for involuntary delisting, especially the delisting dilemma faced by stock market authorities when the firm violates the listing requirements. Next, we review the economic consequences of delisting in terms of value creation or value destruction for shareholders. Finally, noting gaps in the literature and other contrasting results, we propose suggestions for future research.     

Corporate governance in family firms,learning and reaction to recession: Evidence from Italy

This paper focuses on the interaction between internal and external factors explaining performance of small and medium-sized family firms. We used framework foresight to suggest how learning and internal factors such as CEO’s origin, tenure and turnover, could affect the firm’s reactions to one particular external factor, economic recession. The paper draws on empirical observations of a large sample of small and medium family firms operating in Italy between 2002 and 2011 to identify the baseline future, an expected future for these firms. This analysis may be of interest to both management scholars and practitioners. We hope to contribute to the debate on how internal and external factors interact to affect firm success, measured as sales growth. The implications for the future viability of an economic system based on family businesses are straightforward, as the turbulence and instability of the economic environment has grown significantly in the last decade, especially in more developed countries. Whether the ability of a company to adapt and survive to negative shocks depends on its governance provides a rationale for exploring alternative perspectives on the competitiveness of the economic system and the ability of different owners to cope with future negative events.     

The Influence of Vested Interests on Healthcare Legislation in the USA, 2009–2010

Collective lobbying organizations and some big companies acted as cautious partners in the design of the Affordable Care Act of the Obama Administration. In addition to being consulted by government executives, these entities intensively lobbied legislators. The qualitative and statistical analysis I conduct here shows a positive impact of healthcare lobbying. Collective lobbying organizations have a significant impact on lawmaking and complementary lobbying enhances their impact. However, not all (disjointed) lobbying is successful. Perspective-based distortion might explain why organizations lobby on issues against all odds of ever being effective.