Business regulation and labor market performance around the world

Using data from 74 industrial, developing and transition countries for the years 2000–2003, this paper analyzes empirically whether and to what extent anticompetitive business regulations affect the performance of the labor market. According to the regression results, they appear to increase unemployment rates and lower employment rates. It seems that they particularly worsen the employment situation of young people. Our results are robust to variations in specification.      

奖章与陷阱:渐进转轨中的腐败

中国在1970年代后期开始推进以市场化为导向的改革战略，国民经济和社会福利得到迅速的改善和提高，但腐败现象也比较严重；同时，市场化的推进并未能遏制住腐败的扩散，市场化程度较高的地区反而面临着更为严重的腐败现象。通过分析中国的经济转轨过程，本文对此作出了解释。与其他处于经济转轨过程中的经济体相比，中国经济发展所具有的特殊的制度安排既促成了经济的迅速成长，也引发了普遍的腐败问题。它们包括：经济决策的地方分权、双轨制市场化和集体所有的产权形式，这些要素既提高了官员推动经济增长的激励，也促使许多官员以腐败的形式分享经济增长的红利，而以“关系”为基础的社会文化背景、中央政治权威的稳定性有助于减少官员在抽租过程中对经济增长可能产生的负面影响。另外，我们认为，市场化改革对腐败可能产生两方面效应，一方面，市场化通过培育新型的企业家阶层促使大量资源由市场配置，这有助于减少腐败发生的可能性；另一方面．市场化进程通过促进经济增长提高了经济中的租金总量，这成为诱发寻租行为的因素。最终的净效应取决于政府部门的改革。发生在中国的现象可以归结为政府改革的不彻底性。     

Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment

This paper contributes to the ongoing methodological debate on context-free versus in-context presentation of experimental tasks. We report an experiment using the paradigm of a bribery experiment. In one condition, the task is presented in a typical bribery context, the other one uses abstract wording. Though the underlying context is heavily loaded with negative ethical preconceptions, we do not find significant differences with our 18 independent observations per treatment. We conjecture that the experimental design transmits the essential features of a bribery situation already with neutral framing, such that the presentation does not add substantially to subjects’ interpretation of the task. JEL Classification C91 · D62 · D72 · D73 · K42     

透析高校学术腐败现象

学术是神圣庄严的 ,高校本应是一方净土。但越来越严重的高校学术腐败现象使庄严的学术面临失范和失衡的危险。本文列举了当前高校学术腐败的主要表现形式 ,分析了其产生的原因 ,并提出了防治措施。     

Does corruption affect income inequality and poverty?

This paper provides evidence that high and rising corruption increases income inequality and poverty. An increase of one standard deviation in corruption increases the Gini coefficient of income inequality by about 11 points and income growth of the poor by about 5 percentage points per year. These findings are robust to use of different instruments for corruption and other sensitivity analyses. The paper discusses several channels through which corruption may affect income inequality and poverty. An important implication of these findings is that policies that reduce corruption will most likely reduce income inequality and poverty as well. Received: March 2, 2000 / Accepted: September 20, 2001     

政府清廉、财政政策与经济增长

减速治理背景下,政府官员廉洁程度与财政政策有效性之间的动态关系引起社会广泛关注。基于赋予转移概率以时变特征的MS-TVTP模型,研究发现：中国腐败治理取得阶段性成果,但并未呈现持续性改善趋势;政府廉洁状况的改善有助于财政政策有效性的提高,也有利于经济扩张区间的相对延长,最终促进经济增长,但由于中国尚处于腐败较为严重区间且改善程度有限,导致这一促进作用并不十分突出;此外,信贷政策对经济增长的促进作用已十分有限。     

Local corruption and corporate cash holdings: Sheltering assets or agency conflict?

This study investigates the impact of corruption on corporate cash holdings in China. The political extraction argument predicts that firms might shelter liquid assets to avoid extraction by corrupt officials. Using data on A-shared listed firms between 2007 and 2012, we find that firms located in more corrupt regions hold less cash, supporting this hypothesis. Political resources help to diminish the risk of exploitation, reducing the extent to which liquid assets are sheltered. We find that the negative association between corruption and cash holding is more significant for non-state-owned enterprises (Non-SOEs) than for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Moreover, the cash holdings of Non-SOEs without political connections are more sensitive to corruption than those of Non-SOEs with political connections. These findings demonstrate that expropriation by corrupt officials is an important factor driving firms to manage liquidity.     

Framing public governance in Malaysia: Rhetorical appeals through accrual accounting

In government, the challenges of governance and anti-corruption are exacerbated by accounting not being fit for purpose. In developing countries, many governments adopt accrual accounting as a panacea. Drawing on Goffman's frame analysis, and rhetorical appeals to logic, credibility and emotion, this paper examines the adoption of accrual accounting in Malaysia. It was found accrual accounting has potential for keying governance and anti-corruption. However, rhetorical appeals that attempt to legitimate neo-liberalism and engender public support in the name of progress were hindered by perceptions of endemic corruption and relatively weak democratic institutions of ‘good’ governance common to developing countries.     

Can a corrupt ruling party win a re-election through vote buying?

In many developing countries, it is common for electoral candidates to use embezzled money to buy votes. We develop a dynamic model to analyse the trade-off between economic performance and free handouts resulting from corruption on an incumbent party’s chances of being re-elected. The results show, because voters anticipate handouts from the politicians, politicians engage in corrupt behaviour early in the election cycle while minimizing unemployment and maximizing vote buying at the end of the election cycle.     

Strategic location of firms: Does it empower bribe givers or bribe takers?

This paper uses survey data on the corruption experience (rather than corruption perceptions) of firms located in different types of cities in more than one hundred countries to analyze the impact of firms’ strategic location on corruption. In a corrupt economy, location might influence the ability of bureaucrats/politicians and firms to extract and dodge rents. Placing the analysis in the literature on determinants of corruption, our results reveal that the corruption experiences of firms located in nations’ capital cities are qualitatively different from firms located elsewhere: they do not experience greater corruption, while firms in large cities and main business cities do. However, when manufacturing and service firms are considered separately, their corruption experience and perceptions differ.