Anticorruption Strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons from Experience and Ingredients of a Successful Strategy

ABSTRACT

The effects of corruption on economic development have been extensively examined. There is overwhelming evidence that corruption is detrimental to economic progress. This, in turn, has provided the rationale to combat corruption. With the insistence of international development partners, many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have put in place anticorruption strategies to fight corruption. This paper looks at the strategies adopted by some Sub-Saharan African countries to combat corruption with a view to identifying the strengths and weaknesses. Based on the successes or failures of the strategies in the cases examined, the elements that constitute a successful anticorruption strategy are identified. Of the ingredients of anticorruption strategy examined in the paper, the political will to fight corruption appears to be the overriding factor in mounting a successful anticorruption campaign. Besides identifying the necessary factors for a successful anticorruption strategy, the paper also serves as an update on the state of corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa and the literature on the causes of corruption.     

Swiss watch cycles: Evidence of corruption during leadership transition in China

This paper presents evidence of corruption during China's leadership transitions when governmental positions are open for competition. The import value of luxury watches, a popular medium for corrupt exchanges, peaked during regular leadership transitions in 1996–97, 2001–02, and 2006–07. However, imports of nonluxury watches and other luxury items unpopular for corrupt exchanges did not exhibit the same cycle. Nor did imports of luxury watches increase in Hong Kong, Singapore, or the US. During the leadership transition of 2011–12, since wearing a conspicuous luxury watch was by then likely to be exposed on social media and trigger an anti-corruption investigation, this “Swiss watch cycle” vanished.     

The effects of mafia infiltration on public procurement performance

We examine the effects of Mafia infiltration on public procurement performance, based on a sample of 68,063 public work contracts (PWC) awarded by Italian municipalities over the period 2012–2017, of which 687 are identified as Mafia-infiltrated, either because of being awarded by municipal councils subsequently dissolved due to Mafia infiltration, or because of being won by Mafia-owned firms.Our results reveal that Mafia infiltration is positively associated with number of submitted bids, awarding rebates and execution cost overruns, whereas it is negatively associated with delivery delays for PWC. The effect of Mafia infiltration on execution cost overruns and the probability of their occurrence is weaker for larger PWC, and the elections of the new municipal councils, after the dissolution of the previous ones, do not significantly influence the performance of PWC.Our findings suggest the presence of collusive schemes among bidding firms within the Mafia network and provide new insights for the implementation of more sound policies to tackle practices associated with Mafia infiltration in public procurement.     

Preventing rather than punishing: An early warning model of malfeasance in public procurement

Is it possible to predict malfeasance in public procurement? With the proliferation of e-procurement systems in the public sector, anti-corruption agencies and watchdog organizations have access to valuable sources of information with which to identify transactions that are likely to become troublesome and why. In this article, we discuss the promises and challenges of using machine learning models to predict inefficiency and corruption in public procurement. We illustrate this approach with a dataset with more than two million public procurement contracts in Colombia. We trained machine learning models to predict which of them will result in corruption investigations, a breach of contract, or implementation inefficiencies. We then discuss how our models can help practitioners better understand the drivers of corruption and inefficiency in public procurement. Our approach will be useful to governments interested in exploiting large administrative datasets to improve the provision of public goods, and it highlights some of the tradeoffs and challenges that they might face throughout this process.     

吃喝费用的“得”与“失”—基于上市公司投融资效率的研究

本文以2009-2012年A股上市公司为样本,研究企业吃喝费用对投融资效率的影响。研究发现:在融资方面,平均来看,吃喝费用每提高1%,债务融资额度增加2.91%。在投资方面,上市公司的吃喝费用显著降低了企业的投资效率,对于投资不足的公司,吃喝费用每提高1%,投资不足程度增加5.89-9.76%;对于过度投资的公司,吃喝费用每提高1%,投资效率降低12.29-15.10%。公司治理在企业投资过程中的监督机制缺位,是导致投资效率低下的重要原因。本文的研究对探析后金融危机时代我国上市公司的腐败行为对企业经营的微观经济效应提供了经验证据。     

人文社会科学课题经费管理制度之反思

相对于自然科学而言,人文社会科学课题经费使用具有不同的特点,即经费数额较少,贪腐数额较小、手段简单,贪腐成本高,且普遍存在人文社会科学课题经费入不敷出的情况。目前,课题经费管理制度存在很多问题,如无劳务费、培训支出无法报销以及存在报销时限等。应从以下几个方面进行完善：遵循课题经费项目负责人和报销人共同负责原则;在人文社会科学中明确指定较高比例的课题经费为劳务费;改革预算与发票报销制度;拓宽科目报销范围。     

父代关系与代际收入流动：基于教育和就业的视角

文章运用计量方法分析了父代关系与中国代际收入流动性的关系。我们用2010年中国家庭追踪调查中父代为了子女上学和就业“找关系”来衡量寻租行为,通过工具变量法和分位回归法探讨了父代关系对不同人群的影响。结果显示,为子女就学（就业）找关系对于代际收入流动有一定的促进作用;进一步,分位回归和不同社会区域特征的影响揭示,教育和就业领域的“寻租市场”远远不是完全有效市场,在这一市场中所进行的寻租行为进一步加剧了教育和就业资源在城乡之间、不同收入阶层之间原本就存在的分布不均。教育资源均等化和劳动力市场的进一步市场化对于减少为了子代福利而进行的寻租腐败行为、以及建设机会均等的和谐社会具有重要意义。     

Outward FDI from the USA and host country financial transparency

Extant research has focused on the role of host country corruption as either an attractant or deterrent to foreign investment. These studies generally contend that corruption acts more like a ‘grabbing hand’ than as a ‘helping hand’. However, it is plausible that a significant component of foreign investment may be attracted to locales that offer opaque financial environments. Specifically, we hypothesize that money laundering opportunities may encourage illicit capital flows into certain jurisdictions. Using the USA as the ‘source’ country, we investigate the effect of corruption and money laundering opportunities on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows. The empirical findings indicate that corruption deters foreign investment, while money laundering opportunities attract it. We also show that the effect of money laundering and corruption vary based on the host country's level of development. Our findings bolster the contention that FDI into certain host countries is motivated by a facilitation of illicit capital flows.     

Growth, public investment and corruption with failing institutions

Corruption is thought to prevent poor countries from catching up with richer ones. We analyze one channel through which corruption hampers growth: public investment can be distorted in favor of specific types of spending for which rent-seeking is easier and better concealed. To study this distortion, we propose a dynamic model where households vote for the composition of public spending, subject to an incentive constraint reflecting individuals’ choice between productive activity and rent-seeking. In equilibrium, the structure of public investment is determined by the predatory technology and the distribution of political power. Among different regimes, the model shows a possible scenario of distortion without corruption in which there is no effective corruption but the possibility of corruption still distorts the allocation of public investment. We test the implications of the model on a set of countries using a two-stage least squares estimation. We find that developing countries with high predatory technology invest more in housing and physical capital in comparison with health and education. The reverse is true for developed countries.      

Corruption and public debt: a cross-country analysis

Using data from a large panel of countries over the period 1995–2015, this article empirically investigates the effect of corruption on public debt. Overall, the estimates reveal that corruption increases public debt. The effect, however, appears to be heterogeneous across income-related sample splits: it is stronger for advanced economies, but weaker and less statistically robust for less-developed countries, where external factors such as foreign aid may also affect public debt. The analysis suggests the inadequacy of conventional wisdom assuming that more detrimental fiscal effects of corruption arise in low-income countries.