由“问责风暴”谈公务员行政法律责任的完善

一段时间以来。国内安全事故频频见诸报端,有不少官员被依法追究行政法律责任,其影响之大被媒体形容为中国掀起“问责风暴”。这种现象应当引起我们对公务员行政法律责任完善的思考,问责应当形成常态机制,而不能是运动式的追责效果．在这方面可以借鉴香港地区的“廉政公署”制度,健全公务员行政问责机制。     

Investment Flows,Economic Growth,and Corruption in African Countries: An Analysis

ABSTRACT

The analysis of corruption in international business is a relatively new phenomenon, and for the past two decades, many studies have attempted to capture the economic impact of the corruption in a country. However, most of these studies have concentrated their analysis to the experiences of the developed countries. None or very few of the current works have addressed the corruption issue in the context of foreign direct investment and economic growth in the developing countries. This work examines theoretically, as well as empirically, the incidence of corruption in the context of foreign direct investment in the developing countries, especially several African countries that signed a treaty to reduce the incidence of corruption in their respective countries.     

Bridging Africa’s income inequality gap: How relevant is China’s outward FDI to Africa?

This study examines whether: (i) the remarkable inflow of Chinese FDI to Africa matters for bridging the continent’s marked income inequality gap, (ii) Africa’s institutional fabric is effective in propelling Chinese FDI towards the equalisation of incomes in Africa and (iii) there exist relevant thresholds required for the various governance dynamics to cause Chinese FDI to equalise incomes in Africa. Our results, which are based on the dynamic GMM estimator and macrodata for 48 African countries, reveal the following. First, although Chinese FDI contributes to fairer income distribution in Africa, the effect is weak. Second, although Africa’s institutional fabric matters for propelling Chinese FDI towards the equalisation of incomes across the continent, governance mechanisms for ensuring political stability, low corruption, and voice and accountability are critical. Finally, the critical masses required for these three key governance dynamics to cause Chinese FDI and other income inequality-reducing modules to reduce income inequality are 0.8, 0.5 and 0.1, respectively. These critical masses are thresholds at which governance is necessary but no longer sufficient to complement Chinese FDI to mitigate income inequality. Hence, at the attendant thresholds, complementary policies are worthwhile. Policy recommendations are provided in the conclusion.     

密封价格拍卖或招标中的有限腐败

本文研究了密封价格拍卖或招投标中的有限腐败问题,探讨了当行贿者通过行贿招标主持人获得多次出标机会,而其他竞标者不知道这种有限腐败行为时,对拍卖结果所产生的影响。在第二价格拍卖机制下,由于竞标者按真实估价报价总是弱占优策略,该有限腐败行为在此拍卖机制下不会产生影响。但对于密封的第一价格拍卖机制来说,由于行贿者的多个标价中的最高标价比其他竞标者的标价更强势(aggressive),导致其他竞标者获胜的概率减少,行贿者获胜的概率增加。而行贿者的其他出标机会所用的出标策略比其他竞标者的出标策略要弱势,所以在保证期望收益增加的情况下所付出的期望支付有可能比在没有腐败情形下的期望支付要低。特别地,当行贿者获得更多的出标机会时所采用的出标策略与我们的直觉是有差异的。有限腐败对于物品所有者来说是不利的,他的期望收益随着行贿者的特权的增强而减少。     

Quantifying corruption by a human capital earnings equation

This paper uses a human capital earnings equation to quantify administrative corruption in the public sector. Regression analyses are conducted based on information from surveys administered to public officials in Albania. After accounting for officials’ characteristics, e.g., schooling, experience, gender, type of agency, and public and private sectors’ features, we deduce that the administrative corruption was on average 2.6× the officials’ current salary in Albania, which is equivalent to 16.7% of the country’s GDP.

官员腐败对公司实际税率影响的实证研究

税收政策是国家重要的财政政策,当前中国官员在税收执行方面拥有很大的自由裁量权,即政府官员在决定公司享受税收优惠政策上有很大的支配权和决策空间。税务负担是企业的重要支出,为了减轻税务负担,企业有行贿官员以达到降低税务负担的动机。本文以1993～2008年来披露的省部级腐败官员的案例为基础,手工收集涉及腐败官员的上市公司,实证分析了官员腐败对公司税负的影响。研究发现,在行贿事件发生后,相对于没有行贿的公司,行贿公司的实际税率更低,而且行贿公司的实际税率在行贿事件发生后下降。我们认为应该缩小政府职能范围,限制政府官员的权利,建立官僚体系内部的约束激励机制。     

试论“消极腐败”

＂消极腐败＂是品行不端、作风不正的失职失德型的责任行为。＂消极腐败＂表现为奢靡主义、官僚主义、形式主义和好人主义。＂消极腐败＂源于体制不完善、亲情文化、社会监督乏力。＂消极腐败＂影响恶劣,克服＂消极腐败＂要坚持标本兼治、综合治理、惩防并举、注重预防的方针,深入开展党风廉政建设和反腐败斗争;要推进惩治和预防腐败体系建设;要用制度管权管事管人;要强化公共权力的行使者的廉政文化。     

Corruption and Economic Efficiency: Panel Data Evidence

Abstract

This paper investigates empirically the effect of corruption on countries' economic efficiency. By using a sample of 79 countries for the time period 2000–2006 the paper applies DEA window analysis and econometric panel data techniques. The results reveal that there is a U-shaped relationship between countries' corruption perception levels and economic efficiency. Furthermore, it appears that corruption has a negative effect on countries' economic efficiency. For the first time the turning points of such a relationship are being produced indicating that on average terms and regardless of countries' economic structure, Corruption Perception Index (CPI) above five initiate a positive effect on a countries' economic efficiency.     

Tax structures in developing countries: Many puzzles and a possible explanation

Tax policies seen in developing countries are puzzling on many dimensions, given the sharp contrast between these policies and both those seen in developed countries and those forecast in the optimal tax literature. In this paper, we explore how forecasted policies change if firms can successfully evade taxes by conducting all business in cash, thereby avoiding any use of the financial sector. The forecasted policies are now much closer to those observed.     

Firm-level determinants of tax evasion in transition economies

Business tax evasion is an important issue for governments. Yet the factors that determine business tax evasion have not been sufficiently examined in the literature in general, and in transition contexts in particular. To address this gap, this study uses the WB/EBRD Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) database with a sample of over 12,692 firms from 26 transition economies. Applying various modelling strategies, we argue that tax evasion is a function of firm-level and institutional-level variables. We contribute to the literature by providing robust evidence showing that the perceived tax burden has a positive impact on tax evasion. We also find that the tax evasive behaviour of firms is positively influenced by low trust in government and in the judicial system as well as by higher perceptions of corruption and higher compliance costs. We find that smaller firms, individual businesses and firms in sectors that are less visible to the tax administration are more likely to get involved in evasive behaviour. Overall, institutional factors play an important role in determining firms’ tax evasion behaviour in transition economies. This finding has important policy implications.