Harassment, corruption and tax policy: A comment on Marjit, Mukherjee and Mukherjee [Eur. J. Political Economy 16 (2000) 75–94]

Our comment on Marjit et al. [Marjit, S., Mukherjee, V., Mukherjee, A., 2000. Harassment, corruption and tax policy. European Journal of Political Economy 16, 75–94.] addresses the equilibrium concept used in the game with imperfect information, Section 4 of the original paper. The solution represented in the original paper does not constitute a perfect Bayesian Nash-equilibrium. We develop an alternative solution of the game given the assumptions made by Marjit et al. [Marjit, S., Mukherjee, V., Mukherjee, A., 2000. Harassment, corruption and tax policy. European Journal of Political Economy 16, 75–94.] and find that the results concerning the optimal amount of over-evaluation of income and the existence of a pooling or separating equilibrium are altered.     

Corruption, Growth, and Income Distribution: Are there Regional Differences?

This paper uses panel data from 61 countries at different stages of economic development over a 20-year period to investigate regional differences in the effect of corruption on economic growth and income distribution. Using two measures of corruption, we find that there are statistically significant regional differences in the growth and distributional impacts of corruption. The largest growth impact of corruption is found in African countries while OECD and Asian countries have the lowest growth impact. On the other hand, the largest distributional impact of corruption in found in Latin America. A 10% decrease in corruption increases the growth rate of income by about 1.7% in OECD and Asian countries, 2.6% in Latin American countries, and by 2.8% in African countries. A one standard deviation decrease in corruption decreases the gini coefficient of income distribution (0–1 scale) by 0.05 points, 0.14 points, 0.25 points, and 0.33 points in OECD, Asian, African, and Latin American countries, respectively. The results are robust to various specifications, measurement of corruption, measures of investment, as well as the conditioning variables. The results have interesting policy implications for economic growth, especially in low income countries with high rates of corruption.     

行政腐败的宏观经济学分析

本文在增长模型中引入行政腐败和由行政腐败而引起的调整成本 ,考察其对经济增长的影响。通过模型分析得出 ,当政府公共支出的边际生产率比较高 ,税率比较低以及由腐败引致的调整成本比较高时 ,行政腐败对经济增长的负面影响占主导地位。通过对我国行政腐败与公共支出、经济增长率之间关系进行实证分析得出 :在我国市场化过程中 ,行政腐败降低了我国经济增长率 ;在我国公共支出领域 ,行政腐败行为的发生浪费了大量的公共支出。不论以受贿金额占GDP的比重 ,还是以腐败涉及县处以上官员的变动作为衡量行政腐败的指标 ,行政腐败与公共支出占GDP的比重都呈现正相关关系 ;在我国经济发展的过程中 ,存在着大量的预算外支出。预算外支出为腐败行为的发生提供了便利。而且 ,预算外支出由地方或政府官员控制 ,由此引起围绕公共支出的调整成本上升。这表明 ,预算外支出就整体而言阻碍了经济增长。     

党组织参与公司治理与民营企业高管腐败

随着改革的深入,民营企业的健康成长已然攸关中国经济的可持续发展和社会稳定。但近年来频发的民营企业高管腐败问题屡禁不止,即使在高压反腐的背景下,这一问题仍然没有在根本上得到遏制。基于此,文章从基层党建的角度出发,探讨了党组织参与治理对于民营企业（高管）腐败的影响机制和效果。利用2004-2017年中国上市民营公司数据,作者发现：作为正式化、制度化和常态化的治理安排,企业内部党组织的建立能够有效抑制高管腐败的发生,这得益于党组织参与企业治理过程中的监督、协调和推动企业廉洁文化建设方面的作用。进一步,党组织参与治理还能够显著弱化高管权力集中以及家族涉入所带来的不利影响。由此,文章丰富了民营企业高管腐败和党建工作方面的研究文献,为民营企业如何更好地监督和约束高管腐败提供了实践启示。     

微腐败对企业生产率的影响——基于世界银行对143个国家企业调查数据的实证研究

文章利用世界银行对全球143个国家2002-2014年企业的调查数据,重点考察企业微腐败行为对企业生产率的影响。实证结果表明,在控制内生性问题的前提下,微腐败会显著降低企业生产率,一系列稳健性检验验证了结论的可靠性。此外,文章还重点探讨了微腐败影响企业生产率的机制,发现微腐败会显著抑制企业创新从而损害企业生产率。分子样本讨论发现,微腐败对私营企业、服务行业、腐败程度高地区以及经济欠发达地区的企业的生产率负面影响更大。     

"经济人"假设与腐败治理

腐败的蔓延给中国经济社会带来了严重的负面影响,引起社会各界的高度关注。不同的人性假设对腐败的根源有不同的解释。中国传统文化以“性善论”为人性假设,得出了道德防腐的结论;现代经济学以“经济人”为假设前提,得出了制度防腐与法制反腐的主张。在反腐问题上,长期以来存在着分歧。有人认为腐败是“次优选择”,主张有限反腐;有人试图“利用”腐败,任其“腐败出一套新制度来”,因而不主张反腐;多数人是主张坚决反腐的。通过从经济学角度分析腐败问题,认为腐败扰乱了市场的纠错功能,阻碍了改革进程,力主反腐。     

Conditions and benefits of applying decision technological solutions as a tool to curb corruption within the procurement process: The case of Hungary

Unethically influencing a decision maker is as old as civilization. Corruption is an especially damaging phenomenon in the field of public procurement. Experiences in curbing procurement corruption in Hungary, a former Eastern-block country which recently joined the EU, strengthens the view that by raising the level of evaluation practices through the use of decision support methodologies that can serve to narrow the possible damaging effects of corruption. This outcome may be achieved if legal regulations provide a supportive frame and organizational culture can be shaped to accommodate new decision practices.     

THE IMPACT OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION: A SURVEY

In this paper, we offer a comprehensive and updated review of the impact of fiscal decentralization on the economy, society and politics. Our first target is the examination of two crucial and yet unsolved issues in the empirical literature on decentralization: the proper measurement of decentralization itself and its potential endogeneity in econometric estimates. Then, we discuss the main existing findings on the effects of decentralization on a relevant list of socio-economic issues. The impact of fiscal decentralization reforms on political institutions and public policies is also considered. Complete answers on the impact of fiscal decentralization are not likely to be certain but, overall, there are reasons to be optimistic about the net positive result. Our survey by necessity has to be selective but it presents a balanced view of what is known and what is not yet known opening room for further research and practice on fiscal decentralization.     

Corrupción como proceso organizacional: comprendiendo la lógica de la desnormalización de la corrupción

This article discusses the basic assumptions of an individualist vision on corruption. A different argument based on “social density” of the phenomenon is proposed instead: the process of normalization of corruption. Under this umbrella, corruption is a political concept that looks to impose a particular vision on what are “right” behaviors based on a sharp and unrealistic separation of the public and private sphere. A review of the organizational literature on corruption is developed, with the aim of understanding how organizational processes of socialization triggers behaviors that make corrupt acts to appear as “normal” under the organizational logic. Persons find themselves in a “slippery slope”, generating agreements and social dynamics that are able to produce corrupt logics under the normal life of an organization. A plea for discussing the social processes needed to “un-normalize” corruption is defended a conceptualization that goes beyond an individualist and moralist vision of the phenomenon.     

Accountability,corruption and social and environment accounting: Micro-political processes of change

Corruption is a universal concern that can impact the quality of life of citizens. Of relevance to the issue of corruption, is the free-market assumption that market power solves issues of inequality and the power of corporations. Within the context of social and environmental accounting, where corporations are focused upon as agents of change, this paper explores the ability of a civil society framework to resist corruption. Simply put, rather than being limited by perspectives from managerial quarters – an organisation-centric approach – this essay provides an evaluative framework that breaks free from the morass and instead embraces civil society.