信用:成本、风险与收益分析

信用活动中,筹资者为获取收益往往要花费一定成本、承担一定风险,资信越好的筹资者能以较小风险筹集到更多低成本资金;决定筹资者能否获得信用支持的主要因素是筹资者的经济规模、经济结构以及由此决定的市场竞争力;投资者为获取收益也要花费必要成本并面临诸多风险;信用短缺不仅使微观经济主体受损,更会使整个社会经济交易成本上升、交易规模下降、社会资源闲置,甚至会诱发金融危机.     

信贷配给、流动性冲击和民营企业现金持有

融资约束的存在要求企业持有必要的现金以预防可能的流动性冲击。不同于以往研究,本文从融资数量的硬约束——信贷配给视角将企业现金持有水平及其经济后果的考察纳入到一个统一的理论框架,并运用实证的方法研究流动性冲击下我国民营上市公司的现金持有行为。研究表明：民营上市公司持有高额现金的原因出于在信贷配给约束下的预防性动机;在遭受流动性冲击时,增持现金对民营上市公司具有正向的价值效应,且信贷配给水平越高的企业这种正向效应越显著。     

高校学分制条件下的选课制存在的问题与对策

作为高校教学改革的一个重要内容,在实施选课制的过程中出现师资数量不足、课程教学资源缺乏、学生盲目选课等问题,本文在分析存在的问题的基础上,介绍了我院完善选课制的策略,为高校学分制下选课模式的实践与探索提供了新的思路.     

泡沫经济破灭前后日本银企信用风险管理制度及其功效分析

战后,日本金融体系效仿欧美国家建立起一系列信用风险管理制度。同时,根据市场主导型金融市场的特点,逐步建立起具有自身特点的信用风险管理制度。日本银企信用风险管理制度包括商业银行的内部控制制度、银行风险防御及挽救制度、商业银行外部监管制度。通过对日本银企信用风险管理制度的功效进行剖析,可以看出这一制度存在局限性并与日本的泡沫经济、金融危机、金融效率存在内在关系。     

日元升值预期下日本国际投资策略与特点

1971年至1995年期间,日元处于急剧升值阶段,在此之后的十多年里日元升跌互见,整体波动缓和,2008年初以来日元持续升值。在日元升值预期的作用下,自20世纪90年代以来,日本加大了海外直接投资的力度,近2/3的资金流向了经济比较发达的国家和地区。与海外直接投资相比,日本的证券投资规模较大,占海外资产总额的近五成,其投资组合策略注重汇率风险管理,始终保持了一贯的连续性,重视资产的安全性和回报率。日本也加快了以其他方式向海外输出资本的步伐,按照国际收支状况的统计口径,这些投资包括对外贷款、贸易信贷、货币及存款和其他资产,其规模仅次于海外证券投资。研究表明,日本的海外投资区域分布和币种选择体现了分散投资、降低风险的特点,也在较大程度上降低了汇率风险。     

新疆样本县（市）农户借贷行为调查分析

本文通过对新疆玛纳斯县、呼图壁县、吉木萨尔县、吐鲁番市、托克逊县农村信用社和农户的实地调查,对农户的借贷需求行为进行了分析,得出了农户借贷行为的特征。本文认为农户的经济行为特征和资金需求特征对其金融需求具有十分重要的影响。     

我国商业银行外部信用风险测度分析

银行作为债权人将资金放贷给企业,企业无法按时偿还本金,由此带来的风险称为信用风险。本文选择了44家配对上市公司,采用KMV模型对上市公司的信用风险进行度量,实证结果显示,KMV模型对于度量上市公司信用状况具有一定的适用性,但如果将KMV模型与PFM模型相结合,KMV模型使用的范围更加广泛。针对外部信用风险产生的原因,本文还给出了减小外部信用风险的建议。     

信贷渠道对我国股票市场的影响

信贷渠道是我国货币政策主要的传导渠道。货币政策通过传导渠道对股票市场产生影响。本文运用协整与基于向量自回归模型的格兰杰因果检验和预测方差分解等时间序列分析方法,实证分析信贷渠道对股票市场的影响,结果表明信贷渠道对我国股票市场产生显著的负相关影响。     

Does scoring a subpopulation make a difference

Scorecards used by consumer credit providers to assess the probability that an applicant will default are usually built for the population of potential applicants as a whole. This paper investigates whether it is permissible and worth-while to build a separate scorecard for each subpopulation of applicants. We review the legal requirements to find that it is permissible to use separate scorecards for many, but not all, personal characteristics. Second, using data supplied by a credit card organization separate scorecards were built for several subpopulations for each of twelve personal characteristics. The predicted performance of each was compared with that gained form estimating a scorecard for the full population using three methods for setting the cut-off scores in an `independent' way. These methods differ in the degree to which the cut-off scores are independent of information about other subpopulation, in the level of discrimination achieved between likely good payers and defaulters and in the degree to which each method is robust to new data. We conclude, first, that creating scorecards using subpopulations does not necessarily give better discrimination between likely good payers and defaulters. Second, none of the three methods examined to set the cut-off scores dominates the others using the three desirable properties described; trade-offs are required. Finally, subpopulation scorecards lead to the rejection of fewer applicants than scorecards built on full populations.     

Capital,credit constraints and the comovement between consumer durables and nondurables

Evidence indicates that consumer durables are more flexibly priced than nondurable goods and services. In otherwise standard two-sector neoclassical sticky-price models with flexible durable prices, following monetary tightening, nondurables decrease but consumer durables increase. Friction in lending between households can resolve the comovement problem if durable prices are sticky. However, if durable prices are flexible, friction in lending fails to generate joint decline. This paper resolves the co-movement problem by adding capital into a model with flexible durable prices and friction in lending. When capital is needed in production, monetary tightening reduces the relative price of durables which induces investment and decreases firms' real profits in the short run. Due to fewer profits remitted from firms, savers have a lower disposable income and cannot increase expenditures on consumer durables as much as otherwise. As a consequence, aggregate consumer durables decrease and there is a joint decline of nondurables and consumer durables.