我国政府信用的博弈分析

市场经济是以信用为基石的经济体制,政府信用是其中最重要的信用。依据政府在市场中的角色不同,可将我国政府的信用分为交易信用和管理信用。这两种政府信用在市场的一次博弈和重复博弈中显示出与其他市场主体信用不同的特性,政府信用的特殊性导致了信用危机。要改变政府的信用状况,必须建立改变博弈过程的适当机制。     

我国信用评级业结构、竞争及绩效探析

信用评级具有辅助资产定价、揭示市场风险、提高金融监管效率等作用,是成熟金融体制的重要组成部分。本文从产业组织理论出发,考察我国信用评级行业的结构、竞争、绩效等方面,对行业发展现状有更深入的认识,并借鉴发达国家信用评级业发展经验,为行业今后持续、健康发展提出政策建议。     

晴天送伞,雨天收伞——对金融摩擦、信贷周期和企业融资难问题的分析

微观层面上,商业银行有着“晴天送伞,雨天收伞”的行为特征;而在宏观层面上,银行信贷也存在明显的顺周期性特征。本文构建了一个带有金融摩擦的新凯恩斯主义DSGE模型,把对宏观经济现象的分析建立在坚实的微观基础之上,从而将上述两者纳入到一个统一的分析框架之内。此外,本文还运用我国的实际经济数据对模型中的结构参数进行贝叶斯估计,并对模型中的主要经济变量和外生冲击做了脉冲响应函数分析。研究发现：微观层面上,商业银行的信贷紧缩和扩张行为是其在金融市场存在信息不对称问题下的理性决策;宏观层面上,银行信贷的顺周期性是由于存在金融摩擦所导致的;在如今经济增速下行阶段,风险冲击增强了银行的惜贷慎贷情绪,加剧了企业融资难问题。最后,本文根据模型模拟为如何缓解企业融资难问题提出了一些实际的可操作的政策建议。     

信用效应认识的深化与信用秩序的恢复和增强

市场经济从本质上讲是信用经济.在市场经济条件下,信用是最基本的社会经济关系,是整个社会经济得以维系和发展的基础.随着中国经济改革的逐步深入,特别是在加入WTO后,信用的作用逐步显现出来.但是,人们对信用效应的认识还有待深化,尤其是对信用关系紊乱可能带来的负面作用认识得不多,而对信用的积极作用往往习惯于借鉴美欧现成的信用模式.本文从深化对信用效应的认识入手,分析了信用秩序混乱的形成原因,并在简要评价我国信用基本状况的基础上,提出了恢复和增强我国信用秩序的建议.     

组建社区银行应对基层信贷服务缺失的思考

本文介绍了社区银行的概念、经营特点及其在社区金融服务领域的比较优势,提出应该组建社区银行来应对目前存在的基层信贷服务缺失,并探讨了社区银行的组建方式以及在组建和发展过程中应该注意的问题。     

Does direct foreign investment affect domestic credit constraints?

Firms in developing countries cite credit constraints as one of their primary obstacles to investment. Direct foreign investment may ease credit constraints by bringing in scarce capital. Alternatively, if foreign firms borrow heavily from domestic banks, they may crowd local firms out of domestic capital markets. Using firm data from the Ivory Coast, we test whether: (1) domestic firms are more credit constrained than foreign firms, and (2) whether borrowing by foreign firms exacerbates domestic firm credit constraints. Results provide support for both hypotheses. We also find that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are less financially constrained than other domestic enterprises.     

制度创新与社会信用

信用是现代市场经济的基石,也是优化资源配置的有效手段。本文认为,造成我国信用缺失的原因是多方面的,有认识上的原因,也有法律制度不健全、对失信行为处罚力度不够等原因,但最主要的原因是产权制度不完善。因此,进行制度创新,完善产权制度,是建设现代市场经济社会信用的必要条件,也是规范市场经济秩序的治本之策。     

How does competition affect bank systemic risk?

Using bank level measures of competition and co-dependence, we show a robust negative relationship between bank competition and systemic risk. Whereas much of the extant literature has focused on the relationship between competition and the absolute level of risk of individual banks, in this paper we examine the correlation in the risk taking behavior of banks. We find that greater competition encourages banks to take on more diversified risks, making the banking system less fragile to shocks. Examining the impact of the institutional and regulatory environment on bank systemic risk shows that banking systems are more fragile in countries with weak supervision and private monitoring, greater government ownership of banks, and with public policies that restrict competition. We also find that the negative effect of lack of competition can be mitigated by a strong institutional environment that allows for efficient public and private monitoring of financial institutions.     

The ties that bind: Bank relationships and small business lending

The importance of bank relationships for small firms’ ability to raise external finance is well-documented, yet the mechanism through which relationships improve access to capital markets has received little empirical attention. This paper uses hand-collected, proprietary data from a mid-sized bank in the United States to identify the channels that strengthen the relationship between a small business and its bank. In contrast to earlier work that focuses on the role of relationships in alleviating information and incentive problems in lending, I find that the source of value in relationship banking is not limited to enhanced monitoring. Exploiting a unique feature of this dataset, I examine two channels of relationship strength that directly measure the stream of non-lending profits generated from (1) the non-credit services cross-sold to the borrower, and (2) the additional bank clients referred by the borrower. I document that non-lending profitability empirically determines the risk-adjusted terms of lending. In models of loan price that already include both the bank’s proprietary risk rating and traditional risk proxies, non-lending profits significantly improve explanatory power and account for up to half of the total explained variation. Conditional on risk profile, a one-standard deviation increase in aggregate non-lending profits lowers the loan interest rate by 32 basis points and increases access to credit by 26%.     

Cross-hedging strategies between CDS spreads and option volatility during crises

This paper presents a joint analysis of the term structure of credit default swap (CDS) spreads and the implied volatility surface for five European countries from 2007 to 2012, a sample period covering both the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the European debt crisis. We analyze to which extent effective cross-hedges can be performed between the credit and equity derivatives markets during these two crises. We find that during a global crisis a breakdown of the relationship between credit risk and equity volatility may occur, jeopardizing any cross-hedging strategy, which happened during the GFC. This stands in sharp contrast to the more localized European debt crisis, during which this fundamental relationship was preserved despite turbulent market conditions for both the CDS and volatility markets.