农村信用合作社经营性风险因素探究

农村信用合作所具有的资金规模小、专业特色强、地域性经营等特点，使农信社面临着资本保障不足、融资能力不强、运营成本高等经营性风险因素，要防范和化解这些风险因素，就必须改革农村信用社的经营管理体制，加强业务监管，并给予必要的政策扶持。     

建立完善的纳税人税收信用机制

稳定可靠的信用体系是市场经济有效运行的基础,税收信用(TAX CREDIT)是社会信用体系的重要组成部分。目前,我国的税收信用机制处于初建阶段,尚不完善。因此,根据纳税人的信用状况、税收信用制度改革状况的分析,建立完善纳税人税收信用机制具有重要的现实意义。     

信用保险参与农产品经营的探讨

新型城镇化实现的前提是“三农”问题的有效解决,而解决“三农”问题的关键在于农产品企业的发展壮大.本文从农产品生产和经营特点入手,剖析农产品企业在生产经营中遇到的各种问题,从实际案例出发,探讨信用保险在农产品企业经营中发挥的作用以及存在的问题,并提出相应的解决思路.     

Lending technologies,banking relationships,and firms’ access to credit in Italy: the role of firm size

This paper analyses the role of lending technologies and banking relationships on firms’ credit access in Italy. Using EFIGE firm-level data, we show that the depth and strength of firm–bank relationships have heterogeneous effects on credit demand and rationing probabilities depending on the size of the borrower. Multiple banking relationships alleviate financial constraints for small firms, while borrowing from a large number of lenders hinders access to credit for large companies. Small and medium-sized enterprises with a higher share of debt with the main bank have a lower probability of being credit denied, as debt concentration contributes to overcome the opacity problems typical of the SMEs. Long-lasting relationships, by reducing information asymmetries, significantly improve access to credit for small and large firms. Conversely, we find that medium-sized enterprises are more exposed to financing constraints as relationship duration increases, due to possible lock-in effects. Finally, firms maintaining banking relationships based on transactional technologies are more likely to be credit denied, while the use of relationship lending technologies improves credit availability for both small and large enterprises.     

Local government type and municipal bond ratings: what’s the relationship?

There is an extensive literature analysing the executive branch within local U.S. government jurisdictions. This has largely revolved around the differences between elected mayors and appointed city managers. Much of the academic work has considered the potential efficiency gains that may be associated with either form of government and comparative analyses between the two. However, the empirical literature has been divided regarding the relative efficiency of either form. This article attempts to add to that literature by considering how bond markets may perceive potential efficiencies that emerge from one executive type over the other by evaluating bond ratings for a sample of large municipal governments in the United States. Overall, the results suggest that municipalities headed by a city manager are associated with increased bond ratings (and thus lower borrowing costs), which may lend support that this form of administration is, on some margin, relatively more efficient than others. These results are robust to a number of specifications.