全文获取类型
收费全文 | 8005篇 |
免费 | 547篇 |
国内免费 | 15篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 1375篇 |
工业经济 | 315篇 |
计划管理 | 1010篇 |
经济学 | 3935篇 |
综合类 | 106篇 |
运输经济 | 17篇 |
旅游经济 | 16篇 |
贸易经济 | 447篇 |
农业经济 | 539篇 |
经济概况 | 807篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 19篇 |
2023年 | 117篇 |
2022年 | 78篇 |
2021年 | 139篇 |
2020年 | 349篇 |
2019年 | 375篇 |
2018年 | 235篇 |
2017年 | 315篇 |
2016年 | 267篇 |
2015年 | 277篇 |
2014年 | 545篇 |
2013年 | 755篇 |
2012年 | 582篇 |
2011年 | 789篇 |
2010年 | 516篇 |
2009年 | 487篇 |
2008年 | 480篇 |
2007年 | 552篇 |
2006年 | 396篇 |
2005年 | 287篇 |
2004年 | 195篇 |
2003年 | 176篇 |
2002年 | 80篇 |
2001年 | 46篇 |
2000年 | 47篇 |
1999年 | 72篇 |
1998年 | 89篇 |
1997年 | 87篇 |
1996年 | 69篇 |
1995年 | 31篇 |
1994年 | 29篇 |
1993年 | 14篇 |
1992年 | 4篇 |
1991年 | 1篇 |
1988年 | 1篇 |
1986年 | 1篇 |
1985年 | 11篇 |
1984年 | 12篇 |
1983年 | 17篇 |
1982年 | 12篇 |
1981年 | 1篇 |
1980年 | 4篇 |
1979年 | 4篇 |
1978年 | 3篇 |
1975年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有8567条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
51.
This paper investigates the link between trade and environment by exploring the effects of green tariffs on innovation, location of production and the environment. It shows that tariffs levied on polluting goods could result in less world pollution than global harmonization of environmental standards by inducing more pollution-abatement R&D effort and generating lower unit emissions from production. Specifically, green tariffs reduce pollution by (1) shifting production to the region where environmental standards are respected, (2) inducing the firm in the clean country to engage in more abatement R&D by granting it a higher market power/share in its home market, (3) instigating green R&D investment by deterring delocation. When these outweigh the R&D-creating effect of environmental harmonization in the dirty country, green tariffs bring about a cleaner environment. 相似文献
52.
In a general auction model in which bidders’ signals are affiliated, we characterize the unique separating equilibrium in which the seller can use reserve prices to credibly signal her private information. When the buyers’ signals are independent, the optimal reserve price is shown to be increasing in the number of bidders under certain conditions. We also demonstrate that the probability that the item is sold at the reserve price can increase as the number of bidders increases, which indicates a more central role for reserve prices than perceived in the standard auction models. 相似文献
53.
Educational Attainment and Family Background 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
Abstract. This paper analyses the effect of aspects of family background, such as family income and parental education, on the educational attainment of persons born from 1967 to 1972. Family income is measured at different periods of a child's life to separate long-term versus short-term effects of family income on educational choices. We find that permanent income matters to a certain degree, and that family income when the child is 0–6 years old is an important explanatory variable for educational attainment later in a child's life. We find that short-term credit constraints have only a small effect on educational attainment. Long-term factors, such as permanent family income and parental education, are much more important for educational attainment than are short-term credit constraints. Public interventions to alleviate the effects of family background should thus also be targeted at a child's early years, the shaping period for the cognitive and non-cognitive skills important later in life. 相似文献
54.
Seok-ju Cho 《Journal of Economic Theory》2003,113(1):118-130
We prove uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining with quadratic utilities, for an arbitrary common discount factor. For general concave utilities, we prove existence and uniqueness of a “minimal” stationary equilibrium and of a “maximal” stationary equilibrium. We provide an example of multiple stationary equilibria with concave (nonquadratic) utilities. 相似文献
55.
Klaus Kultti 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,137(1):721-728
We establish a link between von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set and the Nash solution in a general n-player utility set. The stable set-solution is defined with respect to a dominance relation: payoff vector u dominates v if one player prefers u even with one period delay. We show that a stable set exists and, if the utility set has a smooth surface, any stable set converges to the Nash bargaining solution when the length of the period goes to zero. 相似文献
56.
Flavio Toxvaerd 《Journal of Economic Theory》2006,129(1):252-272
In most industries, ranging from information systems development to construction, an overwhelming proportion of projects are delayed beyond estimated completion time. This fact constitutes somewhat of a puzzle for existing theory. The present paper studies project delays and optimal contracts under moral hazard in a setting with time to build. Within this setup, project delays are found to be most likely to happen at early stages of development and intimately connected to the degree of commitment of the procurer and the class of contracts that can be enforced. The first-best, optimal spot contracting and optimal long-term contract scenarios are analyzed, as well as commonly encountered additional constraints on the long-term contract. 相似文献
57.
Werner Roeger 《The German Economic Review》2007,8(1):1-27
Abstract. This paper analyses taxation in the presence of distortions in goods and labour markets in an endogenous growth model. The government disposes of capital, labour and consumption taxes. It is shown that the market solution leads to suboptimally low levels of growth and employment. However, available tax instruments are sufficient to attain the first‐best growth path in this economy. The paper further explores the relative distortion of capital and labour taxes. For plausible parametrisations of the model, lowering capital taxes dominate reductions in labour taxes in welfare terms. 相似文献
58.
Entry deterrence and innovation in durable-goods monopoly 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper investigates the efficiency of innovation investments in a durable-goods monopoly when a potential entrant threatens to innovate as well. We show that the durability of the good endows the monopolist with the power to discourage rival innovation since current sales alter the demand for a new generation of the good. The equilibrium is therefore determined not only by the incentive for intertemporal price discrimination in durable-goods monopoly, but also by the incumbent's concern for maintaining the technological leadership. We demonstrate that entry deterrence followed by no innovation always implies underinvestment in innovation. 相似文献
59.
Arthur J. Robson 《Journal of Economic Theory》2003,111(1):1-22
Strategic rationality is subjected here to natural selection. In a zero-sum repeated game of incomplete information, one long-run individual is informed of the state of the world, and plays against a sequence of short-run opponents who are not. Strategies are noisy and have bounded recall. An equilibrium in these is shown to exist. Relative to any such equilibrium, sufficiently greater recall enjoys an advantage that is not decreasing in the original level of recall, thus capturing the Red Queen effect. The selection pressure to reduce a small amount of noise is less than that to increase recall. 相似文献
60.
Tariffs, licensing and market structure 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that exclusive owners of an advanced technology are always better off when producing as a monopolist than when competing against another firm. Competition against a less-efficient firm weakens the power that a host country can exert on the incumbent in the form of its tariff policy. We show that this gives a motive for a monopolist to license its technology to another foreign firm. A host country gains more from increased competition if it can induce the foreign incumbent to transfer technology to the host country firm. We show that the host country can do so by tariff commitment. We also discuss the implications of bargaining under licensing and Bertrand competition in the product market. Hence, this paper qualifies and extends the recent work of Kabiraj and Marjit [Protecting consumers through protection: The role of tariff-induced technology transfer. European Economic Review 47, 113-124]. 相似文献