Corporate Restructuring in Japan Part I: Can M‐Form Organization Manage Diverse Businesses?

The purpose of this paper is to examine the recent organizational restructuring in Japan in the framework of organizational economics, assuming that the product/market portfolio of the firm is fixed. How does a firm set about organizing its internal divisions? I first summarize some stylized facts on corporate diversification strategy and multi‐divisional (M‐form) organization in large Japanese firms from different perspectives. I then analyse the problem of choosing an organizational form. In particular, I argue that, precisely because of its related diversification, the multi‐business Japanese firm adopting the M‐form finds it difficult to differentiate its diverse businesses internally.     

In-house competition, organizational slack, and the business cycle

Multiplant firms pit their facilities against each other for production assignments. The present paper studies the consequences of this practice in a model where production is limited by capacity constraints and asymmetric information allows facilities to accumulate slack. It shows the amount of slack per unit of output to be pro-cyclical. Indeed, as capacity constraints become more acute in economic booms, the power of in-house competition for quota assignments is reduced and slack per unit of output increases, while the opposite is true in downturns. Moreover, in downturns firms may use higher cost facilities even when lower cost plants are not running at capacity since this boosts X-efficiency in low-cost plants.     

Consumer inertia, firm growth and industry dynamics

We develop a model of firm size, based on the hypothesis that consumers are “locked in,” because of search costs, with firms they have patronized in the past. As a consequence, older firms have a larger clientele and are able to extract higher profits. The equilibrium of this model yields: (i) A downward sloping density of firm sizes. (ii) Older firms are less likely to exit than younger firms. (iii) Larger firms spend more on R&D.     

On the distributional effects of income in an aggregate consumption relation

Abstract .  In this paper we analyse the influence of characteristics of the income distribution in modelling aggregate consumption expenditure. We model the aggregate consumption relation of a heterogeneous population, using a statistical distributional approach of aggregation, and apply it to UK-Family Expenditure Survey data. A bootstrap test based on a non-parametric estimation methodology, which accounts for the presence of continuous and discrete variables, suggests that the mean and the dispersion of the income distribution significantly influence aggregate consumption expenditure. Also, the parameters of the aggregate relation are time varying. These findings have implications for constructing empirically sound models of aggregate consumption expenditure.     

Delays and equilibria with large and small information in social learning

The general model of social learning with irreversible investment and endogenous timing is analyzed for any distribution of private informations. Strategic complementarities and multiple equilibria appear which are generated solely by information externalities. Different equilibria generate strikingly different amounts of information. The impacts of various assumptions (bounded beliefs, large number of agents, discrete time and short periods) are examined carefully. The properties are robust to the introduction of observation noise with a continuum of agents.     

Concave utility on finite sets

When does a preference relation on a finite set have a concave or a strictly concave utility function? We provide a complete answer. Our proof is an application of the Theorem of the Alternative, and constructs a concave utility if one exists.     

Strategies as states

We define rationality and equilibrium when states specify agents’ actions and agents have arbitrary partitions over these states. Although some suggest that this natural modeling step leads to paradox, we show that Bayesian equilibrium is well defined and puzzles can be circumvented. The main problem arises when player j's partition informs j of i's move and i knows j's strategy. Then i's inference about j's move will vary with i's own move, and i may consequently play a dominated action. Plausible conditions on partitions rule out these scenarios. Equilibria exist under the same conditions, and more generally ε equilibria usually exist.     

Quality dualism

We suggest a theory of quality dualism, defined in terms of the gap between the highest quality good produced in the informal sector and the lowest quality produced in the formal sector. We develop a model of vertically differentiated products, in which firms producing in the formal and informal sectors face different factor prices, and have a relative advantage in the manufacture of different qualities. We then use the model to examine the cyclical behavior of the respective sizes of the two sectors. Finally, we point out that factor price changes, which reduce or increase the size of the informal sector, may have the same or opposite effect on the degree of dualism in the economy.     

Implementation of college admission rules

Summary We consider both Nash and strong Nash implementation of various matching rules for college admissions problems. We show that all such rules are supersolutions of the stable rule. Among these rules the lower bound stable rule is implementable in both senses. The upper bound Pareto and individually rational rule is strong Nash implementable yet it is not Nash implementable. Two corollaries of interest are the stable rule is the minimal (Nash or strong Nash) implementable solution that is Pareto optimal and individually rational, and the stable rule is the minimal (Nash or strong Nash) implementable extension of any of its subsolutions.We wish to thank Professor William Thomson for his efforts in supervision as well as his useful suggestions. We are grateful to the participants in his reading class, workshops at Bilkent University, University of Rochester, and in particular Jeffrey Banks, Stephen Ching, Bhaskar Dutta, Rangarajan Sundaram and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments.     

对科技型中小企业研发的新思考

研发是科技型中小企业技术创新的动力之源，也是企业在激烈的市场竞争中求生存、谋发展的必然选择。文章对影响企业的研发因素进行了分析，在此基础上，指出了企业进行研发的路径选择以及企业在研发中应当注意的一些问题。