Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements?

Relational exchange arrangements supported by trust are commonly viewed as substitutes for complex contracts in interorganizational exchanges. Many argue that formal contracts actually undermine trust and thereby encourage the opportunistic behavior they are designed to discourage. In this paper, we develop and test an alternative perspective: that formal contracts and relational governance function as complements. Using data from a sample of information service exchanges, we find empirical support for this proposition of complementarity. Managers appear to couple their increasingly customized contracts with high levels of relational governance (and vice versa). Moreover, this interdependence underlies their ability to generate improvements in exchange performance. Our results concerning the determinants of these governance choices show their distinct origins, which further augments their complementarity in practice. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Everybody wins? A discourse analysis of competing stakeholder expectations in Social Impact Bonds

ABSTRACT

This paper explores how diverse stakeholders frame their expectations of Social Impact Bonds (SIBs). Using discourse analysis, the authors examine competing expectations in SIB press releases, showing how they differ between stakeholders, between institutional contexts, and how they evolve over time. The paper highlights how the prioritization of social finance and collaboration discourses privileges the role of private investors, which in turn diminishes the role of service providers as innovators.     

Is it the Law or the Lawyers? Investment Covenants around the World*

This paper introduces a new dataset from 50 private investment funds from 17 countries around the world. We analyse the frequency of use of investment covenants imposed by institutional investors governing the activities of private investment fund managers in areas pertaining to investment decisions, investment powers, types of investments, fund operations and limitations on liability. While the data indicate a role for country legality in affecting the frequency of use of fund covenants, the data further indicate that the presence of legally trained managers has a more pronounced role in affecting the use of covenants. As private equity and venture capital investment increases across Europe and elsewhere, our results indicate that legal practice factors will matter more than the legal setting for the establishment of covenants governing new funds.     

The Disciplining Role of Accounting in the Long-Run

One role of accounting is to discipline softer (more manipulable) sources of information. We use a principal-agent model of hidden actions and hidden information to study this role. In our model, there is both a verifiable signal (a publicly observed output) and an unverifiable signal (a productivity parameter privately observed by the agent). In a one-period setting, the optimal contract does not make use of the agents report on the private signal. However, when the output is tracked over two periods, the agents communication can be valuable. This reversal of results suggests uncovering the disciplining role of accounting may require a long-term perspective.JEL Classification: D82, M41     

Inter-Departmental Cost Allocation and Investment Incentives

This paper endeavors to demonstrate that fixed cost allocation can align investment incentives in a multi-period and multi-division setting. In a decentralized firm, a divisional manager can make an investment that benefits both his own and the operations of a downstream division. The relative budgeted activity (RBA) cost allocation method assigns fixed cost charges according to the ratio of a divisions budgeted activity in proportion to that of the firm, and thereby resolves the hold-up problem created by the decentralized setting. Internal accounting rules can be designed to give managers strong incentives to internalize the firms objective regarding efficient investment levels, and alleviate the tension between ex ante investment efficiency and ex post production efficiency. This paper examines how much the fixed charges should be in order to achieve the optimal level of investment.     

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INNOVATION: A SURVEY

Abstract The traditional economics of innovation, inspired by Schumpeter and more recent advances on his work, seem unable to explain why firms with similar external conditions may show greatly different performance in innovation. Contrastingly, the literature on corporate governance provides some useful insights for understanding corporate innovation activity, to the extent that such literature examines the economic effects of different modes of coordination between firm members. The process through which individuals integrate their human and physical resources within the firm is central to the dynamics of corporate innovation. This paper provides the first survey of the literature on this issue. We start by discussing how various theoretical approaches to the analysis of the firm deal with technological innovation. We then describe three main channels – corporate ownership, corporate finance and labour – through which a system of corporate governance shapes a firm's innovation activity. Finally, we examine the relationship between country‐level institutional settings, national patterns of corporate governance and the aggregate innovation activity of corporations. We conclude by suggesting that future research should focus more deeply on the interrelation between the various dimensions of corporate governance and on their joint effect on firm innovation.     

Task assignment and organizational form

This paper shows that a firm prefers a process-based task assignment compared to a function-based one if the tasks are from functional areas which are neither too complementary nor too substitutable. We consider several projects (processes) with contributions from several functional areas. The organization can be structured along processes like product lines (M-form) or along functional areas like marketing or production (U-form). The U-form enables cost savings due to specialization or scale economies. The more effective incentives under the M-form might outweigh these savings if the functions are neither too complementary nor too substitutable.      

Multi-dimensional contracts with task-specific productivity: an application to universities

Academics produce science and teaching which requires specific unobservable characteristics. Applying the multi-dimensional screening methodology of Armstrong and Rochet (European Economic Review, 43, 959–979, 1999), it is shown that universities optimally propose a menu of contracts to academics: high powered incentives for those who are productive and lower ones for other agents. In some cases, the university can write a single contract for both tasks to increase production. An academic is then expected to produce more teaching to show that she likes science, which is an argument to produce science and teaching in a single institution: universities. These results are discussed in light of economic, sociological and educational literature.      

Ex post participation constraint in a principal–agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard

This paper analyzes optimal contracting when an agent has private information before contracting and exerts hidden effort that stochastically affects the output. Additionally, the contract is constrained to satisfy the agentʼs ex post participation. We highlight three features of this model. First, the agent faces countervailing incentives. Second, the separation of types is never optimal. Third, the optimal constant bonus rewarding success is distorted downward below its efficient level.     

Evergreening in banking

In the dynamic model of banking, a bank's option to hide its loan losses by rolling over non-performing loans is shown to worsen moral hazard. Contrary to the classic theory, moral hazard may arise even when a bank cannot seek a correlated risk for its loans. The loans seem to be performing and the bank makes a profit although it is de facto insolvent. When the bank's balance sheet includes hidden non-performing loans, the bank may optimally shrink lending or gamble for resurrection by growing aggressively. To eliminate this type of moral hazard, which is broadly consistent with evidence from emerging economies, a few regulatory implications are suggested.