Technology Shocks and Monetary Policy: Revisiting the Fed's Performance

Would the U.S. economy's dynamic response to permanent technology shocks have been different from the actual responses if monetary authorities' systematic response to these shocks had been optimal? To answer this question, we characterize the dynamic effects of permanent technology shocks and the way in which U.S. monetary authorities reacted to these shocks over the sample 1955(1)–2002(4) using a structural VAR. A sticky price–sticky wage model is developed and estimated to reproduce these responses. We then formally compare these responses with the outcome of the optimal monetary policy.     

Preferential Regulatory Treatment and Banks' Demand for Government Bonds

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of preferential regulatory treatment on banks' demand for government bonds. Using unique transaction‐level data, our analysis suggests that preferential treatment in microprudential liquidity and capital regulation significantly increases banks' demand for government bonds. Liquidity and capital regulation also seem to incentivize banks to substitute other bonds with government bonds. We also find evidence that this “regulatory effect” leads banks to reduce lending to the real economy.     

The effects of news events on market contagion: Evidence from the 2007–2009 financial crisis

In this paper, we use the quantile regression technique along with coexceedance, a contagion measure, to assess the extent to which news events contribute to contagion in the stock markets during the crisis period between 2007 and 2009. Studies have shown that, not only the subprime crisis leads to a global recession, but the effects on the global stock markets have also been significant. We track the news events, both in the UK and the US, using the global recession timeline. We observe that the news events related to ad hoc bailouts of individual banks from the UK have a contagion effect throughout the period for most of the countries under investigation. This, however, is not found to be the case for the news events originating from the US. Our findings regarding the evidence of contagion effects in the UK reinforce the argument that spreads and contagion—an outcome of the risk perception of financial markets—are solely a result of the behaviour of investors or other financial market participants.     

Rational Inattention in Uncertain Business Cycles

The paper proposes endogenous information choice as a channel through which uncertainty affects price dynamics. I consider a rational inattention model with volatility uncertainty and endogenous information processing capability. According to the model, firms' learning and optimal attention exhibits inertia and asymmetry in response to volatility changes. Firms choose to process more information when uncertainty rises, especially about aggregate conditions, and their pricing behavior changes accordingly. Using a Markov‐switching factor‐augmented vector autoregression (MS‐FAVAR), the paper also documents a significant positive correlation between volatility and firms' responsiveness to macro‐ and microlevel shocks, consistent with model predictions.     

Bank panics and the endogeneity of central banking

Central banking is intimately related to liquidity provision to banks during times of crisis, the lender-of-last-resort function. This activity arose endogenously in certain banking systems. Depositors lack full information about the value of bank assets, so that during macroeconomic downturns they monitor their banks by withdrawing in a banking panic. The likelihood of panics depends on the industrial organization of the banking system. Banking systems with well-diversified big banks are less prone to inefficient bank runs because diversification alleviates the information asymmetry. In addition, big banks can self-monitor through publicly observable branch closure. Systems of many small banks form incentive-compatible bank coalitions to emulate the big banks during times of crisis. Such coalitions improve efficiency by monitoring member banks and issuing money that is a kind of deposit insurance—a precursor of central banking.