行长薪酬、薪酬差距与银行绩效

文章不仅研究了银行高管薪酬的影响因素,还从中国上市银行内部薪酬差距的角度出发,依据锦标赛理论和行为理论探讨了银行内部薪酬差距与银行绩效之间的相关关系。研究结果显示,中国上市银行的薪酬结构具有一定的合理性。此外,通过对银行行长薪酬与银行绩效的回归分析发现,银行行长薪酬与银行绩效的联系程度还不够紧密,需要在今后的薪酬制度改革中进一步加强。     

A model of person‐pay interaction: how executives vary in their responses to compensation arrangements

A wealth of research indicates that both executive characteristics and incentive compensation affect organizational outcomes, but the literatures within these two domains have followed distinct, separate paths. Our paper provides a framework for integrating these two perspectives. We introduce a new model that specifies how executive characteristics and incentives operate in tandem to influence strategic decisions and firm performance. We then illustrate our model by portraying how executive characteristics interact with a specific type of pay instrument—stock options—to affect executive behaviors and organizational outcomes. Focusing on three individual‐level attributes (executive motives and drives, cognitive frame, and self‐confidence), we develop propositions detailing how executives will vary in their risk‐taking behaviors in response to stock options. We further argue that stock options will amplify the implications of executive ability, such that option‐heavy incentive schemes will increase the performance of talented executives but worsen the performance of low‐ability executives. Our framework and propositions are meant to provide a starting point for future theorizing and empirical testing of the interactive effects of executive characteristics and incentive compensation on strategic decisions and organizational performance. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

违约损害赔偿的经济学分析

从经济学的角度看,违约行为并不总是一件坏事,当违约的收益大于或等于因违约而要承担的违约责任时,当事人就有违约的激励。否之,则有履约的激励。违约损害赔偿作为价格高低可以影响当事人选择违约亦或履约的激励。违约损害赔偿的经济目标是鼓励有效率的违约,阻止无效率的违约。通过三种方案的比较,将可得利益损失纳入违约损害赔偿之内,是唯一可以实现违约损害赔偿经济目标,满足法律的效率要求的方案。     

中外资源税费法律制度对比及对我国的启示

资源税费立法作为解决资源短缺问题的法律手段被各国广泛采用,美国、俄罗斯、北欧一些国家根据本国国情进行了各具特色的资源税费立法实践并取得了显著的成绩。通过我国与其他国家在立法层次、立法目的、中央与地方的分享机制、征税范围、资源＂税＂与＂费＂地位、配套机制、公众参与程度等方面的对比分析并以此作为借鉴,提出改革我国资源税费法律制度的建议。     

建立安徽巨灾保险制度的思考

特殊的自然和气候环境导致安徽常遭受洪涝、干旱、冰冻等自然巨灾,给安徽省造成了重大的财产损失和人身伤亡。而在处理和应对重大自然灾害损失方面,安徽省现行的自然灾害损失补偿制度,无法对巨灾损失进行有效补偿,特别是巨灾保险在灾害补偿制度中的重要作用还没有得到有效发挥,影响了安徽社会经济稳定与发展。而改革开放三十多年来,安徽社会经济快速发展、财政实力日益壮大和农业巨灾保险的实践,使得安徽已经具备了建立巨灾保险制度的可行性。建立安徽巨灾保险制度,改革和完善安徽巨灾损失补偿机制,可以有效提升安徽巨灾保险在政府建立的综合巨灾风险管理体系中的地位,消除巨灾损失对创建和谐安徽的巨大冲击。     

我国城市化进程中失地农民问题研究述评

失地农民问题是我国城市化进程中产生的新问题。从失地农民社会保障、失地农民就业、失地农民补偿安置研究失地农民问题是学术界研究的热点,这些研究达成了以下共识：完善以“最低生活保障、养老保障、医疗保障”为核心的失地农民社会保障体系;从就业安置、培训、自主创业出发促进失地农民就业;以“区别对待”方式构建多层次、多种类的失地农民补偿安置模式。以后的有关研究,还应从宏观层面系统性地研究失地农民问题,加强统计方法的应用,并多借鉴国外解决失地农民问题的经验。     

营业转让中的劳动合同承继探讨--从一起劳务派遣转包案件说起

营业转让是用人单位具有一定机能性财产的一体转让,劳动关系已成为营业转让的重要标的和要价筹码。营业转让时劳动者与生产资料继续保持结合,劳动关系转移不违背其人身属性。应在立法中明确规定营业转让时劳动关系随转制度,买受企业应无条件接受原有职工,原职工在劳动条件、福利待遇等不变的情况下不得解除劳动合同。     

The influence of lead indicator strength on the use of nonfinancial measures in performance management: Evidence from CEO compensation schemes

Nonfinancial measures (NFMs) are a common feature of strategic performance management frameworks. We examine the role of one widely used NFM: customer satisfaction, in one aspect of strategic performance management: CEO compensation schemes. Drawing on agency theory precepts, we hypothesize that the extent to which firms link CEO compensation to customer satisfaction is influenced by satisfaction's ability to act as a leading indicator of future profitability (lead indicator strength). We further hypothesize that the extent to which customer satisfaction's lead indicator strength influences the weighting of satisfaction in CEO compensation schemes has a positive influence on future shareholder value. Our empirical results offer strong support for both hypotheses and extend research on the use and efficacy of NFMs in CEO compensation schemes. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

生态补偿对国家重点生态功能区居民可持续生计的影响——基于“精准扶贫”视角

以陕西省调研数据为研究样本,将生态补偿政策引入英国国际发展部的可持续生计能力分析框架,采用结构方程模型研究了国家重点生态功能区的生态补偿政策对居民可持续生计能力的直接影响效应和间接影响效应.结果表明:生态补偿对可持续生计能力的直接影响效应为0.182;通过物质资本、人力资本、金融资本和自然资本对可持续生计能力的间接影响效应分别为0.059、0.104、0.066、0.053,总的间接效应为0.282;生态补偿对可持续生计能力总的影响效应为0.464.因此,精准的生态补偿政策能够实现以可持续生计能力提升为主要内容的"造血式"扶贫.     

Executive Compensation: A Model of Disclosure Choice

Recent public policy debates have led to increased calls for full transparency of executive compensation. However, in practice, many firms are reluctant to disclose the full details of how they link executive compensation to performance. One possible reason for lack of full disclosure is that managers use their power to hide the details of their compensation plan in order to disguise opportunistic rent extraction. If this is the reason for secrecy, then public policy designed to force firms to provide full disclosure is unlikely to be resisted by shareholders. However, another possible explanation for less than full transparency is that some degree of secrecy about executive compensation may be in the interest of the company and its shareholders. If this explanation is correct, then public policy moves to increase transparency may be met by counter moves designed to protect managers and shareholders from such policies. In this paper we investigate if full disclosure of executive compensation arrangements is always optimal for shareholders. We develop a model where optimal executive remuneration solves a moral hazard problem. However, the degree to which the moral hazard problem affects the shareholders depends on hidden information, so that disclosure of the executive compensation scheme will typically reveal the hidden information, which can be harmful to shareholders. The model derives, therefore, the optimal disclosure policy and the optimal remuneration scheme. We find that the shareholders are better off pre‐committing not to disclose the executive compensation scheme whenever possible. Executive directors are shown to be better off too in the absence of disclosure of executive compensation schemes. An argument for mandating disclosure is that it provides better information to shareholders but our analysis demonstrates that disclosure does not necessarily achieve this objective. The results suggest that less than full disclosure can be in the interest of shareholders, the reason for this being that disclosures cannot be made selectively to shareholders but will also be made to strategic opponents. This will be the case if the board of directors and the remuneration committee includes enough independent directors. Whether or not non‐disclosure to shareholders is in their interest is however an empirical matter involving a trade‐off between the proprietary costs associated with disclosure to shareholders and the costs of potential collusion between executive and non‐executive directors associated with non‐disclosure.