集聚效应对跨国公司在华区位选择的影响

本文以跨国公司区位选择微观理论为基础,利用条件Logit模型,对2007年《财富》世界500强中,1995年到2007年期间,457家美国子公司和537家欧洲子公司在华个体区位选择决定因素进行了实证分析。分析结果表明,集聚效应是样本公司区位选择的重要决定因素,在华投资的欧美制造业公司普遍采用"集聚"这一战略,其子公司大量集聚在东部地区,盲目吸收外资来缩小东—西部经济发展不平衡的政策并不合适,尤其是中部地区。因此,在文章末,本文对中国政府应该如何减小区域经济发展不平衡和合理引用外资提出了建议。     

New European Banking Governance and Crisis of Democracy: Bank Restructuring and Privatization in Slovenia

ABSTRACT

The paper makes three contributions to the understanding of the post-crisis European banking governance. First, it offers a more comprehensive approach to banking governance, beyond the Banking Union, through its concept of ‘New European Banking Governance’ (NEBG) that incorporates EU state aid rules and fiscal regulations. Second, it considers the impact of NEBG on democratic institutions and processes in EU member states, an under-researched topic in the literature on European banking governance. Finally, through its in-depth case study of Slovenia it considers the NEBG in relation to peripheral Eurozone states. It argues that the post-crisis banking governance framework of the EU not only severely constrained the Slovenian state in its policy choices but rearranged its policy-making institutions in a way that restricted and continues to restrict democratic banking policy formation.     

论一种"新"型的关税同盟:混合型关税同盟

国际经济学界流行的看法,即认为贸易转移型关税同盟既可导致贸易创造又可导致贸易转移,这是不正确的,这种所谓的贸易转移型关税同盟实际上是一种混合型关税同盟。一个混合型关税同盟包含了一个纯贸易创造型关税同盟和一个纯贸易转移型关税同盟,关税同盟的建立能否给某个加盟国带来福利的增加,取决于这两股相反作用力的相对强弱。若贸易创造大于贸易转移,则福利增加,反之亦然;若两者相当,则还能出现福利不变的情况。     

中欧贸易与欧盟技术性贸易壁垒

近年来,技术性贸易壁垒(TBT)已成为发达国家实施贸易保护主义更为隐蔽、更为有效的手段.作为中国第三大贸易伙伴的欧盟,其实施的各种TBT措施对中国的出口产品产生了严重的影响.因此,必须建立欧盟技术性贸易壁垒预警机制,时时监控其新动向;坚持"以质取胜"的原则,大搞技术创新和产品创新,以更高的产品质量标准和专利注册超越其贸易壁垒.     

Union games: technological unemployment

Summary. Given a production economy, we define union games by considering strategic behavior of the suppliers of factors. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game as union equilibria. We analyze situations where the unemployment of factors is supported as a union equilibrium. The degree of unemployment depends on technological conditions. This allows us to model a source of unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the literature. We state a limit result that demonstrates that, as the market power of unions decreases, the corresponding sequence of union equilibria converges to the Walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors. We also provide some examples that illustrate the main results.Received: 21 October 2004, Revised: 14 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, C72. Correspondence to: Emma Moreno-GarcíaE. Moreno acknowledges financial support from the Research Grant BEC2000-1388-C04-01 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER). G. Fernández de Córdoba and E. Moreno acknowledge financial support from the Research Grant SA091/02 from Junta de Castilla y León. We are indebted to C. Alós-Ferrer, C. Pita, D. Anisi, J. A. Ortega, F. Jimeno, J. P. Torres-Martínez, M. Steinert and C. Hervés for helpful comments and insights. We are particularly grateful to T. Kehoe and an anonymous referee for suggestions that improved this paper.     

The Effects of Public Ownership and Regulatory Independence on Regulatory Outcomes

We examine the effects of public ownership and regulatory agency independence on regulatory outcomes in EU telecommunications. Specifically, we study regulated interconnect rates paid by entrants to incumbents. We find that public ownership of the incumbent positively affects these interconnect rates, and suggest that governments influence regulatory outcomes in favor of incumbents in which they are substantially invested. However, we also find that the presence of institutional features enhancing regulatory independence from the government mitigates this effect. In order to study regulatory independence, we introduce a new cross-country time-series database—the European Union Regulatory Institutions (EURI) Database. This database describes the development of institutions bearing on regulatory independence and quality in telecommunications in the 15 founding EU member states from 1997 to 2003 *We thank Laurent Pipitone for superb research assistance. Geoff Edwards thanks the Sasakawa Foundation and the Institute of Management, Innovation and Organization at the Haas School of Business for generous financial assistance, and London Business School for non-financial support. Leonard Waverman thanks the Global Communications Consortium for support     

Introduction to “Economic and Financial Governance in the European Union after a decade of Economic and Political Crises.”

ABSTRACT

This paper offers the Introduction to the Special Issue “Economic and Financial Governance in the European Union after a decade of Economic and Political Crises.” We introduce the five papers. We distill three important lessons they offer for EU integration.     

Doing Away with the Sovereign: Neoliberalism and the Promotion of Market Discipline in European Economic Governance

ABSTRACT

This article proposes a critical reading of market discipline and its limitations as a mechanism in European economic governance. Consistent with neoliberal beliefs about market-based governance, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is premised on the functioning of the government bond market as a fiscal-policy discipliner. However, the operation of market discipline requires that neither governments nor their private creditors can rely on an authority to bail them out. It, therefore, precludes the kinds of intervention by Eurozone’s supranational institutions witnessed during the euro crisis. In the post-crisis context, efforts to strengthen market discipline continue to be frustrated by the growing reliance of financial institutions on government bond markets as well as the European Central Bank’s (ECB) active participation in those markets. Having undermined the credibility of the market as an autonomous and apolitical mechanism of discipline, European economic governance struggles to come to terms with the rise of a supranational ‘economic sovereign’ in the Eurozone.     

西方产业竞争政策的体系和目标

本文讨论美国、欧共体和日本的竞争政策的方法和体系的差异问题。美国的竞争政策侧重于追求消费者剩余和生产者剩余最大化 ,强调通过竞争的作用来达到这一经济效率目标。欧共体的竞争政策则强调在消费者福利的基础地位 ,通过协调竞争规则来促进欧共体经济一体化的进程。日本的反垄断法原本从西方吸收过来的 ,经过半个世纪的发展和演变 ,已经具有明显的日本特色 ,其基本功特征是对价格机制的运作缺乏信任 ,对规模经济神话的盲目崇拜和信任 ,结果是经常提倡和鼓励那种必然会导致寡占市场结构的兼并活动。     

英国脱欧后美欧贸易投资关系及其变化

由于英国正式脱欧,美国与欧洲的贸易和投资关系快速变化。从贸易角度看,商品贸易中欧盟地位有所下降,成为美国第三大商品出口市场和第二大进口来源市场,美欧之间的贸易商品构成也发生了变化;服务贸易中由于英国所占份额最大,英国脱欧也将影响美欧之间的服务贸易额。从投资角度看,美欧仍是彼此最大的外国直接投资的来源地和目的地。