Central bank forecasts and private expectations: An empirical assessment from three emerging economies

As part of their monetary policy strategy, many central banks are attempting to manage private sector expectations about key macroeconomic variables. In this article, we investigate whether forecasts provided by central banks in three inflation targeting emerging economies (Brazil, Mexico, and Poland) affect the expectations of private forecasters. In particular, we analyze whether the disagreement between the central bank and private sector forecasts applies to explain changes in private sector expectations regarding inflation and economic growth. The findings show that while central bank forecasts are higher than those made by private sector forecasters, the result is an update upwards of private forecasts and that this effect is stronger for GDP growth forecasts than for inflation forecasts.     

The impact of unsuccessful pirate attacks on financial markets: Evidence in support of Leeson's reputation-building theory

This paper examines the effect of unsuccessful Somali pirate attacks on financial-market returns in the Arabian Peninsula. Specifically, it tests Leeson's (2010a) reputation-building theory of pirate signaling behavior postulating that unsuccessful pirate attacks may trigger subsequent future attacks by pirates as pirates attempt to maintain and build their reputation for effective piracy. We test this theory empirically by studying the relationship between pirate attacks and financial-market returns in the Arabian Peninsula. The result of our empirical test supports Leeson's theory: unsuccessful pirate attacks are associated with lower financial-market returns, suggesting that market participants expect unsuccessful pirate attacks to be followed by future pirate attacks.     

The Importance of Time‐Series Extrapolation for Macroeconomic Expectations

This article presents a simple experiment on how laypeople form macroeconomic expectations. Subjects have to forecast inflation and gross domestic product growth. By varying the information provided in different treatments, we can assess the importance of historical time‐series information vs. information acquired outside the experimental setting such as knowledge of expert forecasts. It turns out that the availability of historical data has a dominant impact on expectations and wipes out the influence of outside‐lab information completely. Consequently, backward‐looking behavior can be identified unambiguously as a decisive factor in expectation formation.     

可持续公共债务水平下的政府违约问题研究

现实经济中存在公共债务具有可持续性时却发生政府违约的现象,本文在政府未来收支波动具有不确定性的假设下,建立一个政府与投资者的重复博弈模型以分析这一现象,研究发现:公共债务可持续性并不能完全排除政府违约风险,在政府未来基本盈余不确定的条件下,理性投资者愿意持有的公共债务水平远低于可持续的公共债务水平,两者的差异取决于政府对未来基本盈余的控制能力.     

Are women expected to be more generous?

This paper analyzes if men and women are expected to behave differently regarding altruism. Since the dictator game provides the most suitable design for studying altruism and generosity in the lab setting, we use a modified version to study the beliefs involved in the game. Our results are substantial: men and women are expected to behave differently. Moreover, while women believe that women are more generous, men consider that women are as generous as men.

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Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. We appreciate comments from Josemari Aizpurua, Shoshana Neuman and participants in seminars at Bar-Ilan University, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Univ. Publica Navarra. Tim Cason and one anonymous referee made substantial comments on the previous draft. Financial support from CICYT (SEJ2007-62081/ECON and SEJ2006-00959/SOCI) and FCEA (SOC2.05/43) is gratefully acknowledge. Martha Gaustad revised the English grammar.     

异质预期、非理性行为与并购绩效——基于上市公司的实证研究

本文运用事件研究法,对2002-2005年的沪深上市公司并购行为进行了调查,发现反映投资者非理性行为的市场换手率、封闭式基金折价指数和个股超额换手率与公司并购后超额收益存在显著负相关关系.本文认为,Miller(1977)的观点并不完全成立,投资者畀质预期并不是导致公司并购前股票上升和并购后股价下跌的主要原因,投资者非理性行为扮演着重要的作用,股票的定价应该更充分考虑投资者的非理性行为.     

Intertemporal consumption with directly measured welfare functions and subjective expectations

Euler equation estimation of intertemporal consumption models requires many, often unverifiable assumptions. These include assumptions on expectations and preferences. We aim at reducing some of these requirements by using direct subjective information on respondents’ preferences and expectations. The results suggest that individually measured welfare functions and expectations have predictive power for the variation in consumption across households. Furthermore, estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution based on the estimated welfare functions are plausible and of a similar order of magnitude as other estimates found in the literature. The model favored by the data only requires cross-section data for estimation.     

The temporal dynamics of technology promises in government and industry partnerships for digital innovation: the case of the Copyright Hub

What is the expectation work required to ensure that technological innovation initially supported by government funding is subsequently taken up by market actors? This paper explores this question by applying a linked ecologies framework to the study of the Copyright Hub, a digital infrastructure for Intellectual Property trading developed in the UK. We draw our analysis from a five year long study, including forty-six interviews and six weeks of participant observation. We found that expectation work in policy-led infrastructural communities entails (1) leveraging technology to reshape the position of actors in the innovation space; (2) exploiting the different temporalities of expectation work in allied ecologies and (3) mobilising ‘slow’ expectations to provide momentum to the newly arranged innovation space. Highlighting difference in temporal dynamics for the various partners involved as a ‘hinging’ factor, our analysis contributes to clarifying the complex temporal alignment of policy and innovation processes in technology projects.     

Adaptive learning and monetary exchange

This paper investigates three classic questions in monetary theory: How can an intrinsically worthless asset, such as fiat money, maintain value as a medium of exchange? What are the short-run and long-run effects of a change in the money supply? What is the social cost of inflation? I answer these questions using a microfounded model of monetary exchange that replaces the rational expectations assumption with an adaptive learning rule. First, I show that monetary exchange is a robust arrangement in the sense that agents are able to learn the stationary monetary equilibrium while the non-monetary equilibrium is unstable under learning. Second, an unanticipated monetary injection has real effects in the short-run because learning the value of money takes time. In the long run, agents successfully learn the value of money, hence money is neutral. Third, under a constant money growth policy, an increase in the growth rate of money increases output in the short-run producing a short-run Phillips curve. A ten percent increase in the money growth rate has a social cost of 0.41 percent of output per year. Alternatively, a ten percent decrease in the money growth rate has a social benefit of 0.37 percent of output per year.     

Fundamentalists vs. chartists: Learning and predictor choice dynamics

In a simple, forward looking univariate model of price determination we investigate the evolution of expectations dynamics in the presence of two types of agents: fundamentalists and chartists. In particular, we combine evolutionary selection among heterogeneous classes of models through predictor choice dynamics based on a logit model, with adaptive learning in the form of parameters updating within each class of rules. We find that, for different parameterizations, it can happen that fundamentalists drive chartists completely out of the market or vice versa, and also that heterogeneous equilibria in which fundamentalists and chartists coexist are possible. Interestingly, though, only equilibria in which fundamentalists outperform chartists turn out to be adaptively learnable by agents.