Margin regulation and volatility

An infinite-horizon asset-pricing model with heterogeneous agents and collateral constraints can explain why adjustments in stock market margins under US Regulation T had an economically insignificant impact on market volatility. In the model, raising the margin requirement for one asset class may barely affect its volatility if investors have access to another, unregulated class of collateralizable assets. Through spillovers, however, the volatility of the other asset class may substantially decrease. A very strong dampening effect on all assets׳ return volatilities can be achieved by a countercyclical regulation of all markets.     

Selection and monetary non-neutrality in time-dependent pricing models

For a given frequency of price adjustment, monetary non-neutrality is smaller if older prices are disproportionately more likely to change. Selection for the age of prices provides a complete characterization of price-setting frictions in time-dependent models. Selection for older prices is weaker and non-neutralities are larger if the hazard function of price adjustment is less strongly increasing. Selection is weaker if there is heterogeneity in price stickiness. Finally, selection is weaker if durations of price spells are more variable. In particular, the Taylor (1979) model exhibits maximal selection for older prices, whereas the Calvo (1983) model exhibits no selection.     

APPROACHES AND METHODS FOR THE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF MARKET POWER: A SURVEY AND EMPIRICAL COMPARISON

This study discusses two widely used approaches in the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) literature and examines the strengths and weaknesses of the Production-Theoretic Approach (PTA) and the General Identification Method (GIM) for the econometric analysis of market power in agricultural and food markets. We provide a framework that may help researchers to evaluate and improve structural models of market power. Starting with the specification of the approaches in question, we compare published empirical studies of market power with respect to the choice of the applied approach, functional forms, estimation methods and derived estimates of the degree of market power. Thereafter, we use our framework to evaluate several structural models based on PTA and GIM to measure oligopsony power in the Ukrainian dairy industry. The PTA-based results suggest that the estimated parameters of oligopsony power are significantly different from zero, while GIM-based results do not indicate any evidence of oligopsony market power in the Ukrainian dairy industry. Moreover, estimations results vary substantially due to the employed estimation procedure.     

Targeted campaign competition,loyal voters,and supermajorities

We consider campaign competition in which candidates compete for votes among a continuum of voters by engaging in persuasive efforts that are targetable. Each individual voter is persuaded by campaign effort and votes for the candidate who targets more persuasive effort to this voter. Each candidate chooses a level of total campaign effort and allocates his effort among the set of voters. We completely characterize equilibrium for the majoritarian objective game and compare that to the vote-share maximizing game. If the candidates are symmetric ex ante, both types of electoral competition dissipate the rents from office in expectation. However, the equilibria arising under the two electoral objectives qualitatively differ. In majoritarian elections, candidates randomize over their level of total campaign effort, which provides support for the puzzling phenomenon of the emergence of supermajorities in majoritarian systems. Vote-share maximization leads to an equilibrium in which both candidates make deterministic budget choices and reach a precise fifty–fifty split of vote shares. We also study how asymmetry between the candidates affects the equilibrium. If some share of the voters is loyal to one of the candidates, then both candidates expend the same expected efforts in equilibrium, but the advantaged candidate wins with higher probability for majoritarian voting or a higher share of voters for vote-share maximization.     

The role of miniatures in computable general equilibrium modelling : Experience from ORANI

ORANI is a large general equilibrium model of the Australian economy used by policy analysts and university research workers. This paper describes the role of miniature models in the development and application of ORANI. Miniature versions of ORANI have been useful in (a) explaining results; (b) detecting errors; (c) conducting sensitivity analyses; (d) experimenting with new specifications; and (e) teaching. The present paper concentrates mainly on (a) and (b). A miniature model is developed to explain ORANI results for the effects of increases in protection, reductions in the real costs of labour, increases in oil prices and increases in real aggregate demand.     

An extended interpersonal influence model of organizational buyer behavior

Traditional views of buyer-seller dyads in organizational buyer behavior (OBB) research often focus on the dyad as a unit. This article considers the purchasing member of the dyad in the dual role of information source and decision influencer embedded in the buying center. The sales representative then is seen to approach the buying center through this liaison, who in many respects performs selling functions within the purchasing organization. A model operationalizing this approach and specific implications for further research are presented.     

关于制定劳务输出法的构想

从法律的角度看,解决我国国际劳务输出中存在的有关问题的当务之急是制定劳务输出法.该法应符合国际服务贸易的有关规定,贯彻国家主权与利益原则、鼓励劳务输出原则、保护海外劳工合法权益的原则,设立相应的机构,制定相关政策.     

《四库全书总目·子部·杂家类·杂纂之属》存目补正

《四库全书总目》由于种种原因,存在着诸多问题。前辈学者对此已多有纠正,而有关子部杂家类的问题尤多。现就杂家类杂纂之属存目部分有关编著者姓名、字号、籍贯、科第、仕履及著作内容等方面的疏漏和讹误,再补正30条。     

中国养老保险制度变迁的经济效应

本文针对中国目前正在进行的社会养老保险制度变迁 ,在一般均衡框架下构建了一个两期的动态生命周期模拟模型。我们从宏观经济、微观经济生产者、微观经济消费者、经济公平和转轨代价五个方面对制度变迁的经济效应进行了模拟量化分析。分析表明 ,制度变迁将使资本量和产量增加 ,资本 -产出比提高 ,利率下降 ,工资率上升 ;两类劳动者个人效用上升 ,养老金替代率上升 ,收入分配差距缩小 ;同时发生一定转轨代价。总的来看 ,此次中国养老保险制度变迁的经济效应是正面的。