Politics and economics in weak and strong states

While much research in political economy points out the benefits of “limited government,” political scientists have long emphasized the problems created in many less-developed nations by “weak states,” which lack the power to tax and regulate the economy and to withstand the political and social challenges from non-state actors. I construct a model in which the state apparatus is controlled by a self-interested ruler, who tries to divert resources for his own consumption, but who can also invest in socially productive public goods. Both weak and strong states create distortions. When the state is excessively strong, the ruler imposes such high taxes that economic activity is stifled. When the state is excessively weak, the ruler anticipates that he will not be able to extract rents in the future and underinvests in public goods. I show that the same conclusion applies in the analysis of both the economic power of the state (i.e., its ability to raise taxes) and its political power (i.e., its ability to remain entrenched from the citizens). I also discuss how under certain circumstances a different type of equilibrium, which I refer to as “consensually strong state equilibrium,” can emerge whereby the state is politically weak but is allowed to impose high taxes as long as a sufficient fraction of the proceeds are invested in public goods. The consensually strong state might best correspond to the state in OECD countries where taxes are high despite significant control by the society over the government.     

The valuation relevance of R&D expenditures: Time series evidence

The literature on the valuation relevance of R&D investments is based primarily on cross-sectional regressions or panel data regressions with time and firm (or industry) fixed effects such that the parameters relating R&D to market value are cross-sectionally constant. In an alternative approach, this paper investigates the value relevance of R&D investment using an earnings-based time series valuation model. Model parameters are estimated for each firm separately. In contradistinction to the results obtained from cross-sectional and fixed effects panel models, this study finds weak empirical support at best for the value relevance of R&D expenditures at the firm level.     

Reflections on the Efficient Market Hypothesis: 30 Years Later

In recent years financial economists have increasingly questioned the efficient market hypothesis. But surely if market prices were often irrational and if market returns were as predictable as some critics have claimed, then professionally managed investment funds should easily be able to outdistance a passive index fund. This paper shows that professional investment managers, both in The U.S. and abroad, do not outperform their index benchmarks and provides evidence that by and large market prices do seem to reflect all available information.     

Bank CEO materialism: Risk controls,culture and tail risk

We investigate how the prevalence of materialistic bank CEOs has evolved over time, and how risk management policies, non-CEO executives’ behavior and tail risk vary with CEO materialism. We document that the proportion of banks run by materialistic CEOs increased significantly from 1994 to 2004, that the strength of risk management functions is significantly lower for banks with materialistic CEOs, and that non-CEO executives in banks with materialistic CEOs insider trade more aggressively around government intervention during the financial crisis. Finally, we find that banks with materialistic CEOs have significantly more downside tail risk relative to banks with non-materialistic CEOs.     

Social networks in the global banking sector

We show that banks with shared social connections partner more often in the global syndicated loan market and that central banks in the network play dominant roles in various interbank transactions, indicating that social connections facilitate business connections. However, more centralized banks in the network also contribute significantly to the global systemic risk. Moreover, we find the soft information generated by social networks is particularly valuable when potential partners operate under different accounting and regulatory standards. Finally, we show that the recent banking crisis significantly limited the positive soft information effects of social networks in the global banking system.     

The consequences to analyst involvement in the IPO process: Evidence surrounding the JOBS Act

The JOBS Act allows certain analysts to be more involved in the IPO process, but does not relax restrictions on analyst compensation structure. We find that these analysts initiate coverage that is more optimistically biased, less accurate, and generates smaller stock market reactions. Investors purchasing shares following these initiations lose over 3% of their investment by the firm's subsequent earnings release. By contrast, issuers, analysts, and investment banks appear to benefit from this increased bias, as optimism is more positively associated with proxies for firm visibility and investment banking revenues when analysts are involved in the IPO process.     

Cross‐Border Auction Cycle Effects of Sovereign Bond Issuance in the Euro Area

We provide evidence for the euro area of spillovers from foreign public debt auctions into domestic secondary‐market auction cycles. We also confirm existing evidence of such spillovers from domestic issues into the domestic secondary market. Consistent with a theory of primary dealers’ limited risk‐bearing capacity, we find that auction cycles from domestic issues are stronger during the recent crisis period, whereas cross‐border effects are stronger in the precrisis period, but this evidence is not strong. This finding likely reflects the opposing effects of reduced sovereign bond market integration during the crisis and higher yield covariances caused by more market volatility.     

Using Market Expectations to Test for Speculative Bubbles in the Crude Oil Market

The wide fluctuations of oil prices from 2003 to 2008 have attracted the interest of academics and policymakers. A popular view is that these fluctuations were caused by speculative bubbles due to the increased financialization of oil futures markets. This hypothesis, however, is difficult to examine since the fundamental price of oil is unobservable and, therefore, econometric evidence in favor of bubbles may actually be due to misspecified market fundamentals. In this paper, we extend two recently proposed methodologies for bubble detection that alleviate this problem by using market expectations of future prices. Both methodologies provide no evidence of speculative bubbles.     

Zombie Board: Board Tenure and Firm Performance

We show that board tenure exhibits an inverted U‐shaped relation with firm value and accounting performance. The quality of corporate decisions, such as M&A, financial reporting quality, and CEO compensation, also has a quadratic relation with board tenure. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that directors’ on‐the‐job learning improves firm value up to a threshold, at which point entrenchment dominates and firm performance suffers. To address endogeneity concerns, we use a sample of firms in which an outside director suffered a sudden death, and find that sudden deaths that move board tenure away from (toward) the empirically observed optimum level in the cross‐section are associated with negative (positive) announcement returns. The quality of corporate decisions also follows an inverted U‐shaped pattern in a sample of firms affected by the death of a director.