Demand fluctuations and capacity utilization under duopoly

Summary.  This paper studies the impact of uncertain demand on firms’ capacity decisions when they operate in an oligopolistic environment. We define a two-stage game where firms choose capacity in the first stage without knowing which state of Nature is going to realize, and output levels in the second, knowing which state is realized. We prove the existence of a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium at which firms are in excess capacity compared with the capacity they would choose in the Cournot certainty equivalent game. Received: May 17, 1996; revised version July 31, 1996     

Endogenous timing in trade policy games: Should governments use countervailing duties?

Endogenous Timing in Trade Policy Games: Should Governments Use Countervailing Duties? - Trade policy under oligopoly is analysed in two multistage games with endogenous timing of trade policy. At the beginning of the games, the domestic and foreign governments choose whether to set trade policy at stage one or two. It is shown that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of both games, the domestic government will set its tariff (and production subsidy) at stage one and the foreign government its export subsidy at stage two. The domestic country commits not to use a countervailing duty in both games, and both countries are better off than when they set trade policy simultaneously.     

Regulation And The Rise In Asset-Based Mutual Fund Management Fees

In this article I explain why asset‐based fees are common for mutual fund management companies and why the average fee has increased recently. I argue that Securities and Exchange Commission fee regulations make alternative fee types illegal or unattractive. Management companies can maintain higher fees because regulations and brand‐name capital partly insulate them from competition and because investors cannot easily distinguish between performance‐oriented and marketing‐oriented fund companies. Index funds and unit investment trusts may offer competition to mutual funds in the future because they are designed to minimize management fees.     

Nonlinear Drift And Stochastic Volatility: An Empirical Investigation Of Short-Term Interest Rate Models

In this article I provide new evidence on the role of nonlinear drift and stochastic volatility in interest rate modeling. I compare various model specifications for the short‐term interest rate using the data from five countries. I find that modeling the stochastic volatility in the short rate is far more important than specifying the shape of the drift function. The empirical support for nonlinear drift is weak with or without the stochastic volatility factor. Although a linear drift stochastic volatility model fits the international data well, I find that the level effect differs across countries.     

Productivity growth in Indian agriculture: is there evidence of convergence across states?

This paper explores the question of convergence in total factor productivity (TFP) in agriculture across fourteen major agricultural states of India. Using a Törnqvist–Theil index for TFP growth for the period 1973–1993, we find no evidence to support convergence to a single TFP level (σ‐convergence). After grouping the various states on the basis of their productivity performance, we find that the high‐performing states show a gradual movement towards the trend, whereas the low‐performing states generally show more volatility. Testing for long‐run convergence in levels of agricultural productivity, we find evidence of conditional beta‐convergence after controlling for state‐specific factors and idiosyncratic year‐specific volatility. The results are robust to alternative specifications of tests of unit root in panel data developed recently.     

Markets and pro-poor agricultural growth: insights from livelihood and informal rural economy models in Malawi

This article presents the development of a set of programming models describing the major features of different rural livelihoods and of the informal rural economy they together make up in Malawi. The models allow for differentiated responses by different household types to change and for the partial equilibrium effects of consequent supply, demand, and price adjustments in labor and grain markets. The models provide insights into the relations between own‐farm and nonown‐farm activities in different households' livelihoods and in the informal rural economy as a whole, and are used to investigate possible impacts of increasing cash crop prices and of a more open rural economy. Impacts of these changes on the poor are found to be critically dependent upon supply and demand elasticities in labor and grain markets, but the poor could potentially suffer significant losses from increased openness of the local economy leading to increased expenditure by less poor households on imported goods and services.     

Fertility,Taxation and Family Policy*

Historically, there is clear evidence of an inverse relationship between female labour supply and fertility. However, the relationship across countries is now positive. Countries like Germany and Italy, with the lowest fertility, also have the lowest female participation rates. This paper analyses the extent to which this can be explained by public policy, in particular taxation and the system of child support. The results suggest that countries which have individual rather than joint taxation, and which support families through child care facilities rather than child payments, are likely to have both higher female labour supply and higher fertility.     

How to get firms to invest: A simple solution to the hold-up problem in regulation

Abstract. Many governmental programs are effective only if firms make costly investments. The inability of authorities to precommit to a regulatory scheme creates incentives for firms not to invest and to hold-up the regulator. This paper describes a simple subsidy/tax scheme embedded in a four-stage mechanism that solves the hold-up problem. We design a self-financing subsidy/tax scheme which benefits a complying firm at the expense of a non-complying firm. In order to be credible, the subsidy and tax rates must maximize social welfare for any combination of investment decisions. We show that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which all firms invest and no actual implementation with subsidies and taxes is required. We discuss in which cases the mechanism can work under incomplete information. Received: 30 December 1998 / Accepted: 12 October 2001     

ALL THINGS CONSIDERED,TAXES DRIVE THE JANUARY EFFECT

The multitude of explanations for the January effect leaves the reader confused about its primary cause(s): is it tax‐loss selling, window dressing, information, bid‐ask bounce, or a combination of these causes? The confusion arises, in part, because evidence has generally been presented in support of a particular hypothesis though the same evidence may be consistent with another hypothesis. Furthermore, prior work does not adequately control for the bid‐ask bounce. In this article we try to disentangle different explanations of the January effect and identify its primary cause. We find that tax‐related selling is the most important cause, overshadowing other explanations.