The taxation of passive foreign investment: lessons from German experience

Abstract The paper evaluates the working of German CFC rules that restrict the use of foreign subsidiaries located in low‐tax countries to shelter passive investment income from home taxation. While passive investments make up a significant fraction of German outbound FDI, we find that German CFC rules are quite effective in restricting investments in low‐tax jurisdictions. We find evidence that the German 2001 tax reform, which unilaterally introduced exemption of passive income in medium‐ and high‐tax countries, has led to some shifting of passive assets into countries for which the exemption was previously limited.     

Disability benefit microsimulation models in the Netherlands

Disability rates in the Netherlands used to be among the highest in the world. In 2002 the number of disability recipients approached one million. However, since then the number of disability cases has dropped remarkably due to a number of policy changes, the last of which being the new 2006 disability insurance scheme. On the other hand, in recent years the number of beneficiaries in the special scheme dedicated to the young handicapped has increased rapidly.     

Do National Numerical Fiscal Rules really shape fiscal behaviours in developing countries? A treatment effect evaluation

This paper analyses the effect of National Numerical Fiscal Rules (FRs) upon fiscal discipline in 74 developing countries over the period 1990–2007. It is the first study that assesses the impact of FRs on budgetary outcomes while controlling for the self-selection problem. It finds that the effect of FRs on structural fiscal balance is significantly positive, robust to a variety of alternative specifications, and varies with the type of FRs. It also finds that the treatment effect differs according to countries' characteristics: number of FRs, time length since FRs adoption, presence of supranational FRs, government fractionalisation and government stability.     

The extension of social security coverage in developing countries

We study the dynamic general equilibrium effects of introducing a social pension program to elderly informal sector workers in developing countries who lack formal risk sharing mechanisms against income and longevity risks. To this end, we formulate a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model that incorporates defining features of developing countries: a large informal sector, private transfers as an informal safety net, and a non-universal social security system. We find that the extension of retirement benefits to informal sector workers results in efficiency losses due to adverse effects on capital accumulation and the allocation of resources across formal and informal sectors. Despite these losses recipients of social pensions experience welfare gains as the positive insurance effects attributed to the extension of a social insurance system dominate. The welfare gains crucially depend on the skill distribution, private intra-family transfers and the specific tax used to finance the expansion.     

Foreign aid preferences and perceptions in donor countries

We present original survey data on preferences for foreign aid in 24 donor countries from 2005 to 2008. On publicly-funded foreign aid (Official Development Assistance, or ODA), we find patterns that are consistent with a standard model of democratic policy formation, in which donations are treated as a pure public good. Controlling for perceptions of current ODA, we show that individual preferences for ODA are (i) negatively correlated with relative income within a country-year; and (ii) positively correlated with inequality at the country level. We extend the analysis to explain variation in the gap between desired aid and actual ODA, arguing that lobbying by high-income special interest groups can divert resources away from the median voter’s preferred level of aid. Consistent with this, we observe that ODA is significantly lower where policymakers are more susceptible to lobbying. Finally, we present a novel test of competing “crowding out” hypotheses. Self-reported private aid donations are negatively correlated with actual ODA, and positively correlated with perceived ODA. This finding is consistent with an emerging argument in the literature, whereby ODA crowds out private aid by enabling charities to forego fundraising activities and crowds in private aid through a signaling channel.     

IS A SOCIAL EMPOWERMENT OF PPP FOR INFRASTRUCTURE DELIVERY POSSIBLE? LESSONS FROM SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS

Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) have emerged in recent years as outcome‐based public‐private partnerships (PPP) for the delivery of welfare services, where the payment to the private operator is linked to the achievement of superior social impact. Since the traditional infrastructure‐based PPP approach seems to have failed to achieve higher level of efficiency and, above all, effectiveness, this paper discusses the extent to which the SIB model can represent a reference point to innovate the PPP model by introducing more focus on outcome achievement and social value generation.     

WHAT DO CITIZENS THINK ABOUT PUBLIC ENTERPRISES? SUBJECTIVE SURVEY DATA ON THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES OF THE GERMAN PUBLIC SECTOR

We analyse the legitimacy of public enterprises that perform economic activities by focusing on the citizens’ subjective preferences, i.e. determining their political legitimacy. Using data from a representative survey conducted among 318 citizens of the German state of Rhineland‐Palatine, we explore determinants for the support of either privatisation efforts or the instrumental thesis, a widespread principle in German‐speaking countries, which considers public enterprises solely as instruments to fulfil economic policy objectives. Our results indicate that the respondents’ perception of the efficiency of public enterprises as well as their personal economic situation are important factors for the support of privatisation. The influential factors for the use of public enterprises as policy instruments are political ideology, the perception of a higher security of supplying goods and services as well as opinions regarding corporate social responsibility. The subjective preferences of a (democratic) country's citizens are thus an important reason why the public sector should or should not play an active part in providing goods and services. This can play an important role when decision makers from the public sector are keen to take into account the citizens’ approval or disapproval of privatisation measures.     

Where Should the Elderly Live and Who Should Pay for Their Care?*

We consider a model with a population consisting of earners and retired persons; elderly care is publicly provided. There is one big city, where congestion effects and agglomeration forces are at work, and a number of small villages. We show how the externalities related to population mobility lead to an inefficient spatial distribution of earners and retirees, and we characterize the second‐best solution. Decentralization of this solution in a fiscal federalism structure requires the use of taxes and subsidies proportional to the number of earners and retired persons living in the city and the villages.     

Housing Allowance and the Rent of Low‐income Households

This paper analyses the effect of a housing allowance programme on the rent paid by assisted low‐income households. The data consist of 12,000 rental households in the free‐market and municipal sectors. The effect is estimated using the programme reform of 2002 as an instrument. The reform increased the allowance of the assisted households depending on housing characteristics, but it had little effect on the eligibility. Results suggest that in the private sector, one additional euro of allowance increases the rent of claimants by 60–70 cents. The effect is zero in the municipal sector, as rents are tied to the housing costs.     

Party Discipline and Environmental Policy: The Role of “Smoke‐filled Back Rooms”*

We adopt the view that greater party discipline induces legislators to commit to promised policies after being elected. We then develop the hypothesis that the effect of party discipline on the stringency of environmental policy is conditional on the degree of government corruption. Our empirical work suggests that greater party discipline results in more stringent environmental policies when the level of corruption is relatively low, but in weaker policies when the level of corruption is comparatively high.