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11.
Hans Gersbach 《Review of Economic Design》2002,7(1):45-56
Abstract. Many governmental programs are effective only if firms make costly investments. The inability of authorities to precommit
to a regulatory scheme creates incentives for firms not to invest and to hold-up the regulator. This paper describes a simple
subsidy/tax scheme embedded in a four-stage mechanism that solves the hold-up problem. We design a self-financing subsidy/tax
scheme which benefits a complying firm at the expense of a non-complying firm. In order to be credible, the subsidy
and tax rates must maximize social welfare for any combination of investment decisions. We show that there exists a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium in which all firms invest and no actual implementation with subsidies and taxes is required. We
discuss in which cases the mechanism can work under incomplete information.
Received: 30 December 1998 / Accepted: 12 October 2001 相似文献
12.
Christoph Lülfesmann 《European Economic Review》2002,46(8):1379-1397
We consider a model where one region in a federation can realize a public project after undertaking value-increasing investments. While negotiations on the federal level ensure that an efficient project size is implemented in equilibrium, non-contractibility of investments causes the overall outcome to differ across regimes. If the region bears the entire implementation costs of its policies, underinvestment prevails and subsidiarity (centralized governance) is superior when spillovers are weak (strong). Conversely, if linear cost sharing arrangements are feasible, decentralized authority often admits a socially optimal outcome while centralized authority (with majority or unanimity rule) does not. 相似文献
13.
A spatial tax harmonization model 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Yoshiaki Ohsawa 《European Economic Review》2003,47(3):443-459
Policies to harmonize value-added tax rates are controversial in the European Union. This paper formulates a multi-country model over a one-dimensional space as a non-cooperative Nash game, in which each country aims at maximizing its tax revenue, subject to the constraint that its tax rate lies within a given common band. Then we examine the effects of changes in the common band on tax rates, tax revenues and the number of cross-border shoppers at Nash equilibrium. We also analyze the effects of geographical variation in country size and location. 相似文献
14.
Cr3+-H3PO4光度法测定磷酸体系中的Cr3+ 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Cr3 与H3PO4生成绿色配合物,其最大吸收峰在660nm,摩尔吸光系数为1.4×102L·mol-1·cm-1,Cr3 在0~0.5mg/30ml范围内符合比尔定律,用加入法直接测定磷酸体系中的Cr3 ,结果满意。 相似文献
15.
British public investment has declined sharply both as a share of GDP and as a share of government spending since the 1970s. Only part of this decline is explained by privatisation, which transferred some public investment to the private sector. More important was the very large and permanent reduction in public house‐building between the mid‐1970s and the early 1980s. Between the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the rate of public investment recovered somewhat, but after that time it declined again, reaching a record low in 1999. The most recent decline in public investment has affected a range of central government programmes, and it has not been significantly offset by investment under the Private Finance Initiative. The government now plans to increase investment spending, although levels look set to remain low by historical standards for some time to come. 相似文献
16.
Martín Gonzalez-Eiras 《Journal of Monetary Economics》2008,55(2):197-218
We analyze the effect of the projected demographic transition on the political support for social security, and equilibrium outcomes. Embedding a probabilistic-voting setup of electoral competition in the standard OLG model with capital accumulation, we find that intergenerational transfers arise in the absence of altruism, commitment, or trigger strategies. Closed-form solutions predict population ageing to lead to higher social security tax rates, a rising share of pensions in GDP, but eventually lower social security benefits per retiree. The response of equilibrium tax rates to demographic shocks reduces old-age consumption risk. Calibrated to match features of the U.S. economy, the model suggests that, in response to the projected demographic transition, social security tax rates will gradually increase to 16%. Other policies that distort labor supply will become less important; labor supply therefore will rise, in contrast with frequently voiced fears. 相似文献
17.
Panu Poutvaara 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2008,110(3):591-608
This paper investigates public and private choices between internationally applicable and country‐specific education when graduates are mobile. Human capital depends on innate skills and study effort with either type of education. It is shown that national governments provide too few students with internationally applicable education, and too many with country‐specific education. This effect is mitigated, but not entirely eliminated, by the introduction of a graduate tax, according to which graduates are required to pay part of their taxes to the country where they received their education, regardless of residence. However, private educational choices are socially optimal with suitably differentiated tuition fees. 相似文献
18.
Matthias Wrede 《The German Economic Review》2003,4(2):203-216
Abstract. This paper analyzes how deviating from individual taxation affects married couples. The focus is on time allocation, on investment in family‐specific human capital and on distribution of income within the family. Two insights are discussed in detail. First, the distribution of tax‐reduction gains due to the income splitting system depends on whether the family has been started or not. After marriage, joint taxation increases redistribution among family members. Second, although joint taxation reduces the tax burden of the family, it might harm the marriage partner that is more productive in household production provided that potential marriage partners foresee the effects of joint filing on the time allocation within the family. 相似文献
19.
We examine the spillover wealth effects of the Orange County, California bankruptcy announcement in December 1994 on municipal bonds, municipal bond funds, and bank stocks. This bankruptcy is prominent because of unprecedented losses and because it was caused by a highly leveraged derivatives strategy rather than a shortage of tax revenues and excess spending. We find contagion in the bond market with significantly negative abnormal returns for municipal bond funds without direct exposure to Orange County and for non‐Orange County municipal bonds. In addition, our findings suggest the contagion spills over to the common stocks of investment and commercial banks that deal in or use derivatives; however, the equities of banks unexposed to derivatives are not affected. 相似文献
20.
Blane D. Lewis 《Asian Economic Journal》2005,19(3):291-317
As a result of Indonesia's decentralization program, local governments have gained significantly more responsibility for service delivery, considerably larger fiscal resources, and much greater authority over the use of those resources than before. The present paper develops a simple budget model to describe and explain the substantial differences in pre‐ and post‐decentralization local government fiscal behavior related to spending, taxing and saving. During the post‐decentralization period special attention is paid to the fiscal behavior of natural resource rich regions. Among other things, the evidence suggests that: post‐decentralization local government spending is partly responsive to increasing needs and partly the subject of elite capture; local government taxation has become more aggressive under decentralization and appears to be mostly driven by local bureaucratic expectations related to routine overhead budgets; and the increased savings of local governments during the post‐decentralization period is determined to a large degree by delayed central government transfer payments. 相似文献