Reputation,risk-taking,and macroprudential policy

This paper examines the role of macroprudential capital requirements in preventing inefficient credit booms in a model with reputational externalities. In our model, unprofitable banks have strong incentives to invest in risky assets when macroeconomic fundamentals are good in order to avoid the stigma of being assessed as low ability by the market. We show that across-the-system countercyclical capital requirements that deter such gambling are constrained optimal when fundamentals are neither extremely weak nor extremely strong.     

Write-down bonds,credit risk and imperfect information

A structural model of pricing Write-Down (hereafter WD) bonds under imperfect information has been developed to investigate the effect of WD bonds issuance on credit risk. Information is not only delayed but also asymmetrically distributed between managers and outside investors. We derive analytical solutions for corporate securities prices and find the issuance of WD bonds could significantly improve firm value via reducing bankruptcy cost. Our numerical results further demonstrate that the WD bonds issuance increases corporate risk tolerance and reduces the risk of bankruptcy and credit spreads under imperfect information.     

Flight to liquidity and the Great Recession

This paper argues that counter-cyclical liquidity hoarding by financial intermediaries may strongly amplify business cycles. It develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which banks operate subject to agency problems and funding liquidity risk in their intermediation activity. Importantly, the amount of liquidity reserves held in the financial sector is determined endogenously: Balance sheet constraints force banks to trade off insurance against funding outflows with loan scale. A financial crisis, simulated as an abrupt decline in the collateral value of bank assets, triggers a flight to liquidity, which strongly amplifies the initial shock and induces credit crunch dynamics sharing key features with the Great Recession. The paper thus develops a new balance sheet channel of shock transmission that works through the composition of banks’ asset portfolios.     

我国小企业的紧融资约束

紧融资约束是我国大多数小企业进一步发展所面临的瓶颈问题。其直接原因是信贷配给制下国有银行的自利性歧视,如企业规模歧视、治理结构歧视、所有权歧视、资金需求歧视和交易费用歧视等。其根本原因是我国的金融抑制和金融发展的水平偏低。重要的是,金融抑制往往是金融不发达的重要原因。因此,解决的办法主要有加强信用评价与管理、发展信用担保业、加强对国有银行贷款行为的规制、放松对民间融资的规制和在银行业中引入私人小银行等。其中,第三条措施是根源于国有银行的企业性质的,也是可以立即执行并在短期内见效的解决办法。     

Capital controls and monetary policy autonomy in a small open economy

Is there a link between capital controls and monetary policy autonomy in a country with a floating currency? Shocks to capital flows into a small open economy lead to volatility in asset prices and credit supply. To lessen the impact of capital flows on financial instability, a central bank finds it optimal to use the domestic interest rate to “manage” the capital account. Capital account restrictions affect the behavior of optimal monetary policy following shocks to the foreign interest rate. Capital controls allow optimal monetary policy to focus less on the foreign interest rate and more on domestic variables.     

Exploring the mismatch between credit ratings and loss-given-default: A credit risk approach

It is commonly observed that high grade loans with better ratings are often associated with low recoveries if they default (i.e. with relatively high loss-given-default (LGD)). To address the mismatch problem, this paper proposes a credit risk approach by minimizing LGD for higher rated loans as a risk-rating matching standard in the sense that the decreasing LGD from creditors’ perspective is associated with higher credit rating for the borrower. This standard forces customers’ credit rating of each grade to be optimally determined in correspondence to its LGD, which means the LGD of high grade loans tends to be low. The approach is then tested using three credit datasets from China, i.e. credit data from 2044 farmers, 2157 small private businesses and 3111 SMEs. The empirical results show that the proposed approach indeed guides the way to solve the mismatch phenomenon between credit ratings and LGDs in the existing credit rating literature. By optimally determining credit ratings, the findings derived from this paper help provide a valuable reference for bankers, and bond investors to manage their credit risk.     

“投资人付费”vs.“发行人付费”:谁的信用评级质量更高？

本文选择2011-2015年被中债资信覆盖的发债A股上市公司作为主要研究对象,比较了“投资人付费”与“发行人付费”模式下的评级质量高低。研究发现:(1)与“发行人付费”评级相比,采用“投资人付费”模式的中债资信所作评级显著更低。(2)与“发行人付费”评级相比,当采用“投资人付费”模式的中债资信所作评级越低时,发行人未来盈利能力越差、预期违约风险越高,投资者要求的风险补偿也越高,这表明“投资人付费”模式下的信用评级质量更高。(3)“发行人付费”模式的评级结果可以在一定程度上反映公司的内部私有信息,但由于同时存在独立性缺失问题,“发行人付费”模式的信用评级质量仍然不如“投资人付费”模式的信用评级质量,这说明独立性对于评级机构尤其重要。     

The leverage effect and the basket-index put spread

Benchmark models that exogenously specify equity dynamics cannot explain the large spread in prices between put options written on individual banks and options written on the bank index during the financial crisis. However, theory requires that asset dynamics be specified exogenously and that endogenously determined equity dynamics exhibit a “leverage effect” that increases put prices by fattening the left tail of the distribution. The leverage effect is larger for puts on individual stocks than for puts on the index, thus increasing the basket-index spread. Time-series and cross-sectional variation in the leverage effect explains option prices well.     

Pitfalls and perils of financial innovation: The use of CDS by corporate bond funds

We use the financial crisis of 2007–2009 as a laboratory to examine the costs and benefits of teams versus single managers in asset management. We find that when a fund uses complex trading strategies involving the use of CDS team-managed funds outperform solo-managed funds. This may be due to the greater diversity of expertise, experience and skill of teams relative to single managers. During the financial crisis, however, the performance premium of teams becomes negative, which may be because of the slower decision times of teams, which are especially costly during times of rapidly changing market conditions.