非对称信息下企业信用风险形成机理及其降低策略

信用风险控制既是风险控制研究的理论难点，也是风险控制实践的难点。从非对称信息理论的角度出发。分析非对称信息下信用风险形成的机理，可以得出控制信用风险的关键在于事前阶段的结论。加强客户信用信息管理系统的建设是企业降低信用风险的关键，也是实现企业信用风险标本兼治的第一步。     

信息管理与信息系统学科建设的现状和设想

经济信息管理专业和管理信息系统专业在国内开办已20多年了，经济几代人的努力，专业建设有了很大的发展，但是，该专业的特色和优势还不明显，现在更是受到计算机科学与技术专业，电子商务专业的两面夹击，专业的发展空间和生存空间受到了严重的挑战，因此，必须重新构建信息管理与信息系统专业的框架，并科学定位。     

公司治理与会计信息质量控制

简要分析了公司治理结构与会计信息质量的关系,并在借鉴国外公司治理经验的基础上,结合中国企业的实际情况,从公司股权结构、公司治理模式、独立董事制度、股票期权激励约束机制以及绩效评价体系等有关公司治理的五个方面提出了若干建议和设想。     

企业网络财务信息披露调查与分析——来自河北省的案例

网上获取财务信息是管理者和投资者获取信息的主要途径之一,本文选取河北省上市为样本企业调查了企业网上财务信息的披露情况。调查发现,绝大部分企业建立了自己的网站,但普遍存在网上财务信息披露水平不高、财务信息披露量参差不齐、披露形式单一、对信息的安全性重视不足、数据更新不及时等问题,针对这些问题提出了改进建议。     

上市公司财务报表附注披露存在的问题、原因及改进

本文首先从我国会计环境的实际出发,指出应对上市公司财务报表附注披露进行适度管制,在此基础上结合实例重点分析了我国上市公司财务报表附注披露存在的问题及成因。由于政出多门等原因,我国上市公司财务报表附注披露信息过载与披露不充分问题并存。     

Misperceiving the value of information in predicting the performance of others

Economic models typically allow for “free disposal” or “reversibility” of information, which implies non-negative value. Building on previous research on the “curse of knowledge” we explore situations where this might not be so. In three experiments, we document situations in which participants place positive value on information in attempting to predict the performance of uninformed others, even when acquiring that information diminishes their earnings. In the first experiment, a majority of participants choose to hire informed—rather than uninformed—agents, leading to lower earnings. In the second experiment, a significant number of participants pay for information—the solution to a puzzle—that hurts their ability to predict how many others will solve the puzzle. In the third experiment, we find that the effect is reduced with experience and feedback on the actual performance to be predicted. We discuss implications of our results for the role of information and informed decision making in economic situations. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9128-y. JEL Classification C91, D83     

Social learning with private and common values

Summary. We consider an environment where individuals sequentially choose among several actions. The payoff to an individual depends on her action choice, the state of the world, and an idiosyncratic, privately observed preference shock. Under weak conditions, as the number of individuals increases, the sequence of choices always reveals the state of the world. This contrasts with the familiar result for pure common-value environments where the state is never learned, resulting in herds or informational cascades. The medium run dynamics to convergence can be very complex and non-monotone: posterior beliefs may be concentrated on a wrong state for a long time, shifting suddenly to the correct state.Received: 6 January 2005, Revised: 5 May 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D82.Jacob K. Goeree: Correspondence toFinancial support from the National Science Foundation NSF (SBR-0098400 and SES-0079301) and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Richard McKelvey posthumously for insights and conjectures about information aggregation that helped shape our thinking about the problem. We also acknowledge helpful comments from Kim Border, Tilman Börgers, Bogachen Celen, Luis Corchon, Matthew Jackson and seminar participants at University College London, the University of Arizona, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, the California Institute of Technology, the 2003 annual meeting of ESA in Pittsburgh, the 2003 Malaga Workshop on Social Choice and Welfare Economics, the 2003 SAET meetings in Rhodos, and the 2003 ESSET meetings in Gerzensee.     

Selection dynamics and adaptive behavior without much information

This paper uses the experimental method to investigate behavior in a coordination game when the information available to subjects is limited to their feasible choices and their experienced payoffs. In the experiment subjects converge to an absorbing state at rates that are orders of magnitude faster than reinforcement learning algorithms, but slower than under complete information. This state is very close to a mutual best response outcome. All cohorts converged to the market statistic predicted by the interior equilibrium regardless of the information conditions or the stability conditions. Eric Battalio programmed the graphical user interface. The National Science Foundation and Texas Advanced Research Program provided financial support. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or the Texas Advanced Research Program.     

EDGAR on the internet: The welfare effects of wider information distribution in an experimental market for risky assets

Policies such as the SEC’s Fair Disclosure Rule, and technologies such as SEC EDGAR, aim to disseminate corporate disclosures to a wider audience of investors in risky assets. In this study, we adopt an experimental approach to measure whether this wider disclosure is beneficial to these investors. Price-clearing equilibrium models based on utility maximization and non-revealing and fully-revealing prices predict that in a pure exchange economy, an arbitrary trader would prefer that no investors are informed rather than all are informed; non-revealing theory further predicts that an arbitrary trader would prefer a situation in which all traders are informed rather than half the traders are informed. These predictions can be summarized as “None > All > Half”. A laboratory study was conducted to test these predictions. Where previous studies have largely focused on information dissemination and its effects on equilibrium price and insider profits, we focus instead on traders’ expected utility, as measured by their preferences for markets in which none, half, or all traders are informed. Our experimental result contradicts the prediction and indicates “Half > None > All”, i.e. subjects favor a situation where a random half is informed. The implication is that in addition to testing predictions of price equilibrium, experiments should also be used to verify analytical welfare predictions of expected utility under different policy choices. JEL Classification D82, D53, G14, L86 This work was largely completed while this author was at The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.     

会计信息与公司治理结构分析

公司治理结构与会计信息都产生于委托代理理论、契约理论和产权理论的需要,理论基础的交叉重叠使会计信息与公司治理结构具有内在的逻辑性。会计信息质量决定公司治理效率,目前由于会计信息的有效需求不足和供给质量不高导致信息供需不均衡,从而使会计信息与公司治理陷入恶性循环,本文通过剖析信息供需机制不均衡的原因,提出完善的对策和建议。