Accountability of independent directors: Evidence from firms subject to securities litigation

We examine which independent directors are held accountable when investors sue firms for financial and disclosure-related fraud. Investors can name independent directors as defendants in lawsuits, and they can vote against their reelection to express displeasure over the directors’ ineffectiveness at monitoring managers. In a sample of securities class action lawsuits from 1996 to 2010, about 11% of independent directors are named as defendants. The likelihood of being named is greater for audit committee members and directors who sell stock during the class period. Named directors receive more negative recommendations from Institutional Shareholder Services, a proxy advisory firm, and significantly more negative votes from shareholders than directors in a benchmark sample. They are also more likely than other independent directors to leave sued firms. Overall, shareholders use litigation along with director elections and director retention to hold some independent directors more accountable than others when firms experience financial fraud.     

Monetary Policy,Trend Inflation,and Unemployment Volatility

The literature has long agreed that the DMP model (after Diamond 1982, Mortensen 1982, Pissarides 1985) with search and matching frictions in the labor market can deliver large volatilities in labor market quantities, consistent with empirical data, only if there is at least some wage stickiness. I show, however, that the model can deliver nontrivial volatilities without wage stickiness, as long as it has price dispersion and nonzero long‐run inflation rates. I find that by keeping inflation at a positive rate, monetary policy may be accountable for the large standard deviations observed on labor market variables. In addition, the Shimer (2005) puzzle disappears under monetary policy shocks.     

Dependence structure between the equity market and the foreign exchange market–A copula approach

This paper investigates the dependence structure between the equity market and the foreign exchange market by using copulas. In particular, several copulas with different dependence structure are compared and used to directly model the underlying dependence structure. We find that there exists significant symmetric upper and lower tail dependence between the two financial markets, and the dependence remains significant but weaker after the launch of the euro. Our findings have important implications for both global investment risk management and international asset pricing by taking into account joint tail risk.     

Settling for efficiency – A framework for the European securities transaction industry

Despite a lot of restructuring and many innovations in recent years, the securities transaction industry in the European Union is still a highly inefficient and inconsistently configured system for cross-border transactions. This paper analyzes the functions performed, the institutions involved and the parameters concerned that shape market and ownership structure in the industry. Of particular interest are microeconomic incentives of the main players that can be in contradiction to social welfare. We develop a framework and analyze three consistent systems for the securities transaction industry in the EU that offer superior efficiency than the current, inefficient arrangement. Some policy advice is given to select the ‘best’ system for the Single European Financial Market.     

Why did the average duration of unemployment become so much longer?

There has been a substantial increase in the average duration of unemployment relative to the unemployment rate in the U.S. over the last 30 years. We evaluate the performance of a standard job-search model in explaining this phenomenon. In particular, we examine whether the increase in within-group wage inequality and the decline in the incidence of unemployment can account for the increase in unemployment duration. The results indicate that these two changes can explain a significant part of the increase over the last 30 years, although the model fails to match the behavior of unemployment duration during 1980s.     

Evaluating the economic significance of downward nominal wage rigidity

The existence of downward nominal wage rigidity has been abundantly documented, but what are its economic implications? This paper demonstrates that, even when wages are allocative, downward wage rigidity can be consistent with weak macroeconomic effects. Firms have an incentive to compress wage increases as well as wage cuts when downward wage rigidity binds. By neglecting compression of wage increases, previous literature may have overstated the costs of downward wage rigidity to firms. Using micro-data from the US and Great Britain, I find that the evidence for the compression of wage increases when downward wage rigidity binds. Accounting for this reduces the estimated increase in aggregate wage growth due to wage rigidity to be much closer to zero. These results suggest that downward wage rigidity may not provide a strong argument against the targeting of low inflation rates.