New evidence of salary discrimination in major league baseball

Salary discrimination in MLB has largely been discarded as a research topic. However traditional quantitative methods (particularly least squares regression) have concentrated on the effect of race for the average player. If only a particular salary class of players are subject to discrimination, or if the size of the discrimination is small at the average, then least-squares techniques will struggle to identify discrimination. I use quantile regression to uncover salary discrimination against black players in the lower half of the salary distribution. Not only are the premia for white and Hispanic players statistically significant, but they are large: up to 25% of salary for the bottom quintile of players.     

Optimal risk taking in an uneven tournament game with risk averse players

We analyze the optimal choice of risk in a two-stage tournament game between two players that have different concave utility functions. At the first stage, both players simultaneously choose risk. At the second stage, both observe overall risk and simultaneously decide on effort or investment. The results show that those two effects which mainly determine risk taking – an effort effect and a likelihood effect – are strictly interrelated. This finding sharply contrasts with existing results on risk taking in tournament games with symmetric equilibrium efforts where such linkage can never arise. Conditions are derived under which this linkage leads to a reversed likelihood effect so that the favorite (underdog) can increase his winning probability by increasing (decreasing) risk which is impossible in a completely symmetric setting.     

Firm-level determinants of tax evasion in transition economies

Business tax evasion is an important issue for governments. Yet the factors that determine business tax evasion have not been sufficiently examined in the literature in general, and in transition contexts in particular. To address this gap, this study uses the WB/EBRD Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) database with a sample of over 12,692 firms from 26 transition economies. Applying various modelling strategies, we argue that tax evasion is a function of firm-level and institutional-level variables. We contribute to the literature by providing robust evidence showing that the perceived tax burden has a positive impact on tax evasion. We also find that the tax evasive behaviour of firms is positively influenced by low trust in government and in the judicial system as well as by higher perceptions of corruption and higher compliance costs. We find that smaller firms, individual businesses and firms in sectors that are less visible to the tax administration are more likely to get involved in evasive behaviour. Overall, institutional factors play an important role in determining firms’ tax evasion behaviour in transition economies. This finding has important policy implications.     

一种新颖的低功耗、强移动性的密码锁设计

本文介绍一种基于单片机控制的电子密码锁设计。本系统由P89LPC900系列单片机、矩阵键盘和报警系统组成。系统能完成电子控制开锁、超时报警、超次锁定、管理员解密和修改用户密码的基本功能。除上述基本的密码锁功能外,还具有节电模式、掉电存储、按键中断唤醒等功能。该系统结构简洁、成本低、体积小,功能实用。     

Maximum likelihood estimation of search costs

In a recent paper Hong and Shum [2006. Using price distributions to estimate search costs. Rand Journal of Economics 37, 257-275] present a structural method to estimate search cost distributions. We extend their approach to the case of oligopoly and present a new maximum likelihood method to estimate search costs. We apply our method to a data set of online prices for different computer memory chips. The estimates suggest that the consumer population can be roughly split into two groups which either have quite high or quite low search costs. Search frictions confer a significant amount of market power to the firms: Despite more than 20 firms operating in each of the markets, we estimate price-cost margins to be around 25%. The paper also illustrates how the structural method can be employed to simulate the effects of the introduction of a sales tax.     

An incentive pricing with two types of qualities and users

This paper analyses quality discrimination when the monopolist provides two types of qualities for two-types of users, for example, in the software market. The users using software are confronted with two types of quality in using the software: one is related to learning, while the other is operation. In addition, the users are discriminated by the frequency of utilization for software, for example, low-demand and high-demand users. In this paper, the characteristics for bi-directional quality distortion in both learning quality and operation quality are analysed. It is shown that the distortion can occur both for low demanders and for high demanders. Finally, from public policy, a subsidy mechanism is introduced.     

The Early Careers Of Engineers And The Accumulation Of Skills In The Canadian Economy

In this paper we use world cycling records to study the pattern of technological development of the track bicycle. We find that there is a strong evidence of ‘contagious’ effects among cycling records which in turn provides indirect evidence of ‘contagious’ effects among technological innovations. Interestingly, the ‘contagiousness’ of records is not a salient characteristic of track and field competitions where, arguably, technology plays a smaller role.     

Cooperation In R&D With Spillovers And Delegation Of Sales ∗

Cooperation in several phases of the innovation process is viewed by antitrust authorities with suspicion. They face the dilemma between providing the right incentives for the appro-priability of returns to R&D and the risks of diminishing product market competition. The current legislation in the European Union and the United States gives special treatment to cooperation in R&D and the joint exploitation of results (extended cooperation).

We study several collusive regimes for a class of examples in which vertical relations are explicitly introduced. Regarding antitrust policy implications we fmd that: a) there is an ana-lytical justification to a ‘rule of reason’ treatment for extended cooperation in research joint ventures and, b) individual exemptions, though restrictive of competition, might be welfare improving.     

Cournot Competition and Hit-and-Run Entry and Exit in a Teaching Experiment

Instructors can use a computerized experiment to introduce students to imperfect competition in courses on introductory economics, industrial organization, game theory, and strategy and management. In addition to introducing students to strategic thinking in general, the experiment serves to demonstrate that profits of a firm fall as the number of competitors is increased in a market and that firms enter profitable markets. The authors have used the experiment in undergraduate classes on strategy and management as well as in master of business administration courses with great success.     

Labour migration in the enlarged EU: a new economic geography approach

This paper studies the impact of migration policy liberalisation on international labour migration in the enlarged European Union (EU) in a structural economic geography approach. The liberalisation of migration policy would induce an additional 1.80–2.98% of the total EU workforce to change their country of location, with most of migrant workers relocating from the East to the West. The average net migration rate is decreasing in the level of integration, suggesting that from an economic point of view no regulatory policy responses are necessary to labour migration in the enlarged EU.