关于我国水务业市场化改革的探讨

从产业整体属性看．水务业属于与人民生活密切相关．公益性显著的自然垄断产业。人们通常认为．市场机制在该领域的作用具有较大的局限性，需要政府管制．并独家垄断经营。但从水务业各环节看，除防洪、水系治理、水源保护、输水管网之外．其他业务均可以不同程度地引入市场机制。我国水务业市场化模式选择的思路是：公私合作制下的多样化投融资方式，以流域为单元的水务统一管理体制，独立管制下的相机抉择竞争机制。     

Limited participation,private money,and credit in a spatial model of money

Summary. The purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of private money issue for the effects of monetary policy, for optimal policy, and for the role of fiat money. A locational model is constructed which gives an explicit account of the role for money and credit, and for limited financial market participation. When private money issue is prohibited, there is a liquidity effect as the result of a money injection from the central bank, but this effect goes away when private money is permitted. Private money issue changes dramatically the nature of optimal monetary policy. With private money, fiat currency is no longer used in transactions involving goods, but currency and central bank reserves play an important part in the clearing and settlement of private money returned for redemption.Received: 5 May 2003, Revised: 1 December 2003JEL Classification Numbers: E4, E5.The author thanks seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond and Duke University, conference participants at the Texas Monetary Conference at U.T. Austin, February 2002, and the Conference on Recent Developments in Money and Finance at Purdue University, May 2003, as well as Gabriele Camera, Ed Nosal, Will Roberds, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions.     

Free banking and the stability of early joint-stock banking

Proponents of free banking argue that systems adopting theirpolicies will be stable. In this paper, we present evidencesuggesting that, in general, early joint-stock banking systemsdid not adopt free banking, and those that did proved to beunstable. In particular, we demonstrate that those systems imposingregulations were generally stable. We rationalise the successof regulation as a pragmatic solution to the time-inconsistencyproblem arising from the peculiar nature of the banking firm.Notably, we find that the ‘golden age’ of free bankingstability can be attributed to restrictions on the organisationalform of the early banking firm.     

Limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium

In Chichilnisky (Working Paper No. 586, 1991), Chichilnisky (Working Paper No. 650, 1992) and Chichilnisky (Economic Theory, 1995, 5, 79–108), I introduced the concept of a global cone and used it to define a condition on endowments and preferences, ‘limited arbitrage’, which I showed to be necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium. In response to a comment (Monteiro et al., Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1997, 26, 000-000), I show here that the authors misunderstood my results by focussing on brief announcements which cover other areas, social choice (Chichilnisky, American Economic Review, 1994, 427–434 and algebraic topology (Chichilnisky, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 1993, 29, 189–207), rather than on the publication which contains may proofs on equilibrium. The comment's example is irrelevant to my results in Chichilnisky (Economic Theory, 1995, 5, 79–108) because it starts from different conditions. Limited arbitrae is always necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium, with or without short sales, with the global cones as I defined them, and exactly as proved in Chichilnisky (Economic Theory, 1995, 5, 79–108).     

西方财务理论的挑战:行为金融学

传统的西方财务理论和实际的证券市场上的情况存在着不同,这样就引起了人们对西方财务理论质疑,主要是对传统西方财务理论的基础有效市场理论的质疑。本文从现代证券市场中与传统的西方财务理论不一致的异象出发,引出了可以解释这些情况的行为金融学。行为金融学是以有限理性为基础的,它比传统金融理论的完全理性假设更符合证券市场的现实情况。     

When does a public–private partnership (PPP) lead to inefficient cost management? Evidence from South Korea’s urban rail system

This paper investigates the impact of a public–private partnership (PPP) on the operational cost-efficiency of South Korea’s urban rail system. Seoul’s line 9, which is operated by a PPP, was compared with Seoul Metropolitan Rapid Transit (SMRT) which is entirely run by the public sector. Overall, no evidence was found that private operation led to clear and significant declines in costs to the public. Private shareholders, on the other hand, experienced a surprisingly high rate of return. The author explains why two characteristics defining a typical PPP—activity bundling and public–private risk-sharing—were behind this unintended outcome and makes suggestions to prevent other governments experiencing similar problems.     

The impact of contract characteristics on the performance of public–private partnerships (PPPs)

Four significant features of public–private partnership (PPP) contracts are analysed to understand their impact on performance. These are whether the contract allows sanctions to be imposed; its complexity; its flexibility; and whether renegotiation is possible. The effects of these characteristics were investigated by surveying participants in all of the PPP projects in The Netherlands. The only feature considered to have any significant impact on perceived performance was the possibility of imposing sanctions. The authors’ findings cast doubt on earlier research into managing PPP performance and suggest that researchers, governments and the private sector need to look beyond contract terms to properly understand and manage PPP performance.     

Infrastructure public–private partnership project ecosystem – financial and economic positioning of stakeholders

The purpose of this paper is to construct an analytical cash flow-based project model to facilitate project appraisal of both private investors and public sector. With the help of the model that focuses on ecosystem and its stakeholders, it is simpler to identify potential conflicts usually encountered in public–private partnership (PPP) projects. The model construct is based on classical cash flow accounting and cost–benefit analysis. In the model, the flows of cash (private investors) and the flows of costs and benefits (public investors) are integrated in a single framework. The model shows that within the ecosystem the investors' (public vs. private) social, economic and financial targets are not necessarily coinciding. Prospecting of common ground and win–win situations becomes a crucial success factor for any PPP project. The paper discusses the policy and investment strategy implications for successful PPPs.     

“物权法定原则”的理论反思与制度完善

物权类型封闭原则起源于潘德克顿法学,其本意只是限制私法自治,并无限制物权法律渊源的意图。东亚地区的物权法定原则是物权类型封闭原则的亚类型,即在物权类型封闭原则的基础上,附加限制了物权法律渊源。物权类型封闭原则的形式合理性在于对物债二分体系的维护,其实质合理性则主要在于保障财物的可流通性与交易安全,同时也发挥着公共政策功能。虽然在公示制度逐渐完善的情况下,物权类型封闭的交易安全保障功能已经减弱,但其在体系维护和公共政策方面仍然发挥着无可替代的功能。已经实行物权类型封闭原则的国家并无改采物权自由创设的必要,同时物权自由创设本身包含的制度风险也削弱了其可行性。我国的民法体系、登记制度现状以及特殊国情决定了未来民法典应当维持物权法定原则,但物权法律渊源应当与民法法律渊源保持一致。立法机关应当对物权法定原则的规范表达进行完善,并对相关制度做出妥善安排。     

The consequences of an unknown debt target

Several proposals to reduce U.S. debt reveal large differences in their targets. We examine how an unknown debt target affects economic activity using a real business cycle model in which Bayesian households learn about a state-dependent debt target in an endogenous tax rule. Recent papers use stochastic volatility shocks to study fiscal uncertainty. In our setup, the fiscal rule is time-varying due to unknown changes in the debt target. Households infer the current debt target from a noisy tax rule and jointly estimate the transition probabilities. Three key findings emerge from our analysis: (1) limited information about the debt target amplifies the effect of tax shocks through changes in expected tax rates; (2) the welfare losses are an order of magnitude larger when both the debt target state and transition matrix are unknown than when only the debt target state is unknown to households; (3) an unknown debt target likely reduced the stimulative effect of the ARRA and uncertainty about the sunset provision in the Bush tax cuts may have slowed the recovery and led to welfare losses.