内部审计模式的历史演进及其动因分析

内部审计模式经历了控制基础审计、流程基础审计、风险基础审计、风险管理基础审计等发展阶段。本文认为,追溯内部审计模式的历史演进,分析各类审计模式的产生背景,寻求推动其发展的动因,对于我国内部审计模式的跨越式发展将会产生积极的效应。     

VaR模型及其在金融风险管理中的应用

风险价值(简称VaR)是目前国际金融风险管理领域广泛使用的工具,也是度量金融风险的一种新的技术标准。本文着重介绍了VaR的概念、计算及其应用,并指出VaR模型作为衡量金融市场风险的标准在我国的应用前景。     

风险导向内部审计:背景分析与框架建构

风险导向内部审计是内部审计领域的最新发展,西方国家对其基本理论研究才刚刚开始,本文在论述内部审计历史演进规律的基础上,首先对风险导向内部审计产生的背景进行分析,然后构筑风险导向内部审计基本理论框架,并对其基本理论问题展开叙述。本文的研究将对风险导向内部审计这一前沿问题进行系统化和结构化的探索。     

高度危险行业农民工权益保护现状及对策

农民工的权益保护已成为全社会普遍关注的热点问题。而矿山开采、建筑施工、危险化学品等高危行业农民工权益保护更是迫在眉睫。要妥善解决这一问题，进一步完善劳动保护制度，地方政府严把安全生产和企业准入关，提高农民工自我保护意识等是必要手段。     

Axiomatic reference-dependence in behavior toward others and toward risk

Summary. This paper considers the applicability of the standard separability axiom for both risk and other-regarding preferences, and advances arguments why separability might fail. An alternative axiom, which is immune to these arguments, leads to a preference representation that is additively separable in a reference variable and the differences between the other variables and the reference variable. For other-regarding preferences the reference variable is the decision-maker’s own payoff, and the resulting representation coincides with the Fehr-Schmidt model. For risk preferences the reference variable is initial wealth, and the resulting representation is a generalization of prospect theory.Received: 28 April 2004, Revised: 27 April 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: D81, D64.An earlier version of this paper was titled “An Axiomatic Characterization of the Fehr-Schmidt Model of Inequity Aversion.” I am grateful to Rachel Croson, Jill Stowe, and Karl Vind for helpful comments. Financial support was provided by the Private Enterprise Research Center, the Program in the Economics of Public Policy, and the Program to Enhance Scholarly and Creative Activities.     

A contribution to duality theory,applied to the measurement of risk aversion

This paper determines the precise connection between the curvature properties of an objective function and the ray-curvature properties of its dual. When the objective function is interpreted as a Bernoulli or cardinal utility function, our results characterize the relationship between an agent’s attitude towards income risks and her attitude towards risks in the underlying consumption space. We obtain these results by developing and applying a number of representation theorems for concave functions.The work of Juan E. Martínez-Legaz has been supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology and the FEDER, project BEC2002-00642, and by the Departament d’Universitats, Recerca i Societat de la Informació, Direcció General de Recerca de la Generalitat de Catalunya, project 2001SGR-00162. He also thanks the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA for its support. John Quah would like to acknowledge with gratitude the financial support of the ESRC (grant number R000271171). He would also like to thank the Department of Economics at UC Berkeley, whose hospitality he enjoyed while completing this project. Both authors would like to thank Simon Cowan for pointing the way to some important references. They are also very grateful to the referee whose insightful suggestions led to a much improved paper     

The effects of risk preferences in mixed-strategy equilibria of games

We consider the effects of risk preferences in mixed-strategy equilibria of 2×2 games, provided such equilibria exist. We identify sufficient conditions under which the expected payoff in the mixed equilibrium increases or decreases with the degree of risk aversion. We find that (at least moderate degrees of) risk aversion will frequently be beneficial in mixed equilibria.     

When does Strategic Debt-service Matter?

Recent work in corporate finance has suggested that strategic debt-service by equity-holders works to lower debt values and raise yield spreads substantially. We show that this is not quite correct. With optimal cash management, defaults occassioned by deliberate underperformance (strategic defaults) and those forced by inadequate cash (liquidity defaults) work as substitutes: allowing for strategic debt-service leads to a decline in the equilibrium likelihood of liquidity defaults. In some cases, this decline is sufficiently sharp that equilibrium debt values actually increase and yield spreads decline. We provide an intuitive explanation for these results in terms of an interaction of optionalitiesExpanded versions of this paper were presented in conferences and seminars at the Scottish Institute for Research in Finance, European Finance Association, Western Finance Association, Financial Management Association, 10th Derivative Securities Conference, Santa Clara University, Virginia Tech, the Norwegian School of Management, the Norwegian School of Business and Economics, Duke University, and Carnegie-Mellon University. We benefitted greatly from the comments of participants at these seminars and would particularly like to thank Francesca Cornelli, Kose John, Pete Kyle, Sanjay Unni, and Raman Uppal in this context     

Information, trade and incomplete markets

The no-trade result of Milgrom and Stokey, J Econ Theory 26:17–27 (1982), states that if rational traders begin with an ex-ante Pareto optimal allocation then the arrival of information cannot generate trade. This paper allows traders to trade before and after the arrival of information. If there are enough securities to hedge against all payoff relevant risk, then the preinformation-arrival allocation is Pareto optimal and information arrival has no effect. This no-retrade result is the competitive analog of the no-trade result of (1982). However, information generically generates trade when markets are state-contingent incomplete.We thank seminar participants at Cambridge, Carnegie Mellon,Cornell, Essex, London, Maastricht, USC, and York and participants at the 2003 SITE, the 2003 SAET and the Fall 2002 Cornell–Penn State Macro Conference. We also thank Karl Shell and a referee for this journal for useful comments     

Inflation in Open Economies with Complete Markets

This paper uses an overlapping generations model to analyze monetary policy in a two-country model with asymmetric shocks. Agents insure against risk through the exchange of a complete set of real securities. Each central bank is able to commit to the contingent monetary policy rule that maximizes domestic welfare. In an attempt to improve their country’s terms of trade of securities, central banks choose to commit to costly inflation in favorable states of nature. In equilibrium the effects on the terms of trade wash out, leaving both countries worse off. Countries facing asymmetric shocks may therefore gain from monetary cooperation.