Capital structure and the control of managerial incentives

We present a theory of capital structure based on the power of shareholders, bondholders and managers to control the incentive conflicts in large corporations. The manager–owner conflict produces a trade-off between inefficiency in the low state and rents in the high state, and the shareholder–bondholder conflict produces under-investment as in Myers [Journal of Financial Economics 19 (1997) 147]. Since managers and bondholders both prefer more efficient actions in the low state, the two conflicts are interdependent. With risk-less levels of debt, there are no shareholder–bondholder agency costs, but managerial control over the incentive-setting process produces excessive rents. With risky debt, shareholders focus more on returns in the high state so that shareholder–bondholder agency costs increase but managerial rents decrease. Efficient levels of debt holder protection facilitate a reduction in manager–owner agency costs that outweighs shareholder–bondholder agency costs, and are decreasing in firm performance. The results are consistent with the separate empirical results relating control to both compensation and leverage, and suggest how future studies can be integrated.     

Zombie Board: Board Tenure and Firm Performance

We show that board tenure exhibits an inverted U‐shaped relation with firm value and accounting performance. The quality of corporate decisions, such as M&A, financial reporting quality, and CEO compensation, also has a quadratic relation with board tenure. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that directors’ on‐the‐job learning improves firm value up to a threshold, at which point entrenchment dominates and firm performance suffers. To address endogeneity concerns, we use a sample of firms in which an outside director suffered a sudden death, and find that sudden deaths that move board tenure away from (toward) the empirically observed optimum level in the cross‐section are associated with negative (positive) announcement returns. The quality of corporate decisions also follows an inverted U‐shaped pattern in a sample of firms affected by the death of a director.     

Political uncertainty and labour investment efficiency

ABSTRACT

We examine the impact of political uncertainty on the labour investment efficiency (LIE) of a firm. Using a sample of Chinese firms, we test the market discipline and managerial entrenchment hypotheses. Our findings suggest that political uncertainty adversely affects LIE. The results are consistent with the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. That is, firms hire more labour in a period of increased information asymmetry due to the political uncertainty, which deteriorates LIE. Our findings are robust to a battery of alternative measures of LIE and estimation methods. We conduct several additional analyses and document that the adverse impact of political uncertainty is stronger when the newly appointed government official is older, the firm is state-owned, the firm belongs to a politically sensitive industry or the firm operates in locations with stringent labour protection. By contrast, when the firm locates in a region with weak Chinese government intervention or after President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign, the adverse impact of political uncertainty on LIE is less pronounced. Last, we document that after hiring more labour, firms receive tangible and intangible benefits in terms of receiving more loans, collect more government subsidies, and able to re-establish some political connection but at the cost of lower performance.     

行为域和环境域匹配的模型分析

R·R·布莱克和J·S·穆顿的管理方格理论认为,由于管理者对人或生产的关心程度不同,每个管理者有自己的管理方式.我们认为,管理者的管理方式并非仅限一种,而是管理方格中的一个区域,即行为域;同样地,企业对管理方式的需求也是方格中的一个区域,即环境域.行为域和环境域可以相互影响,相互吸引,进而扩大其吻合的部分,二者的吻合程度反映了管理者与企业匹配的合理程度,提高吻合度需要管理者选择合适的企业和最佳的管理方式、努力改造自己和适度改造企业.     

管理教练、权变奖励、组织公民行为与B2B顾客满意

本文构建了一个有关主管行为、组织公民行为和B2B顾客满意的概念模型并加以检验。研究发现（1）销售人员的组织公民行为对于B2B顾客满意具有显著正向影响;（2）销售人员组织公民行为对B2B顾客满意的影响受环境不确定性的正向调节;（3）感知的管理教练行为和权变奖励均对销售人员的情感性组织承诺和组织公民行为具有正效应;（4）情感性组织承诺是主管行为对员工组织公民行为影响的中介变量;论文最后阐述了研究的管理内涵以及未来的研究方向。     

The Bakery: a cross-functional case study for introductory managerial accounting

This instructional case is designed to achieve four educational objectives: (1) to give students a more complete appreciation of the importance of considering accounting information along with marketing and economics-related information, avoiding a myopic focus on accounting data, (2) to give students practice in pricing, cost volume profit analysis (CVP) and outsourcing decisions, (3) to help students learn to build spreadsheets that are capable of what-if analysis, and (4) to provide an active learning experience that engages introductory accounting students. The Bakery is a non-profit organization whose primary function is to sell baked goods and beverages to students in a large campus residence hall complex. In completing the case, students utilize information provided about the costs and previous pricing structure of The Bakery, along with information they collect about competitors' product offerings, prices, and accompanying services, and their own knowledge of The Bakery's customers, college students and their parents, as a basis for making pricing decisions. Once they have completed the pricing analysis, students use the resulting variable costing income statement to perform CVP and to analyze a decision to potentially outsource The Bakery's operations.     

Greenmail premia, board composition and management shareholdings

This paper investigates the association between premia paid in targeted share repurchases (greenmail) and the characteristics of the boards of directors. A nonlinear relationship is found between the premium paid and the proportion of shares held by the inside directors. The premium decreases as the proportion of unaffiliated outside directors increases.     

Earnings persistence, accruals and managerial share ownership

We investigate the relationship between earnings persistence and a broad measure of total accruals (TACC). We propose and find that in Australia, TACC is less persistent than cash flows. We further propose that the persistence of accrual components is positively associated with the reliability of those components. However, we find that the least reliable accrual component has the greatest persistence and suggest possible reasons for this. We then investigate the relationship between earnings persistence and managerial share ownership, but find no evidence of a consistent, strong relationship. Rather, for the non-current operating accruals we find evidence consistent with incentive alignment for large firms with high operating cash flows, whereas for small firms we find evidence consistent with efficient contracting.     

管理者过度自信、市场竞争与商业信用

基于行为金融视角,考量沪深两市2007～2011年上市公司管理者过度自信与商业信用的关系。结果表明,管理者过度自信与提供的商业信用正相关。民企面临的市场竞争大于国企,使得过度自信的管理者会提供更多的商业信用,而国有企业不存在这样的关系;同时,在竞争行业与管制行业之间,也表现出这种显著性关系。     

信息不对称、管理者内生偏好与上市公司股权融资偏好

一般以为,上市公司的股权融资偏好是由于不合理的成本因素、有缺陷的监管制度和政策与低效的资本市场等原因造成的.本文分析认为,上市公司股权融资偏好产生的基本原因是管理者的内生融资偏好.如果公司绩效影响管理者的财富(或职位、声誉等),管理者的偏好将支配公司的融资决策;对称信息下,管理者将有充分的股权融资偏好.不对称信息下,如果管理者对公司项目(或资产)拥有私人信息,且厌恶风险,管理者将最大限度地使用股权融资,直至达到均衡.最后,本文提出,管理者对股权融资的偏好是内生的,治理目前上市公司股权融资偏好所产生危害的基本思路是"疏",而不是"堵".