Corporate aggregate disclosure practices in Jordan

This study reports the results of an empirical investigation of the disclosure behavior of listed companies in Jordan after important changes in economic and accounting regulations. It also reports the relationship between aggregate disclosure (both mandatory and voluntary) and a number of company characteristics (financial and non-financial) for Jordanian companies listed in Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). The results of the study revealed that there was a significant increase in the level of aggregate disclosure (its average was 69%) compared to previous studies in Jordan. The extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosures was 83% and 34% respectively. Univariate analysis revealed that firm size, profitability, number of shareholders, listing status, industry type, audit firm size and company age are significant variables in explaining the variation in the level of aggregate disclosure among Jordanian companies. Meanwhile, multivariate analysis showed firm size (sales), profitability (ROE), audit firm size, industry type and listing status, to be significantly associated with the level of aggregate disclosure.     

The effects of audit firm rotation on perceived auditor independence and audit quality

Our study explores loan officers’ perceptions of auditors’ independence and audit quality under three experimental audit firm rotation scenarios. We use a case experiment with a between-subjects design to determine whether rotation of the audit firm impacts financial statement users’ perceptions of auditor’s independence and quality. Findings based on 212 useable responses indicate that loan officers do perceive an increase in independence when the company follows an audit firm rotation policy. However, the length of auditor tenure within rotation fails to significantly change loan officers’ perceptions of independence. Findings also indicate that neither the presence of a rotation policy nor the length of the auditor tenure within rotation significantly influences the loan officers’ perceptions of audit quality.     

Mandated disclosures under IAS 36 Impairment of Assets and IAS 38 Intangible Assets: value relevance and impact on analysts’ forecasts

Drawing on a large sample of European firms, we examine whether variant compliance levels with mandated disclosures under IAS 36 Impairment of Assets and IAS 38 Intangible Assets are value relevant and affect analysts’ forecasts. Our results indicate a mean (median) compliance level of about 84% (86%) but high variation among firms and disclosure levels regarding IAS 36 being much lower than those regarding IAS 38. In depth, analysis reveals that non-compliance relates mostly to proprietary information and information that reveals managers’ judgment and expectations. Furthermore, we find a positive (negative) relationship between average disclosure levels and market values (analysts’ forecast dispersion). Results, however, hold more specifically for disclosures related to IAS 36, and these also improve analysts’ forecast accuracy. Our findings add knowledge regarding the economic consequences of mandatory disclosures, have an appeal to regulators and financial statement preparers and reflect on the IASB’s concerns to increase the guidance and principles on presentation and disclosure.     

Mandatory dividend rules and the investment decision: The case of Chile

Chilean companies are forced by law to distribute at least 30% of their liquid profits. The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether this mandatory dividend rule has an impact on investment decisions. Based on accounting data and by using the discontinuous regression approach, our results show that there are no significant differences between the investment plans of Chilean companies that pay dividends and those that do not. Moreover, consistent with the signaling hypothesis, our results also show that firms with a greater probability of paying an excess dividend (above the minimum required by the law) are those with more investment opportunities and more financial constraints.