银行理财产品收益率市场化演进机制研究——基于修正Hotelling模型的理论分析与实证检验

本文利用修正的Hotelling模型对我国银行理财产品收益率的市场化演进机制进行了理论分析,并使用2005至2019年的银行理财产品历史数据进行了实证检验,得到了一系列结论。第一,收益率落后的"输家"银行下期将以更大的相对幅度提高其收益率,呈现出"输家"追赶"赢家"的锦标赛竞争机制。第二,上述竞争机制受到"输家"银行排名、不同银行之间收益率差距和监管政策的影响。"输家"银行排名越靠后、不同银行之间的收益率差距越大,那么,下期"输家"银行提高其理财产品收益率的相对幅度就越大,不同银行之间的竞争行为就越强烈;与之相对的,监管政策越严,则不同银行之间的竞争强度越弱。本文的研究结论对进一步深入理解我国存款市场化利率的形成机制、加强对商业银行的监管和引导有一定的借鉴和启示意义。     

论建立塔里木河流域配水机制的必要性

通过塔里木河流域水资源开发利用现状的分析,设计建立流域配水机制,以期合理分配水资源,维护流域生态平衡,实现流域内水资源永续利用和农业可持续发展。     

企业控制权演变与财权配置

企业的财权配置是企业所有权的核心内容。从最初的业主制企业到现代的股份公司，财权配置主要是企业内部各利益主体(如股东、经营等)之间的权力分配和合约安排。随着企业控制权的演变及“利益相关理论”的兴起，企业的财权配置应不仅仅是股东和经营的企业内部财权配置，而应扩展到包括外部利益相关在内的外部财权配置，以及为保证利益相关财权配置实现的相机治理机制。     

Nash implementation with an infinite-dimensional trade space

This paper deals with the problem of implementing the Walras correspondence via Nash equilibria, in exchange economies with infinitely many commodities and finitely many households with possibly non-ordered preferences. We explicitly construct a feasible mechanism enjoying some features, which have natural economic meanings. Under a fairly weak boundary condition, this game fully implements the Walras equilibria. If this condition is not fulfilled, our mechanism nevertheless implements the constrained Walras equilibria. Received: 11 December 2003, Accepted: 29 July 2005 JEL Classification: D41, D43, D51 We thank (without implicating) Prof. Jean-Marc Bonnisseau and Cuong Le Van for helpful comments. The views expressed in this paper reflect those of the authors and not necessarily those of Calyon.     

我国货币政策利率传导渠道的体制转换特征——利率市场化改革进程中的考察

本文考察了我国利率市场化改革进程中货币政策利率传导渠道效应的体制转换特征。实证结果表明:1978年第一季度至2009年第二季度期间我国货币政策传导的管制利率渠道发生了两次体制转换,转换之后贷款基准利率调整对产出和物价水平的效应都降低了。1996年1月至2009年7月期间我国货币政策传导市场利率渠道发生了一次体制转换,转换之后同业拆借利率变动平抑产出和物价波动的效果都更强劲、更持续。这意味着我国的利率市场化改革取得了阶段性成果,也意味着我国利率调控由直接方式逐渐转向主要依靠间接方式不仅是必要的,也是可行的。     

我国金融市场间溢出效应研究——基于四元VAR-GARCH(1,1)-BEKK模型的分析

汇率改革以来,政府实施了一系列金融市场改革,促使金融市场一体化程度显著提高,增强了金融市场间联系。本文采用四元VAR(6)-GARCH(1,1)-BEKK模型分析了我国主要金融市场(股票市场、债券市场、外汇市场以及货币市场)的溢出关系。研究发现,上述市场有很强的波动集聚性和持续性,大多数金融市场间存在显著的双向均值溢出,所有市场间均存在显著的双向波动溢出,还发现市场间溢出可能主要来自于市场传染效应。据此,本文认为政府应该采取合理有效的监管框架,监控金融市场参与者的资本金状况,防止金融市场大幅波动,降低风险累积程度,并在执行货币政策时,兼顾金融市场价格变化对货币政策执行效力的影响。     

征信体系的作用与效率——基于信息不对称随机有限重复博弈的分析

征信体系的意义可以用重复博弈理论来加以解释.本文建立了一个信息不对称随机有限重复信用博弈模型,证明如果存在征信体系实现的信息共享机制,那么不论借款者的类型是什么,诚实守信是可以作为序列均衡的结果在有限重复博弈的绝大多数时期中出现的.如果不存在信息共享机制,信贷市场有可能消失,即便引入资产抵押,信贷市场仍是不完全的.基于上述序列均衡分析,本文进一步阐释了全面征信、法律保障、市场结构对征信体系效率运行的重要性.就发展中国家而言,成立中性、独立、信息全面的国家信用局和鼓励民营信用公司积极竞争,完善义务征信的法律体系是较为理想和可行的选择     

The Norwegian debate on the gold standard and monetary integration in the 1870s

Abstract

The origin of the gold standard and the desire for monetary integration shared the same root, the prevailing liberal worldview of Norwegian elites. The actual timing of the final move, however, was strongly influenced by fear of foreign exchange volatility in the wake of the German monetary unification rather than the fear of inflation highlighted in earlier studies. The diminished prospect for a single “world money” after the Franco-Prussian war made monetary integration a dividing issue. In 1873, the attempt by the government to safeguard some of the advantages of integration by joining the Scandinavian Currency Union (SCU) was defeated by the parliamentary majority. The opposition was based both on a more optimistic view of the prospect of even further monetary integration and on fears of political opposition to Scandinavianism and the government. However, eighteen months later, parliament conceded and Norway joined the SCU.     

Are bygones not bygones? Modeling price-level targeting with an escape clause and lessons from the gold standard

Like the gold standard, price-level targeting (PT) involves not letting past deviations of inflation be bygones; both regimes return the price level (or price of gold) to its target. The experience of suspension of the gold standard in World War I and resumption in the 1920s (for some countries at a different parity) is reviewed. It suggests that, in practice, PT might operate with an escape clause that would allow rebasing of the price target in the face of large shocks. Using a calibrated general equilibrium model, we show that such an escape clause can produce multiple equilibria. For some parameterizations, there is a low credibility equilibrium (with high expectation of a reset) associated with high output volatility and frequent resets. These problems reduce, or reverse, the expectational advantage PT has over inflation targeting.