Since the euro was launched, divergences in European economies'evolutions have been more significant than generally expected. The article, based on a multinational macroeconomic model describing the interdependence between 14 European countries, examines the role played by relative‐price adjustment mechanisms and difficulties inherent in asymmetric evolutions.
The efficiency of relative‐price adjustment mechanisms seems limited and, even in the most flexible countries, the return to equilibrium is slow and still incomplete after 10 years. Differences in relative‐price adjustment mechanisms remain a source of asymmetries between member countries. Extra‐European exchanges have a stabilizing role which is uneven on account of trade openness and price elasticities. A decrease of the world demand and a depreciation of the euro, still have an important impact with significant disparities between countries.
Several lessons can be drawn in terms of economic policy. A more restrictive European fiscal policy proves more costly in the long run in Germany and the Netherlands on account of the weakness of price compensation effects. On the contrary, thanks to their greater flexibility, the United Kingdom and Sweden can offset an initial negative shock more rapidly. The wage dimension in the definition of a good European policy mix has also to be examined. 相似文献
This paper estimates the backward-looking and forward-looking monetary policy reaction functions of the Central Bank of the
Republic of Turkey (CBRT) by considering the post-crisis period from August 2001 to September 2006, with a special emphasis
on inflation targeting. Policies which the CBRT applied are analyzed according to the Taylor rule. The empirical results indicate
that the CBRT followed the Taylor rule in its interest setting behaviour. In forward-looking models, the response coefficient
of inflation and the output gap is greater than that of backward-looking models. The results of forward-looking models reflect,
the policies conducted in Turkey. In the post-crisis period, expected inflation has been the main reaction variable for the
CBRT. This suggests that monetary policy over the post-crisis period was not accommodating increases in expected inflation.
The main conclusion is that ‘Taylor rule’ based monetary policies were effective in inflation targeting in Turkey.
ABSTRACT This article proposes a critical reading of market discipline and its limitations as a mechanism in European economic governance. Consistent with neoliberal beliefs about market-based governance, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is premised on the functioning of the government bond market as a fiscal-policy discipliner. However, the operation of market discipline requires that neither governments nor their private creditors can rely on an authority to bail them out. It, therefore, precludes the kinds of intervention by Eurozone’s supranational institutions witnessed during the euro crisis. In the post-crisis context, efforts to strengthen market discipline continue to be frustrated by the growing reliance of financial institutions on government bond markets as well as the European Central Bank’s (ECB) active participation in those markets. Having undermined the credibility of the market as an autonomous and apolitical mechanism of discipline, European economic governance struggles to come to terms with the rise of a supranational ‘economic sovereign’ in the Eurozone. 相似文献
Empirical evidence suggests that women are discriminated against in the labor market. We analyze the effects of taste-based and statistical gender discrimination on business cycle and inflation dynamics by including unpaid household production, two-agent households, and discriminatory firm behavior in a tractable New Keynesian model. After a negative demand shock, we find that the economic downturn is more severe in comparison to a non-discriminatory environment, as the shock implies an increase in the inefficient utilization of female and male productivity. Furthermore, the working time allocation between women and men becomes more inefficient. Moreover, we show that discrimination implies a lower transmission of expansionary monetary policy shocks on inflation. Overall, taste-based discrimination leads to larger macroeconomic distortions, while statistical discrimination implies higher intra-household inefficiencies. 相似文献