Institutional failure or market failure?

We investigate the effect of the power of creditors, property rights protection, and institutional quality, on bank profits using a panel of 498 banks from 46 countries. Results show that better institutions and stronger property rights protection reduce bank profits, while stronger power of creditors drives up bank profits significantly. Results imply that better institutions and enhanced property rights protection lead to greater flow of credit allowing firms and investors to undertake more profitable ventures. By extension, stronger creditor rights erect steeper barriers to external finance for firms and investors. National indicators of economic freedoms may be more important to lowering the spread than strict creditor rights. Seemingly, credit markets fail when economic institutions fail or when governments intervene into these markets in ways that impede the safety and soundness of financial transactions and private contracting.     

Will FinTech make regional banks superfluous for small firm finance? Observations from soft information-based lending in Germany

Regional banks have a competitive advantage in that short distances to clients enable the use of soft information for superior lending decisions. If the ambition of FinTech start-ups to create superior screening and monitoring technologies materialises, this advantage would be diminished and regional banks would become superfluous for small firm finance. To explore this claim, the paper in hand analyses qualitative empirical data about the lending processes and rating system use of regional German savings banks. In essence, the results from participant observation and interviews clarify the importance of “real” soft information for critical lending decisions. The context specificity and limited verifiability of “real” soft information hamper it from being hardened through the use of rating systems and other bank-ICT. Though FinTech's scoring technologies may overcome the first limitation, it appears likely that in the course of scoring development “real” soft information will be systematically crowded out due to the manipulation problem. The paper expects improved access to finance for SMEs if FinTech solutions overcome both limitations of “real” soft information use, or if peer-to-peer lending and regional banks coexist. Deteriorated access to finance is expected if FinTech companies displace the relationship banking of regional banks due to enhanced competition, without preserving the advantages of “real” soft information with superior screening and monitoring technologies. The paper concludes with recommendations on how to prevent deteriorated access to finance for small firms by promoting fair competition and FinTech innovations.     

Is current institutional quality linked to legal origins and disease endowments? Evidence from Africa

This paper empirically assesses if and to what extent cross-country differences in institutions inherited from the past affect current institutional quality in Africa. Specifically, the work evaluates if legal origins and disease endowments explain cross-country differences in the quality of contemporary institutions that are widely considered to be important for financial system development and other economic outcomes, such as those related to creditor rights protection and the credit information infrastructure, as well as the judicial, legal property and insolvency systems. Empirical tests are carried out on a sample of 46 African former European colonies with data on current institutional quality from 2004 to 2013. The findings reveal that the legal origins hypothesis receives strong support in the data: historical factors, rooted in legal origins, have long-lasting effects on current institutional quality in the African context. Mixed evidence is instead found for the endowment view.     

Fuelled Power: Oil,Financiers and Central Bank Policy in Nigeria

While the literature on business power and global finance has illuminated the ways in which financial institutions limit the policy autonomy of states in developing countries, we know much less about the circumstances under which the power of financiers is undermined. In this article, I advance explanations of these circumstances by arguing that state access to natural resource revenues reduces the power of financial institutions and enhances the capacity of the state to pursue central bank policies which violate the interests of major financiers. I employ a case study of central bank policy in Nigeria to probe this argument and find evidence that supports the claim that whenever the Nigerian government's access to resource revenues increased, the state's capacity to diverge from financiers’ preferred central bank policies and to advance its own preferences increased as well. The analysis provides the basis for broader propositions about the policy space of developing countries vis-à-vis financial institutions and the variability of structural power.     

企业财务管理中的业财融合问题分析

近年来,随着我国各领域的快速发展,企业的数量持续增多,各企业扩大了发展规模,承受着巨大的竞争压力。通过业财融合问题的分析,发现企业财务管理对企业的经济发展有直接的影响性。对此,需要提高重视度,优化管理理念,创新管理模式,及时地发现业财融合所存在的问题,采取科学合理的措施进行有效解决,确保企业财务管理工作的稳定发展。     

自然灾害背景下农村金融消费者权益保护问题探讨

目前，农村金融消费者权益保护工作力量薄弱，自然灾害对农村金融消费者影响较大；同时，金融产品设计对农村金融消费者权益保护考虑不足。为保护农村金融消费者权益，并最大限度地规避自然灾害给农户带来的经济损失，应循序渐进、阶段性地推动金融消费立法，完善农村金融服务体系，构建农村金融消费者自然灾害权益保护机制，开展针对农村金融消费者的常态化宣传教育活动。     

云财务共享服务模式设计——以费用报销流程为例探讨

在企业数量增加的同时,企业之间所具有的竞争情况也愈发激烈。其中,财务共享服务是目前企业提升运营效率、降低运营成本的一项重要方式。本文中就以企业的费用报销流程为例对云财务共享服务模式进行一定的研究与设计。     

Foreclosure externalities: New evidence

Policy makers have used externalities to justify government intervention in the foreclosure process. Using a new dataset that covers 15 of the largest metropolitan statistical areas in the U.S. and a novel identification strategy, this paper provides new evidence on the size and source of these externalities. Our results show that a property in distress affects the value of neighboring properties from the time when the borrower becomes seriously delinquent on the mortgage until well after the bank sells the property to a new owner. Properties with seriously delinquent loans within 0.1 miles are found to decrease transaction prices of non-distressed properties by approximately one percent on average. The spillovers are found to dissipate rapidly with distance and completely disappear one year after the bank sells the property to a new homeowner. Importantly, we find that the size of the externality is sensitive to the condition of foreclosed properties, as bank-owned properties in poor condition lower nearby transaction prices by 2.6% on average while those in good condition marginally raise prices. We argue that the measured price spillovers are physical externalities caused by a lack of property maintenance and not pecuniary externalities that reflect local supply or demand shocks.     

Underperformance of Actively Managed Portfolios: Some Behavioral Insights

Abstract

Two glaring anomalies in investment management are apparent: (1) after fees, active portfolio managers do worse than market indices, and (2) clients continue to pay for services they don’t receive. The purpose of this paper is to offer explanations of these anomalies from a behavioral perspective. We explore some of the cognitive biases that perpetuate active management and subsequent underperformance, including herding, disposition, and endowment effects, as well as conservatism and status quo biases, overconfidence, and agency problems. Investors’ continued use of active managers despite persistent disappointing returns is attributed to being victims of framing effect, hot-hand fallacy, lack of knowledge as well as intimidation or insecurity, and status quo bias. We propose some ways that portfolio managers and investors could improve their decision making.