基于COSO模式的国有商业银行内部控制评价模型研究

内部控制是商业银行的一项重要管理活动,是商业银行实现风险管理的有效手段。根据COSO的思想,我国商业银行的内部评价体系可分为五个控制要素,即控制环境、风险评估、控制活动、信息与交流、监督和评审。借助于探索性因子分析和验证性因子分析的双因子检验方法,通过对我国国有商业银行内部控制活动的数据调查,可以对基于COSO模式的国有商业银行内部控制评价模型进行经验性分析,以揭示我国国有商业银行内部控制活动中的成效及不足之处,为加强我国商业银行内部控制、大幅度提高内部控制效率提供可靠的理论借鉴。     

审计委员会、独立董事监管效果研究——来自财务舞弊的证据

本文是对我国监管部门2001年以来提出的在上市公司建立独立董事和审计委员会的执行效果研究。通过对沪深两市2002~2004年51家舞弊公司进行配对研究发现审计委员会在我国自2002~2004年的执行效果显著于独立董事。为此文章提出了一些政策建议。     

基于博弈的审计委员会治理效应分析

审计委员会制度建设表面上的繁荣与实质上的治理弱化，是当前我国上市公司治理改革中亟待解决的一个新问题。我们在解释我国审计委员会治理弱化制度成因的基础上，借助一个简单的博弈分析框架，提出通过激励约束机制的实施，即加大对审计委员会“不尽职”的惩罚力度，可以降低上市公司内部控制人“侵占”的概率，从而在一定程度上解决内部控制人与股东等利益相关者之间的代理问题。     

企业管理当局会计政策选择行为的博弈分析

由于人力资本产权不明确,公司治理结构的不健全,加之外部竞争市场的不完善,期权作为一种激励方式并不能真正反映人力资本的价值.在信息不对称的情况下,管理当局作为理性经济人,很可能为自身利益而选择歪曲会计政策的行为.本文运用博弈论的分析方法,对管理当局会计政策选择与审计委员会、外部竞争市场的博弈进行分析,并借助博弈分析的结论对公司内外治理提出几点建议.     

薪酬委员会提高了公司薪酬业绩敏感度吗？

薪酬委员会的目标之一是为上市公司制定良好的薪酬制度,使经理层与股东利益一致,从而提升公司价值。我国引入的薪酬委员会制度能实现该目标吗？文章选择2002--2006年上市公司自愿设立薪酬委员会作为研究样本,就有效契约论和经理人权力理论对薪酬委员会制度是否有助于提高公司薪酬业绩敏感度进行了理论阐释和实证检验。研究发现：（1）自愿设立薪酬委员会的上市公司的高管薪酬越高,薪酬业绩敏感度越低;（2）公司相对业绩水平会影响薪酬委员会的作用,尤其是相对业绩较差的公司,设立薪酬委员会显著降低了薪酬业绩敏感度;（3）市场化进程也会影响薪酬委员会的作用,市场化程度高（低）会显著增强（减弱）薪酬委员会设立对薪酬业绩敏感度的影响。研究结果表明,薪酬委员会制度的自愿设立更符合经理人权力理论,薪酬委员会的强制设立在短期内并未对提升高管薪酬业绩敏感度发挥作用。     

关于审计委员会制度的比较研究及启示

从审计委员会的组织、章程与职责等几个方面,分析了美国、英国、加拿大的审计委员会制度.为了保证我国审计委员会充分的独立性,审计委员会成员应全部由独立董事组成.应当建立一定的信息提供机制,保证审计委员会能够获得公司经营管理的第一手资料;同时,应将审计委员会制度上升为上市公司的法定要求.     

The unethical practices of accountants and auditors and the compromising stance of professional bodies in the corporate world: Evidence from corporate Nigeria

Investors in Nigeria have lost several billions of dollars through the collusion of accountants and external auditors with companies’ management and directors to falsify and deliberately overstate companies’ accounts. As a consequence of unethical practices by accountants and auditors, which have resulted in the distress or occasionally the closure of companies, some indigenous Nigerian Managing Directors of multinational corporations such as Lever Brothers Nigeria Plc and Cadbury Nigeria Plc have been sacked and replaced with expatriates. Some companies placed under receivership have also lost billions of dollars due to professional misconduct by their official receivers. Contrary to the claim of ‘protecting the public interest,’ accountants and auditors may be partly responsible for cases of distress and closure of companies and banking institutions in Nigeria. However, the various Statutory Provisions and Acts relating to companies and professional bodies all place the responsibility on the accountants and auditors to detect and report to the regulators cases of suspected fraud and accounting malpractice. Through detailed consideration of cases of fraud, falsifications and deliberate overstatement of companies’ accounts, this paper examines the claim that the professional bodies are capable of protecting the public interest. It utilizes archival documents to provide evidence that suggests professional misconduct by accountants, particularly the members of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN). The paper provides further evidence that ICAN has been reluctant to either investigate or sanction its erring members. The paper posits that the reluctance or inability of the ICAN's “Investigation and Disciplinary Machinery” to either investigate or discipline the erring accountants and auditors suggests that whether by design or default, the ICAN's “Investigation and Disciplinary Machinery” operates to shield the activities of its erring members in accountancy firms from critical scrutiny.     

Impact of family dominance on monitoring of earnings management by audit committees: Evidence from Hong Kong

This study examines whether the establishment of audit committees by Hong Kong firms would constrain earnings management, especially in firms with family-dominated corporate boards, a condition unique to Hong Kong. The study uses the methodology of three-stage (3SLS) regression analyses to control for endogeneity among earnings management, voluntarily established audit committee, and corporate board size. The results of regression analyses based on 523 observations for the period of 1999-2000 when the audit committees were first established by Hong Kong firms show that overall audit committees play a significant role in constraining earnings management even in the business environment of higher ownership concentration. The effectiveness of audit committees is, however, significantly reduced when family members are present on corporate boards, especially when family members dominate the corporate board.     

商业银行操作风险度量问题思考

操作风险日益受到专家学者的关注,新巴塞尔协议规定操作风险为银行业面临的三大风险之一。操作风险的种类主要有内部欺诈、外部欺诈;雇员活动和工作场所安全问题;客户、产品和业务活动问题;实物资产的损坏;业务中断和系统错误、执行、交付和过程管理等九类。操作风险度量模型主要有基本指标法、标准法、高级度量法三种方法。我国商业银行应选择适当的度量方法,建立损失数据库,加强对高级度量方法的研究,结合我国商业银行实际开发出新方法。     

What drives the liquidity of sovereign bonds when markets are under stress? An assessment of the new Basel 3 rules on bank liquid assets

The new rules on bank liquidity set by the Basel Committee require banks to hold high-quality liquid assets (HQLAs) against future cash outflows in periods of market stress. Domestic government bonds are considered to be HQLAs. To assess the appropriateness of this rule, we investigate the liquidity of European government bonds in ordinary times and in periods of market turmoil. We find that the effect of adverse market conditions on liquidity strongly depends on individual bond’s characteristics. Our evidence argues for rules on HQLAs that should constrain the eligibility of government bonds depending on their characteristics (primarily, duration and rating).