“Bring the numbers and stories together”: Valuing events

This article introduces a Valuation Studies approach, in which valuation is seen as a social practice, to studying the outcomes of events. Drawing on material gathered around the Arctic Winter Games organized in Nuuk, Greenland in 2016, we exemplify how researchers working together across disciplinary and methodological boundaries can engage together with events stakeholders in making event values knowable beyond the confines of traditional evaluation. Analytically, we use Callons’ concepts on framing and overflows to exemplify alternative outcomes of events. We argue that a valuation approach offers an iterative understanding of event outcomes which encourages economics and constructivist research to collaborate on exploring event worth and making event overflows knowable and valuable.     

试论北京奥运会后中国竞技体育的发展

目前,我国竞技体育举国体制存在着不足,竞技体育职业化不足,借鉴日、美等国的经验,我国竞技体育应调整体制,使之与社会体育均衡发展,并积极推进其产业化、商业化、职业化。     

奥运会的旅游效应分析--以悉尼奥运会及雅典奥运会为例

奥运会作为一项大型节事，会对举办地的旅游业产生重大影响。论文比较了悉尼奥运会及雅典奥运会对澳大利亚和希腊的旅游业的长期与短期效应。由于受到多方面因素的影响，悉尼奥运与雅典奥运带给所在国家的短期旅游效应有很大的不同之处。而在长期奥运旅游效应方面．这两届奥运会则有许多相同之处。     

Aggregate play and welfare in strategic interactions on networks

In recent work by Bramoullé and Kranton (2007), a model for the provision of public goods on a network was presented and relations between equilibria of such a game and properties of the network were established. This model was further extended to include games with imperfect substitutability in Bramoullé et al. (2014). The vast multiplicity of equilibria in such games along with the dramatic changes in equilibria with small changes in network structure, makes it challenging for a system planner to estimate the maximum social welfare of such a game or to devise interventions that enhance this welfare. Our main results address this challenge by providing for arbitrary networks, close approximations to the maximum social welfare and the maximum aggregate play in terms of only network characteristics such as the maximum degree and independence number. For the special case when the underlying network is a tree, we derive formulas which use only the number of nodes and their degrees. These results allow a system planner to assess aggregate outcomes and design interventions for the game, directly from the underlying graph structure, without enumerating all equilibria of the game, thereby significantly simplifying the planner’s problem. A part of our results can be viewed as a logical extension of Pandit and Kulkarni (2018) where the maximum weighted aggregate effort of the model in Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) was characterized as the weighted independence number of the graph.     

青年奥林匹克运动会的发展前景探析

运用文献资料法和逻辑分析法对现代奥林匹克运动面临的问题和青年奥运会的发展前景进行了研究,认为青年奥林匹克运动会在对青年的教育和人才的培养以及促进奥林匹克运动的可持续发展方面将发挥重要的作用。     

西北五省滑雪场空间分异特征及其影响因素研究

西北五省区冰雪资源丰富、冰雪运动历史悠久、冰雪文化厚重,具备优越的冰雪旅游资源条件和发展基础。本文以2019年西北五省区125个滑雪场为研究对象,运用最邻近指数、核密度、空间自相关、热点分析和不均衡指数等方法,分析滑雪场空间布局分异及其影响因素。研究表明：（1）西北五省区滑雪场呈“双核心、集聚化”的空间格局特性,2个高密度区域分别为陕西中部和新疆北部地区;空间自相关性较明显,冷热点分布呈现“西北和东南热,中部区域较冷”的非随机性分布特点。（2）西北五省区滑雪场分布受多种因素影响,供给维度的核心影响因素是冰雪资源禀赋条件、交通可达性基础,消费维度的核心影响因素是社会经济发展水平、城市辐射与消费市场。据此建议西北五省区应以中国冰雪旅游新发展极为战略目标,构建“多点连片”空间发展结构,放大核心资源综合利用效率,建造多要素融合发展新模式,强化区域协作与联动发展,塑造国际化冰雪旅游品牌。     

谈北京奥运会酒店营销策略

随着我国旅游业快捷、健康的发展,酒店得到了蓬勃发展。2008年北京奥运会为我国酒店业带来了巨大的商机,针对在奥运期间,如何做好酒店产品的营销,如何及时调整营销计划、改进营销组合策略,获得更高的市场占有份额,以及开创新的营销模式,如关系营销的深化,服务营销,品牌与文化营销,网络营销等,提出若干建议和想法。     

体验营销理念在奥运火炬传递活动中的运用

体验营销反映了受众参与的概念,奥运火炬传递活动作为体育赛事的一个环节也强调了全民参与体验的重要性。本文在分析奥运火炬传递中运用体验营销理念的意义的基础之上介绍了奥运火炬传递对体验营销理念的运用。     

Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction

The backward induction (or subgame-perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game is shown to be the unique evolutionarily stable outcome for dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large.     

Ambiguity in Electoral Competition

The paper proposes an explanation to why electoral competition induces parties to state ambiguous platforms even if voters dislike ambiguity. A platform is ambiguous if different voters may interpret it as different policy proposals. An ambiguous platform puts more or less emphasis on alternative policies so that it is more or less easily interpreted as one policy or the other. I suppose that a party can monitor exactly this platform design but cannot target its communications to individuals one by one. Each individual votes according to her understanding of the parties’ platforms but dislikes ambiguity. It is shown that this electoral competition has no Nash equilibrium. Nevertheless its max–min strategies are the optimal strategies of the Downsian game in mixed strategies. Furthermore, if parties behave prudently enough and if the voters aversion to ambiguity is small enough, these strategies do form an equilibrium.