The Capital Tax and Welfare Effects from Asymmetric Information on Equity Markets

This paper explores the implications of informational asymmetries between domestic and foreign investors for optimal capital tax rates and welfare. It adopts a model in which asymmetric information implies a home bias in equity. The paper finds that asymmetric information may raise capital tax rates by reducing the marginal cost of taxation. Furthermore, it shows that investors may gain from informational asymmetries. Although asymmetric information increases the uncertainty as perceived by investors, it may also increase tax rates and allow for a higher consumption of public goods. This reflects that asymmetric information may reduce the distortionary effects of competition among governments.     

Why Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies: The Role of Multinational Firms

This paper discusses the role of multinational firms and double taxation treaties for corporate income taxation in open economies. We show that it is optimal for a small open economy to levy positive corporate income taxes if multinational firms are taxed according to the full taxation after deduction system or the foreign tax credit system. Positive corporate taxes also occur in the asymmetric case where some countries apply the exemption system and others apply the tax credit system. If all countries apply the exemption system, the optimal corporate income tax is zero. We also show that, under tax competition, corporate income taxes are not necessarily too low from the perspective of the economy as a whole. While the undertaxation result is confirmed for the case of the exemption system, tax rates may also be inefficiently high if the deduction or the credit systems are applied.     

Assessing the international spillover effects of capital income taxation

Changes in capital taxes by one economy spill onto other economies with internationally mobile capital. We evaluate these impacts using a two-region, intertemporal general equilibrium model. The foreign economy's unilateral reduction in corporate income taxation has positive but small effects on U.S. welfare. In contrast, unilateral reductions in personal income taxation impose large negative spillovers. The differences result from CIT being source-based and PIT residence-based. The CIT cut reduces tax burdens to U.S. residents who invest abroad, while the PIT cut reduces foreigners' tax burdens only. Through general equilibrium adjustments neglected in simpler models, the PIT cut lowers U.S. residents' welfare.     

中国的经济增长、需求约束与税收结构

在我国目前的经济增长中,出现了投资需求过热而消费需求不足的结构性失衡状况。为此,可以把税收结构引入汉森-萨缪尔森模型,来研究税收结构对投资和消费的影响。通过实证研究发现,在税收结构中,流转税(间接税)比重的增加对投资增长有激励作用,而对边际消费倾向没有显著影响;所得税和其他税(代表了直接税)比重的增加,有利于抑制投资和过快的经济增长,相反,可以提高边际消费倾向,从而促进消费。     

税收正义刍论

税收正义是当前税制改革的前提规范。一个税收体制公正合理性的基础是平等课税、公平税负、效能化税收的真正体现。构建社会主义“和谐社会”需要一个公正合理的税收制度的支撑,需要一个真正实现了程序正义、结果正义和制度正义的税收体制的建构。因而,现代税收制度的建构呼吁税收正义的实现。     

税务行政处罚的法理探析

法学意义上的税收是一种金钱给付关系。关于税收的法律关系性质有权利关系说和债务关系说两种观点,不同观点之下对于税务行政处罚的法理有不同的分析。事实上,国家和纳税人之间是一种公法意义上的债权债务关系,税务行政处罚是国家对纳税人不按时履行税收合约的一种惩罚。     

论税收撤销权

税务机关如何正确行使撤销权,有关的法律规定过于简单。因而,需要从理论和实践相结合的角度对税收撤销权的成立要件、税收撤销权的行使及效力、税收撤销权的冲突等问题给予明确,以期对税收实践有所裨益。     

The Taxation of Banking in an Integrating Europe

The banking sector is subject to explicit taxation and to bank regulation and supervision with quasi-fiscal implications. The assignment of national fiscal policy rights and duties regarding international banks in the EU varies with the fiscal instrument and with whether the international bank owns foreign branches or subsidiaries. Decentralized national policy-making in the EU gives rise to fiscal burdens on banks that differ internationally and with the national origin of banks in the same country. This paper discusses the international aspects of the overall fiscal regime facing banks in the EU and it evaluates some avenues for reform.     

Testing for Vertical Fiscal Externalities

The purpose of this paper is to design a test of whether the vertical external effects associated with tax base sharing among local and regional governments have become internalized via the intergovernmental transfer system. Such tests are important in the sense that the income tax rates chosen by different levels of government will generally be correlated, even if the resource allocation is optimal from society's point of view. By using panel data for the Swedish local and regional public sectors, the results imply that an increase in the regional income tax rate induces the municipalities in the region to decrease their income tax rates. In addition, we are able to reject the null hypothesis that the vertical external effects have become internalized.