The new Capital Accord and banks’ lending decisions

Capital requirements (‘pillar one’ of the new Capital Accord) rising with the increase in borrowers’ PDs were thought as being likely: (i) to have a serious impact on the financing of small and medium-sized enterprises (usually riskier than large corporates) and (ii) to increase the procyclicality of the supply of credit.

The aim of this paper is to provide an empirical evaluation of the possible impact of the new Accord proposals on the lending policies of Italian banks. We compare the interest rate charged to a large set of Italian firms with the cost brought about by the change in the calculation of capital requirements. Since the two variables move together in response to an increase in borrowers’ PDs, we conclude that the new regulatory approach to measuring capital adequacy appears consistent with banks’ own risk evaluations. This result is supported by a ‘stress testing’ exercise: the relationship also holds in a distressed economic scenario, which replicates the financial conditions of the Italian corporate sector in the 1993–1994 recession.     

借款陈述会影响借款成本和借款成功率吗？——基于网络借贷陈述的文本分析

本文以Prosper网络借贷平台上2007年12月至2012年2月的交易数据为样本,从文本分析的视角对比研究利率形成机制变动前后借款陈述对借款成功率和实际借款利率的影响。实证表明:在利率竞拍模式下信用等级越低的借款人越倾向于提供借款陈述,借款陈述的迷雾指数和文本长度都与借款成功率呈现“倒U型”关系,并与实际借款利率存在线性正相关关系;其次,在固定利率模式下,借款利率与借款陈述长度存在显著的“U型”关系,与迷雾指数只表现出线性正相关关系;最后,在两种利率模式下借款人提供借款陈述都能降低借款成本,但是不一定能增加借款成功率,且信用等级较低的借款人提供借款陈述对借贷行为的影响更大。     

浅析对等网络中资源定位技术

对等网络资源定位技术发展迅速,给传统的web搜索技术带来了很大的冲击。本文介绍了P2P的定义、资源定位模型,并以P2P系统的拓扑结构为线索,对现有各种P2P搜索算法进行总结和比较,并对P2P的发展进行了展望。     

论产出分布对团体贷款还款率的影响

关于团体贷款的现有研究对于还款率在时间上和空间上的差异还不能够给出有说服力的解释。通过构造一个产出信息不对称下的五人还款博弈模型 ,我们从产出在成员之间的分布的角度解释这种差异。我们的模型表明了产出在成员间的分布状况可以成为导致这种差异的重要力量 ,同时也加深了我们对团体贷款还款阶段各种影响因素的理解     

利率调整对股票价格的短长期效应研究

股票市场在资本市场中扮演重要角色,基准利率的利率调整是货币当局调控股票市场的重要工具。本文从定性和定量两个角度研究基准利率的利率调整对股票价格变动的短长期影响。本文采用Granger因果检验对存款基准利率的调整与上证指数的变动的关系进行研究,结果发现二者不存在因果关系。     

中小企业贷款利率偏高的理论解释与经验证据

现有贷款定价理论一般认为商业银行应该对中小企业贷款实行高定价以实现当期收益最大化,却对中小企业后续业务价值缺乏考虑。本文认为后续业务价值可以用期权收益表示,进而利用期权定价方法构建了同时考虑当期收益和期权收益的贷款定价模型,并以广东省某股份制商业银行2011年中小企业贷款数据为基础进行了实证应用与比较。分析结果表明,当前市场条件下商业银行没有综合考虑中小企业贷款后期权风险与价值的合理匹配,商业银行对中小企业短期贷款利率水平偏高,而长期贷款又过度集中于传统行业并有定价偏低迹象。总体而言,商业银行高估了中小企业短期贷款风险制定了较高贷款利率,这可能超过了中小企业融资负担承受能力,并进一步阻碍中小企业发展壮大与商业银行后续业务拓展。     

公开竞标的贷款定价方式对P2P借贷平台的优化作用

P2P借贷是一种金融创新模式,将互联网技术与民间借贷相结合。互联网信贷的巨大需求推动P2P借贷平台的爆发式发展,而P2P借贷发展核心的两个问题是信用评级和风险定价。由于我国未完全实现利率市场化,P2P平台采用的是量化借款人信息的方式计算贷款利率。信息不对称导致P2P平台的贷款利率不能充分反映借款人风险,同时造成信誉良好的借款人不能获得低成本的贷款。文章利用拍卖机制模型对公开竞标的贷款定价方式进行探究,认为公开竞标方式可以改善信息披露,降低借款人的成本,借款人和投资人在公开竞标的贷款定价方式下都可以获得灵活的选择空间,从而提高借贷成功的比例。     

房价波动、银行信贷与经济增长

运用联立方程模型、面板分析技术及省际面板数据研究发现,我国房价波动、银行信贷与经济增长之间具有紧密的联系.分区域的实证研究结果显示:各地区房价的上涨与金融支持有关,过度的金融支持使东中部地区的房价偏离了经济基本面;中西部地区房价的上涨对银行信贷的扩张有显著影响,而经济增长是各地区促进银行信贷扩张的共同因素.此外,房价的上涨与银行信贷的扩张共同促进了我国各区域经济的繁荣.     

Deposit insurance and credit union lending

We exploit an exogenous change in the coverage of insured deposits following the passage of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (2008) to investigate the impact of deposit insurance on the volume, composition and quality of credit union lending. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find changes in the volume, composition and riskiness of credit union lending. Specifically, we find that affected credit unions increase total and unsecured lending, leading to a decline in loan quality. Overall, our results suggest that an increase in the maximum coverage of insured deposits induces credit unions to lend more at the expense of loan quality.     

Blessing or curse? Government funding of deposit insurance and corporate lending

A key policy to limit the possibility of bank runs is an explicit deposit insurance scheme, which can be either privately or government funded. Using syndicated loans from 63 countries during the period 1985–2016, we study the effect of government involvement in deposit insurance funding on price and non-price characteristics of loans. We show that changes from purely private-funded to either government-funded or jointly funded deposit insurance increase all-in-spread-drawn by approximately 4.6 %, further increase loan fees, decrease loan maturity, and increase the use of performance pricing provisions. Our findings are consistent with the moral hazard problem behind government-funded deposit insurance schemes.