Does banks’ dual holding affect bank lending and firms’ investment decisions? Evidence from China

This study investigates the effect of banks’ dual holding on bank lending and firms’ investment decisions using a sample of listed firms in China. We find that dual holding leads to easier access to bank loans, a result that is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than SOEs. We also find that dual holding distorts banks’ lending decisions and harms the investment efficiency for SOEs, while resulting in optimal lending decisions and enhanced investment efficiency for non-SOEs. For non-SOEs, further analysis suggests that optimal lending decisions and efficient investment can be achieved for firms with higher ownership concentration, and firms in which the family and foreign investors are the controlling shareholders. We argue that, in emerging markets, whether a bank plays a monitoring role by directly holding the debt and equity claims of companies relies heavily on whether the potential collusion between firm executives and bank managers can be averted, which in turn is determined by the firms’ governance framework and ownership structure.     

Risky bank lending and countercyclical capital buffers

We study the properties of a monetary economy with an essential role for risky bank lending. Banks issue deposits and lend to entrepreneurs. Because banks׳ lending rate cannot be made contingent on aggregate shocks, and because banks face capital adequacy regulations, they require a capital buffer against loan losses. Capital adequacy regulations are modeled on the Basel-III rules, including a minimum capital adequacy ratio, an endogenous capital conservation buffer, and a countercyclical capital buffer. We find that a countercyclical capital buffer leads to a significant increase in welfare. It also reduces the need for countercyclical adjustments in policy interest rates.     

The effect of auditors’ internal control opinions on loan decisions

We examine the effect of internal control reports on lending officers’ assessments of a company’s creditworthiness. We suggest that an adverse internal control opinion can undermine the assurance provided by an unqualified opinion on financial statements taken as a whole and have a negative affect on lenders’ assessments. In addition, we investigate whether auditor size plays a role in determining the effect on lenders’ judgments.     

Information, Credit Risk, Lender Specialization and Loan Pricing: Evidence from the DIP Financing Market

We provide an empirical support for theories of lender specialization using the recently developed market for Debtor-in-Possession (DIP) financing. The legal environment in which DIP financing operates represents a natural laboratory for testing determinants of lending specialization (e.g. lender choice). We find that the choice of lender is not driven by credit risk, but by information considerations and that this lending specialization has loan pricing effects. In short, banks (non-bank lenders) lend to more (less) transparent firms and at lower (higher) loan spreads. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that banks provide important and useful services.

The role of bankers in the U.S. syndicated loan market

I construct a novel dataset of individual bankers in the U.S. syndicated loan market to analyze the impact of bankers for the largest, most transparent borrowers. Bankers exhibit time-invariant preferences for specific loan characteristics, or styles. In addition, exploiting within-borrower variation in personal relationship strength from banker turnover, I find that stronger relationships lead to significantly lower interest rates. This effect is stronger if borrowers lack a credit rating or issue less frequent and shorter horizon management reports. Relationship loans are associated with fewer bankruptcies and fewer favorable modifications in renegotiations.     

“小银行优势”的理论突破与实践新进展

传统的理论观点认为小银行在中小企业信贷方面具有比较优势,并且主要依赖关系信贷技术,而大银行在开展中小企业信贷方面,存在着信息不对称、组织规模不利于软信息传递等方面的劣势。但近年来的理论与实践置疑传统观点的正确性。学术界认为,实施新资本协议、信贷技术的提升以及大型银行的优势,使得其开展中小企业信贷将比中小银行更具有优势。在中小企业信贷的国际实践中,新加坡淡马锡、美国富国银行、印尼金融银行等大型金融机构以及美国硅谷银行、孟加拉格莱珉银行等中小银行在中小企业信贷方面已经获得巨大的发展,并已形成各具特色的业务模式。中国银行业已经开始重视中小企业信贷业务的发展,可以从中学习与借鉴国外银行业的发展经验。     

P2P借款人的定价偏差与被动违约风险——基于“人人贷”数据的分析

本文主要通过行为资产定价理论和"人人贷"2014-2018年的数据,研究网络借贷(P2P)借款人定价偏差的影响因素及其与被动违约风险之间的关系。定价偏差是将P2P借贷利率分解为效率部分和无效率部分,并通过成本随机前沿模型得到。结果表明:借款人定价存在显著偏差且在不同群体间有所差异;借款人的粉饰行为未能起到减小定价偏差的作用,甚至会起到反效果;当借款人的声誉成本高于还款成本时,此时的违约主要表现为被动违约;即使借款人主观还款意愿强烈,但定价偏差越大,借款人剩余收入就越吃紧,还款过程中逾期次数和欠债比例增加的可能性就越大,进而引发被动违约风险。     

日本"消金三恶"与治理研究

日本经济高速发展期间,贷金业对扩大内需、提升消费率、推动经济增长意义积极.由于贷金业长期未被纳入正规金融体系,加之监管缺位,过高利率、多重借贷和暴力追债的"消金三恶"日渐猖獗,导致消费者福利损失.在"消金被害者运动"推动下,日本形成了有效的"消金三恶"治理模式,包括政府制定和完善<贷金业法>,设立多重债务者对策本部,设立贷金业协会负责具体监管等.我国消金市场发展可借鉴日本经验,重视地下金融阳光化、最高利率限制和多重债务有所调整、金融消费者保护以及"现代的贫穷"等问题.     

Lending Relationships,Bank Default and Economic Activity

The paper reviews contributions in the literature, which lend theoretical and empirical credibility to the idea that the banking relationship is valuable and important for the firm. Banks offer a lending relationship as the solution to the firm's ongoing credit needs. Bank default disrupts this relationship. Hence risk in the banking sector influences the value of the relationship, the cost of corporate finance, and the level and growth of real activity. As bank default is often the result of fraud and internal irregularities, it is hard to predict. Bank default affects the economy through a number of different channels. The loss of the relationship, benefit for the firm is an important route through which the health of the banking sector influences real activity.     

关于央行对民间借贷监管制度的完善与创新研究

民间借贷已成为融资的重要渠道之一,而我国却还没有关于民间借贷的专门性法律法规,已有的规定相当混乱,导致由民间借贷不仅很难有效控制,而且有可能带来系统性的金融风险,特别是近年来全球性的经济危机,更加剧了这些纠纷的出现,本文探讨一些可行的监管措施,用以解决由民间借贷引起的纠纷,这对于促进民间借贷健康有序的发展及社会的稳定有着重大的现实意义。