Double Moral Hazard,Monitoring, and the Nature of Contracts

generalized double-sided moral-hazard model, with risk-averse parties who mutually monitor each other (to get a reasonable idea of outcome/effort). The model considers trade-off between monitoring costs and moral hazard costs, which are endogenously determined by the extent of monitoring. Using this model, we formally prove a generalized version of Coase's conjecture – that the optimal contract minimizes the agency and risk costs. We then show how varying assumptions about the feasibility or cost of monitoring of the outcome or the worker's effort lead to different contracts being optimal. The analysis is then used to explain the nature of contracts observed in practice under many different situations. We will give an explanation as to why industrial workers typically work under wage contracts, while share contracts are common in agriculture and will explain why profit sharing is more common for senior managers than for the production workers. Received September 19, 2000; revised version received October 30, 1997     

企业高技能型人才培养机制构建新探

随着科学技术的高速发展,我国工业企业高技能型人才出现了严重的短缺现象,应引起有关部门及企业界人士的高度重视.培养大批高级专业技术人才与高级技工人才有利于增强企业的竞争能力,应针对高技能型人才的目前状况,确定相应的培养途径和措施.     

Punishment,counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment

We present the results of an experiment that explores the sanctioning behavior of individuals who experience a social dilemma. In the game we study, players choose contribution levels to a public good and subsequently have multiple opportunities to reduce the earnings of the other members of the group. The treatments vary in terms of individuals’ opportunities to (a) avenge sanctions that have been directed toward themselves, and (b) punish others’ sanctioning behavior with respect to third parties. We find that individuals do avenge sanctions they have received, and this serves to decrease contribution levels. They also punish those who fail to sanction third parties, but the resulting increase in contributions is smaller than the decrease the avenging of sanctions induces. When there are five rounds of unrestricted sanctioning, contributions and welfare are significantly lower than when only one round of sanctioning opportunities exists, and welfare is lower than at a benchmark of zero cooperation. We thank James Andreoni, participants in seminars at Emory University, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University of New South Wales, the University of Sydney, Deakin University, the 2004 North American Regional Meetings of the ESA in Tucson, Arizona, USA, the 2004 IMEBE Meetings in Cordoba, Spain, and the 2005 SAET meetings in Vigo, Spain, for constructive and helpful comments. We thank Elven Priour for programming and organization of the sessions. Instructions for the experiment are available from the authors.     

中国居民物质性消费与收入关系及其空间特征

对1993年起中国开始步入过剩经济时代进行了实证分析，给出了沿海与内地城镇及农村居民物质性消费与收入的恩格尔函数及其特征；在收入－消费关系空间特征分析的基础上，指出居民消费倾向内地高于沿海，内地城镇高于农村。最后从居民物质性消费与收入关系及空间特征角度讨论了现阶段加速中西部地区发展的必要性与合理性。     

资本市场变迁及运行效率相关研究评析

资本市场变迁及运行效率是中外学者研究的重点，形成了许多理论流派，其中信息空间理论为资本市场制度变迁提供了新的分析框架。同时，中国资本市场正处在发展建设之中，亟需有效的理论指导其发展。然而，中国资本市场的不完备性和特殊性导致诸多理论的应用存在局限性。而信息是各理论流派研究的核心，只是角度和侧重点不同，故信息空间理论可为研究资本市场变迁和制度选择提供新的研究思路。     

Non-commitment in performance evaluation and the problem of information distortions

Auditing is modeled in a sequential game without commitment. The manager must decide whether and where to audit a worker's output, taking into account all interim information he has obtained. The worker will work just hard enough (and show it) to divert the manager from making an audit or cover up, withholding information about his work to make an audit more difficult. This usually raises the costs of setting work incentives, so incentives are softened, sometimes drastically. Moreover, when a worker's on-the-job information is valuable for entrepreneurial decisions, work incentives must be softened to improve the internal flow of information.     

R＆D、R＆D溢出、内生增长和内生收敛

根据强调知识与技术创新、知识与技术溢出重要性的当代内生增长理论，本文建立了一个将R＆D和R＆D溢出与资本积累之间、R＆D和R＆D溢出与总产出增长之间直接关联起来的动态模型。面板数据协整检验实证分析结果表明R＆D和R＆D溢出与资本积累之间、R＆D和R＆D溢出与总产出增长之间分别存在显著的正面长期协整关联。进一步的分析表明，R＆D与资本积累之间、R＆D与总产出增长之间分别存在显著的长期双向格兰杰因果关系。由此观知，R＆D乃长期经济增长源泉之所在。另一方面，尽管资本积累或总产出增长并不格兰杰导致R＆D溢出，证据表明R＆D溢出格兰杰导致资本积累和总产出增长。这种由R＆D溢出到资本积累和总产出增长的单向格兰杰因果关系意味着尽管知识与技术的跨国传播并非必然发生。其实为世界经济增长的重要动力。     

上市公司资产减值方向信息含量研究——来自沪深两市2003年的经验证据

我国新颁布的《企业会计准则第8号——资产减值》规定,存货等已确认的资产减值不得转回。针对新准则对资产减值单向计提的规定,本文从资产减值准备计提方向研究上市公司资产减值的信息含量,发现资产减值的计提方向存在信号显示作用。这表明资产减值准备方向传递了公司未来前景的信息,全面取缔资产减值准备的转回将减少资产减值的部分信息含量。     

企业会计信息质量政府监管研究

会计信息质量的重要性不言而喻,加强对会计信息质量的管理,要充分利用政府的管理职能,发挥政府管理职能的作用,提高会计信息质量水平,从而为经济的健康发展提供保证.     

品牌经营:旅行社竞争之发展战略

品牌是旅行社竞争力的核心，而我国旅行社目前缺乏品牌经营意识和科学管理，且市场化进程缓慢。因而要通过建立现代企业制度、实行科学管理、提高员工素质等措施来加强旅行社的品牌经营，提高其竞争力。