“五年规划”该规划什么,不该规划什么?

在市场经济条件下，政府制定规划的基本作用与思路为“研判未来趋势，提出发展愿景，规划政府任务”，对市场进行“负面清单管理”，对政府进行“正面清单约束”。政府应提高治理能力，努力把自己该做的事做足、做好，少搞产业政策，减少对市场干预，做真正体现小政府、大市场、由市场起决定性作用的规划。     

On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games

We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. It turns out that several axiomatizations of the Shapley value on the class of all TU-games do not characterize this solution on the class of assignment games. However, when considering an assignment game as a (communication) graph game where the game is simply the assignment game and the graph is a corresponding bipartite graph where buyers (sellers) are connected with sellers (buyers) only, we show that Myerson’s component efficiency and fairness axioms do characterize the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. Moreover, these two axioms have a natural interpretation for assignment games. Component efficiency yields submarket efficiency stating that the sum of the payoffs of all players in a submarket equals the worth of that submarket, where a submarket is a set of buyers and sellers such that all buyers in this set have zero valuation for the goods offered by the sellers outside the set, and all buyers outside the set have zero valuations for the goods offered by sellers inside the set. Fairness of the graph game solution boils down to valuation fairness stating that only changing the valuation of one particular buyer for the good offered by a particular seller changes the payoffs of this buyer and seller by the same amount.     

A game theoretic approach to optimize multi-stakeholder utilities for land acquisition negotiations with informality

To combat the critical stresses of rising urbanization, the government acquires land from private owners using the power of eminent domain. This land assembly causes negative externalities such as increasing social tension and injustice that may impose a long-term threat to stability and sustainable development. Therefore, there is a need to make the land acquisition process more transparent and just. Considering the unique Indian context where informality has a strong presence, we propose an approach based on game theory that models the bargain through a three-stage Nash equilibrium game. Four agents – the government, the private developer, the landowner, and the free rider – are considered. We provide conditional solutions for the generalizable Case and proceed to model different stakeholder behavior patterns through two utility functional forms – linear and exponential. In the linear case, we find that the free rider obtains half of the revenue of the project, whereas the landowner gains between one-fourth and one-half of the revenue. Thus, we highlight the undeniably crucial role free riders play in land acquisition negotiations. However, closed form solutions cannot be obtained for the exponential form, due to which we use simulations to demonstrate a solution procedure. We conclude by stating that the proposed model can be useful in formulating future land policies in a sustainable and inclusive manner, with optimal utility derivations for all concerned stakeholders. Our model can also be extended to other spatial contexts where informality features heavily in the land market, especially in the Global South.     

Cost-sharing in directed networks: Experimental study of equilibrium choice and system dynamics

This study reports the results of an experiment on directed networks with positive externalities induced by cost-sharing. Subjects participated in a network game in which they had to choose between private and public transportations. If a player chose public transportation, then she shared the travel cost equally with other players making the same choice, whereas if she chose private transportation, then her travel cost was fixed. Travel costs on the private route were manipulated across the two experimental conditions. In one condition, these costs were homogeneous among players; in the other condition, they were heterogeneous among players and only privately known. We found that half (none) of the player groups in the homogeneous (heterogeneous) condition converged toward the efficient equilibrium. Examination of the system dynamics shows that convergence toward efficiency was facilitated by: (1) the existence of an intermediate equilibrium choice; and (2) strategic teaching by which a farsighted player chooses strategies with poor short-term payoff in order to shift group decisions to the efficient equilibrium and thereby increase her own long-term benefit.     

地方政府政策变迁对跨国公司企业社会责任的影响

笔者运用合作博弈的谈判模型研究地方政府政策对跨国公司企业社会责任合约的影响。模型推导出在宽松、适度、严格三种政策下,地方政府收益最大时对跨国公司社会责任履行合约的取值要求,研究认为政策的选择取决于地方政府谈判成本大小和声誉损失系数以及跨国公司在当地的社会责任履行成本系数,并就三种政策下跨国公司企业社会责任的影响因素进行分析。     

The promise and peril of dynamic targeted pricing

Dynamic pricing is widely adopted in many industries, such as travel and insurance. These industries are also gaining extensive capabilities in identifying and segmenting customers, partly fueled by the increasing availability of data. It is natural to ask whether firms should take advantage of such developments by charging different prices to different customer segments. If so, under what conditions? We seek answers to these highly managerially relevant questions.We consider a market with two customer segments served by a monopolist. The monopolist can choose among a set of pricing strategies to exploit consumers’ inter-temporal preferences and/or inter-segment variations. At one end of the spectrum, the firm can charge a constant price to all customers, which is called static pricing. At the other end of the spectrum, the firm can charge different prices to different customer segments and vary these prices over time, which is referred to as dynamic targeted pricing. We systematically compare these alternative pricing strategies. We show that dynamic pricing without targeting can be more effective than static targeted pricing when customers are not very forward looking, which corroborates the findings in the empirical literature. Interestingly, we find that the monopolist can be worse off when she adopts targeting in addition to dynamic pricing. We conduct laboratory experiments to test several key model predictions. The studies show that individuals behave in a manner consistent with the predictions of our model.     

Constructive deviance as a driver for performance in retail

A growing body of research is concerned with deviance in the workplace. While much research has explored negative forms of deviance, we examine constructive deviance: behaviour that deviates from salient norms and benefits the reference group. We empirically explore manifestations, determinants and performance outcomes of constructive deviance in standardised work processes. We do this through a mixed-methods study in bakery trading departments of an Australian retailer. We illustrate that constructive deviance occurs in these settings and show that some manifestations of constructive deviance improve organisational performance and pave the way for applying constructive deviance as a strategic tool in retail.     

Delivery leadtime and channel structure decisions for make-to-order duopoly under different game scenarios

We develop game-theoretic models to explore the quoted delivery leadtime, price, and channel structure decisions for a make-to-order duopoly system under three game scenarios. Under the integrated-manufacturer first scenario, we find that (i) decentralization of the supply chain increases quoted leadtime; and (ii) both manufacturers may choose different channel structures under symmetric duopoly. By comparing with the symmetric scenario and the retailer first scenario, we find that a manufacturer facing a decentralized rival adopts decentralization when leadtime sensitivity, leadtime cost, and price elasticity are very small; the effect of decentralization on quoted leadtime largely depends on game scenario.     

Remembered experiences and revisit intentions: A longitudinal study of safari park visitors

Tourism is an experience-intensive sector in which customers seek and pay for experiences above everything else. Remembering past tourism experiences is also crucial for an understanding of the present, including the predicted behaviours of visitors to tourist destinations. We adopt a longitudinal approach to memory data collection from psychological science, which has the potential to contribute to our understanding of tourist behaviour. In this study, we examine the impact of remembered tourist experiences in a safari park. In particular, using matched survey data collected longitudinally and PLS path modelling, we examine the impact of positive affect tourist experiences on the development of revisit intentions. We find that longer-term remembered experiences have the strongest impact on revisit intentions, more so than predicted or immediate memory after an event. We also find that remembered positive affect is temporally unstable and declines over time.     

中国卷烟行业竞争态势分析

我国卷烟企业长期存在生产规模小、分布范围散、销售区域性强等的特点,卷烟行业始终处于一种"优不胜、劣不汰"的低水平均衡。本文从博弈的角度解释了这种现象的产生原因,并分析了我国卷烟行业的市场竞争类型,提出建立寡头垄断市场是重组卷烟企业的目标。